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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to evolutionary economic geography theory relating to the 
process of regional industrial path creation. The research provides an important point 
of departure within the literature by exposing and explaining how institutional 
environments enable or constrain path creating agency. In particular, the enquiry 
focuses on the role of multi-scalar institutions in mediating the interplay of actors, 
assets and mechanisms to create new regional industrial paths relating to socio-
technical transition, specifically offshore wind, in Glasgow and Humberside. The 
research analyses how regional and extra-regional institutional environments shape 
the timing, scale and nature of this causal interplay and subsequent industrial path 
outcomes. By adopting this approach, a more comprehensive account of regional 
industrial path creation and its effect on regional development is generated which 
gives due cognisance to both endogenous and exogenous causal factors. Although 
the research focuses on lagging regions, the findings have relevance across regional 
types. Finally, the multi-scalar and multi-actor perspective exposes and explains the 
role of differing state actors and state institutions in facilitating regional path creation.  
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Dedication 
To my beloved muse, Judith,  
my kith and kin,  
and the two exceptional places which shaped my research,  
Glasgow and Humberside. 
 
Lose ourselves in the history 
of mine and steel and ships, 
the glorious empire somewhat shaming, 
trade and tobacco lording 
over golden and red sandstone 
where the tree newer grew, 
the bird never flew, 
the fish never swam, 
the bell never rang. 
Among stones balanced on stones 
for height, splendour and fame 
ancestors linger, edge us on to chase 
dreams defying stresses and strains, 
to build stronger and grander and higher, 
resenting that the tree never grew, 
the bird never flew, 
the fish never swam, 
the bell never rang. 
Conversing with past we build our future, 
limits expand with the universe. 
Ideas from afar ebb and flow 
through windows, doors open 
for the drift into spaces between 
where trees can grow, 
birds can fly and sing, 
fish can swim, 
bells can ring, 
and the ring binds us all together.  
 IEE Lees, The Tree that Never Grew 
 
Isolate city spread alongside water, 
Posted with white towers, she keeps her face 
Half turned to Europe, lonely northern daughter, 
Holding through centuries her separate place. 
 
Behind her domes and cranes enormous skies 
Of gold and shadows build; a filigree 
Of wharves and wires, ricks and refineries, 
Her working skyline wanders to the sea. 
  
And now this stride into our solitude, 
A swallow-fall and rise of one plain line, 
A giant step for ever to include 
All our dear landscape in a new design. 
  
The winds play on it like a harp; the song, 
Sharp from the east, sun-throated from the west, 
Will never to one separate shire belong, 
But north and south make union manifest. 
   
Lost centuries of local lives that rose  
And flowered to fall short where they began 
Seem now to reassemble and unclose, 
All resurrected in this single span, 
 
Reaching for the world, as our lives do,  
As all lives do, reaching that we may give 
The best of what we are and hold as true: 
Always it is by bridges that we live. 
                                 Philip Larkin, Bridge for the Living 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“What's past is prologue.” 
Act II, Scene I: The Tempest, William Shakespeare 
1.1 Industrial Renewal and Path Creation: Bridging Theory and Policy 
In 2017, the UK Government launched a new industrial strategy (BEIS, November 
2017) which noted that “grand challenges” such as clean growth offer significant 
opportunities for regional reindustrialisation. However, the document was not 
accompanied by detail on how these opportunities could be realised. Additionally, 
although the strategy recognised the importance of “place” there was limited attention 
given to how regional heterogeneity could facilitate new regional industries and 
contribute to national industrial ambitions. This paucity is surprising given the UK’s 
increasingly quasi-federal disposition, ad hoc devolution of powers and place based 
approach to transferring national funding for economic development. Moreover, given 
that the strategy identified potential radical new opportunities for regional industrial 
renewal, such as energy transition, a lack of corresponding radicalism in re-imagining 
the role of the state in regional industrial renewal was notable.  
Tellingly, the UK Government could learn from preceding efforts to create new 
regional industries. In particular, lessons could be learnt from attempts to engender 
and harness industrial opportunities associated with socio-technical transition; the 
shift from the production, diffusion and application of one technology to another to 
fulfil a critical societal need (Geels, 2004; Markard and Truffer; 2008; Truffer and 
Coenen, 2012). For more than a decade, varying levels of government in the UK 
have prioritised energy transition, especially in regard to offshore wind, as a catalyst 
for regional industrial renewal. However the results, despite significant policy and 
resource commitments, have been mixed. Earlier projections of national and regional 
employment creation in relation to offshore wind have only been met in small 
measure1. Therefore, there are evidently key lessons to be learnt from this 
disconnect between expectation and outcome regarding the creation of new regional 
industries relating to socio-technical transition such as energy transition. 
                                               
1 ORE Catapult, 2014; Cambridge Econometrics, 2017 
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Simultaneously, as the offshore wind industry was evolving, a significant and 
compelling body of research in evolutionary economic geography was being 
developed in relation to the creation of new regional industrial paths. This research 
has provided valuable insight on how regions can utilise their heterogeneous assets 
and experiences inherited from previous economic structures and conditions to 
create new industrial paths. Such research has evident utility to regions faced with 
the challenge of finding a means to achieve industrial renewal and reorient their 
economic trajectories. Moreover, this body of work has increasingly considered the 
role of social agency in path creation. Even so, there is a paucity of research on how 
such agency is enabled or constrained by its institutional context.  
Therefore, this research assesses how regional path creation and associated social 
agency are facilitated or impeded by the institutional environment in which they are 
set. In doing so, it will utilise the experience of path creation in two regions which was 
engendered by socio-technical transition relating to decarbonisation of the energy 
system, specifically offshore wind, as its lens of analytical enquiry. The two selected 
regions are Glasgow and Humberside. Although both regions can be broadly 
characterised as lagging, there is marked variation which will facilitate comparison of 
the influence of regional heterogeneity, including assets, institutions and research 
capacity, on path creation. Moreover, while there are similarities in their broader 
institutional environments, the Glasgow case is also set within the devolved policy 
context of the Scottish Government, thereby facilitating insight into the role of 
differing extra-regional environments in mediating agency and path creation.    
Significantly, in 2014, Michael Fallon, a UK Government Minister, stated that the 
establishment of a technology and innovation body in Glasgow, Offshore Renewable 
Energy Catapult, and a Siemens manufacturing facility on Humberside represented 
key milestones for government policy in relation to the development of the offshore 
wind industry2. Therefore, both regions offer relevant entry points for understanding 
the role of UK policy on creating regional industrial paths. 
In terms of the characterisation of both regions as lagging, it is appropriate to offer 
clarification of the denotation applied in this study. Regional taxonomies such as 
lagging (Pike et al, 2007; Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011), under-performing 
(Pike et al. 2007), old industrial (Pike et al, 2010; Trippl et al, 2017) and peripheral 
                                               
2 REALPOWER: News from the wind and marine energy industries, Issue 36, Spring 2014 
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(Dawley, 2007; Hudson, 2007; Trippl et al, 2017) can be relatively fluid and 
overlapping, often obscuring observable heterogeneity between regions (and within 
them). It is a variety akin to Tolstoy’s (1999) observation that: “Happy families are all 
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” (p 1). Therefore, in this study, 
the characterisation of lagging is used in a broad sense, denoting regions that can be 
portrayed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as socio-economically disadvantaged 
in their national context. This weakness is reflected in socio-economic indicators 
such as higher levels of unemployment and economic inactivity and low household 
incomes. Additionally, longstanding consequences of adverse structural change have 
led to an over-dependence on the public sector and lower value employment and a 
deficit of knowledge intensive, higher productivity firms.       
Finally, by fusing this enquiry with my experience of developing and implementing 
economic and regional development strategies, the research aims to strengthen the 
bridge between the worlds of evolutionary economic geography and policy. It is an 
endeavour that will hopefully contribute to lessening the gap in “understanding how 
regions diversify into new growth paths and to what extent public policy may affect 
this process” (Asheim et al, 2011a, p 894). Although the research was undertaken to 
provide insight on how lagging regions could create new industrial paths and address 
a research bias towards examining regional “success stories” (Pike et al, 2007, p 
1260), lessons will have a relevance across regional types.  
1.2 Agency and Enabling and Constraining Environments: A Missing Link    
As noted, evolutionary economic geography has made notable progress in refining 
path theory and concepts over the last decade. In particular, Martin’s model of local 
industrial evolution (2010) represents a key contribution in conceptualising path 
creation and development as a dynamic and open process. In turn, the model has 
encouraged greater analysis of the role of social agency in path creation (Dawley, 
2013; Steen, 2016; Evenhuis, 2017). Such research represents a welcome departure 
from more deterministic accounts of regional industrial change (Stam and Garnsey, 
2009). In addition, subsequent enquiry has offered greater specificity of path 
evolutionary processes; for instance in regard to the nature of related actors, assets 
and mechanisms and their interplay (Asheim, 2011a; Kasabov and Sundaram, 2016; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018).     
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Martin’s (2010) contention that industrial change is caused by gradual, endogenous 
firm-led agency is a position advanced in subsequent research (Neffke et al, 2011; 
Martin and Sunley, 2014a). However, this contention limits its applicability and utility 
to the circumstances often found in lagging regions. Moreover, although Martin 
alludes to the notion that some environments are more conducive to path creation 
than others, limited detail is offered. Strikingly, it is a gap that has largely endured in 
the literature, despite some notable exceptions (Dawley, 2013; MacKinnon et al, 
2018).   
Therefore, my research addresses these theoretical shortcomings by analysing the 
process of path creation and related agency in lagging regions, whilst recognising its 
pertinence to other regional types. In particular, the research investigates the nature 
of enabling and constraining environments for path creating agency. Moreover, given 
the prominence accorded to institutions for incentivising and dis-incentivising actors, 
a central aspect of this analysis pertains to the role of institutions in promoting and 
mediating the agency of path actors over time. In addition, the research responds to 
calls for greater cognisance of the interplay of exogenous and endogenous forces on 
path creation (Boschma et al, 2017; Pike et al, 2017) and the role of non-firm actors, 
especially the state, (Dawley et al, 2015) by adopting a multi-scalar and multi-actor 
perspective. By giving greater regard to the state in path creation, recent calls for 
reconsidering the role of policy and state actors in regional industrial renewal can be 
addressed (Martin et al, 2015; Pike et al, 2016a). 
Furthermore, the research considers how the institutional mediation of path creating 
agency regulates the scale, character and timing of regional path creation. Therefore, 
the avenue of investigation accommodates consideration of how new industrial paths 
can counter long standing regional weaknesses and contribute to wider regional 
development.   
1.3 Aims and Research Questions 
The research has three central aims of enquiry, framed by a desire to enhance 
understanding of how socio-technical transition, in this case relating to offshore wind, 
can engender regional industrial path creation and regional renewal. These are to: 
 Further unpack the open and conditional nature of path creation and the 
associated causal interplay between actors, mechanisms and regional assets;  
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 Assess how institutional environments enable and constrain actor agency and 
its interplay with mechanisms and assets to shape the timing, scale and 
nature of path creation and outcomes; and 
 Illuminate the role of the state in path creation and generate theoretical 
insights which can inform regional and industrial policy. 
In order to both focus and drive the enquiry, three research questions are posed: 
 What are the key forms of agency that shape regional path creation? 
 How do multi-scalar institutional environments enable or constrain this 
process? 
 What is the scale and character of the resulting path and its effect on regional 
development? 
1.4 Thesis Structure  
The thesis follows a sequential structure of enquiry. It is one that reflects Coffey and 
Atkinson’s observation that “research problems, research design, data collection 
methods and analytic approaches should all be part of an overall methodological 
approach and should imply one another” (1996, p11).  
Thus, the subsequent second chapter provides a review of literature pertaining to 
evolutionary economic geography and path theory before undertaking a review of 
literature relating to the nature and role of institutions in facilitating regional economic 
and industrial change. Having framed my enquiry within the pertinent literature 
relating to regional industrial path creation, the chapter subsequently presents the 
analytical framework for guiding my empirical enquiry.  
The third chapter details the research methodology. In doing so, the chapter explains 
the bespoke case study approach and the selection of the cases of regional industrial 
path creation (offshore wind paths in Glasgow and Humberside). The chapter then 
turns to detailing the mixed methods deployed, including an account of the empirical 
research process, before explaining the post field work analysis.   
The fourth chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it provides a contextual account of the 
wider offshore wind sector in which the Glasgow and Humberside regional industrial 
path cases are embedded. Secondly, it provides accounts of Glasgow and 
Humberside’s pre-formation regional environments, thereby temporally framing both 
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regional cases within their unique regional contexts. This dualistic conceptualisation 
of context permits illumination of exogenous and endogenous factors, such as 
sectoral and technological path dependences and historic regional path 
dependences, thus framing and informing both cases (Martin and Sunley, 2006; 
MacKinnon et al, 2009; Coenen et al, 2015; Binz et al, 2016; Boschma et al, 2017).  
The fifth and sixth chapters are case studies which explore the process of offshore 
wind path creation in Glasgow and on Humberside. Each of these chapters examines 
three sequential causal episodes of industrial path creation in the respective regions. 
By following and investigating the unfolding path creation process through space and 
time (Pike et al, 2016b), the shifting interplay of multi-actor agency and mechanisms 
in valorising regional assets can be deconstructed and the mediating role of multi-
scalar institutional environments exposed.  
The penultimate seventh chapter compares the empirical evidence across the two 
cases, framed and informed by the analytical framework. Case heterogeneity in 
terms of path assets, actors and mechanisms and their causal interplay are 
contrasted, whilst the role of multi-scalar institutional environments in enabling or 
constraining related actor agency and path outcomes are compared. 
The eighth and final chapter presents the conclusions of the research. Firstly, the 
empirical findings of the investigation are synthesised and framed within the context 
of the research questions. Secondly, key contributions to path theory are offered. 
Thirdly, implications for policy and practice in regard to regional industrial 
development are identified. Finally, promising lines for future evolutionary economic 
geography path research are identified. 
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Chapter 2: Economic Change, Path Creation and Institutions 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it reviews literature relating to regional 
industrial change and continuity, particularly pertaining to path creation theory. In 
doing so, the review recognises recent progress in evolutionary economic geography 
literature in positioning path creation as an open and dynamic process shaped by 
strategic social agency (Martin, 2010; Dawley, 2013; MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
However, a current imprecision on how institutional environments enable or constrain 
this process is identified (Dawley et al, 2015). Consequently, the review considers a 
range of literatures that can inform my research on how path creation is shaped by its 
institutional context. Secondly, based on this assessment, the chapter establishes 
the analytical framework that focuses and drives the enquiry on the nature of 
enabling and constraining institutional environments for path creation.    
The chapter is structured into three sections. The first reviews evolutionary economic 
geography literature, particularly pertaining to path theory, including the role of social 
agency in influencing path evolution (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Steen, 2016). In 
particular, Martin’s model of local industrial evolution (2010) and path branching 
theory (Boschma and Frenken, 2011) provide insights into the path creation process 
and the associated interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms (MacKinnon et al, 
2018). In response to this broad review, the second section focuses on a related 
theoretical missing link (Dawley et al, 2015) concerning how institutional 
environments enable or constrain path creating agency. Accordingly, there is 
consideration of literature that can assist in addressing this gap, primarily relating to 
the influence of institutions and institutional frameworks on industrial and regional 
change and continuity (Amin and Thrift, 1994b; Christopherson, 2002; Peck and 
Theodore, 2007; Gertler, 2010). Also given the importance accorded to novel 
knowledge in engendering economic evolution, theory pertaining to the interplay of 
institutions and innovation is considered (Asheim et al, 2011b; Cooke et al, 2004; 
Trippl et al, 2017). Additionally, in response to the literature’s predisposition to 
privilege the regional level (Lovering, 1999; Pike et al, 2017b), the review also seeks 
out multi-scalar, relational perspectives. The third and final section of the chapter, 
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presents the analytical framework based on the insights generated by the review of 
the literature. 
2.2 Evolutionary Economic Geography and Path Theory 
Although economic change is one of capitalism’s constants, traditional economics 
has often paid limited attention to the dynamics of change, preferring to adopt an 
equilibrist paradigm (Scott, 2000a; Boschma and Martin, 2007). However, in recent 
decades an evolutionary economic perspective has emerged that attempts to 
understand how the actual economy evolves over time. Witt (1997, 2006) observes 
that evolutionary economics explicitly addresses two aspects of economic change. 
Firstly, it identifies the dynamical trajectories of change over time and rejects notions 
of inevitable equilibrium, thereby recognising that economies can embark on virtuous 
upward or malignant downward spirals (Myrdal, 1957). Secondly, it contends that 
novelty is the driver of self-transformation from within. The notion of dynamic change 
over time is not a new one nor is the notion of novelty creating economic change. 
Smith (1776) referred to historic stages of development and Marx and Engels (1848) 
contended that ongoing destruction (Vernichtung) was inherent to capitalism in order 
to create wealth. This latter notion of intrinsic volatility was revisited nearly a century 
later by Schumpeter (1942) who observed that the “creative destruction” of 
innovation drives economic transformation; and that innovation is generated within 
firms. This firm-led perspective represents a common viewpoint in evolutionary 
literature, thereby marginalising the role of multi-actor, political-economic processes 
of change, such as the global shift to renewable energy (Truffer, 2014; 
Essletzbichler, 2012; Pike et al, 2017b).    
However, what differentiates evolutionary economics from other explanations of 
temporal economic change is its application of explicit evolutionary concepts. One 
approach within the school has applied the concepts of Generalised Darwinism - 
such as variety, selection and adaptation - to economic change (Witt, 2003). A 
second has adopted Complexity Theory by applying concepts such as emergence, 
self-organisation and hysteresis to micro-economic dynamics (Potts, 2000). Finally, a 
third approach has utilised the theory of Path Dependence, the concept that historical 
contingency and self-reinforcing dynamics determine evolutionary economic 
outcomes (David, 1985, 1988; Arthur 1987, 1994).  Although this literature represents 
a notable endeavour to understand how economies change over time, the 
9 
 
preponderance of economic theory to treat economies “as a wonderland of no spatial 
dimensions” (Isard, 1956, p 25) persists. In response, economic geographers have 
applied “the insights of evolutionary economics to create a distinct body of theory and 
empirical research within economic geography” (Coe, 2010, p 2). The goal of this 
“evolutionary turn” (Boschma and Martin, 2007) is twofold: firstly, to apply concepts 
and ideas from evolutionary economics and evolutionary thinking to assist 
explanation of how the economic landscape changes over historical time; and, 
secondly, to demonstrate how applying a geographical lens facilitates understanding 
of the processes that drive economic evolution and how geography determines the 
nature and trajectory of an economy’s evolution (Boschma and Martin, 2010). As with 
evolutionary economics and its antecedents, this disciplinary turn has placed 
theoretical and conceptual emphasis on the micro-behaviour of firms, thereby 
maintaining a clear link with the Schumpeterian contention that firms and 
entrepreneurs are the central agents of change (Boschma and Frenken, 2006, 2011; 
Martin 2010; Boschma and Martin, 2007, 2010). However, it is a focus that has been 
at the expense of understanding the role of other actors, such as the state (Pike et al, 
2009; Gertler, 2010; Dawley et al, 2015).   
Of the three noted schools of evolution, economic geographers have been the most 
receptive to path dependence; the notion that processes and systems are 
constrained by their history and that path outcomes are shaped by such history 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006). The adoption of this theory can be attributed to its ready 
applicability to a fundamental concern of economic geography, the issue of 
geographically uneven development (Martin and Sunley, 2013). Path dependence 
has emerged as an important framework, certainly the most important of evolutionary 
economic geography, for conceptualising and debating inertia, continuity and change 
within regional economies. Despite a lack of precision surrounding the application of 
this “irredeemably metaphorical idea” (Martin and Sunley, 2006, p 428), path 
conceptualisations are commonly adopted for theorising on the evolution of 
delineated regional industries and regional economies (Martin and Sunley, 2006, 
2014a; Boschma and Martin, 2007, 2010; Martin, 2010). Moreover, it has been 
observed that there remains limited understanding of how the latter influences the 
former, and vice versa (Grabher, 1993; Henning et al, 2013; Evenhuis, 2017). 
Similarly there remains partial comprehension of the influence of wider sectoral and 
technological path dependences on region-level path evolution given that the 
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interaction of scales remains a relatively unexplored topic (Martin and Sunley, 2006, 
2014a; Boschma et al 2017). For example, there is limited consideration of how the 
temporality and form of regional industrial path creation is shaped by the wider 
industrial system in question i.e. the underlying universal industrial form and logic 
that regulates the process of change (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006).  
Despite this shortcoming, integrating path research objects (e.g. regions, industries), 
subjects (e.g. path dependence, path creation) and levels (regional, extra-regional) 
into a holistic and integrated framework has remained embryonic and problematic 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006, 2013). The implications of this observation for my research 
design and methods will be considered in due course. Prior to this, several key 
theories relating to path dependence and path creation which underpin the research 
merit further attention.  
2.2.1  Path dependence: structure before agency    
As noted, path dependence relates to how previous events within a system increase 
the probable occurrence of future events. Three principal strands of path dependency 
theory can be identified. The concept is often associated with David’s (1985, 1988) 
assertion that technological fields become locked-in to a trajectory even when other 
technologies are available3. Alternatively, Arthur (1987, 1994) identifies dynamic 
increasing returns as a source of path dependence, whereby externalities and 
learning mechanisms produce positive feed-back mechanisms that reinforce existing 
development trajectories. Finally, North (1990) and Setterfield (1997) recognise that 
institutional and social arrangements co-evolve and become self-reinforcing, thereby 
creating institutional hysteresis. 
Building on these theories of path dependence, Martin and Sunley (2006) observe 
that institutions and technology embody the two main “carriers of history” within an 
economy. It is an observation endorsed by Gertler’s (2010) contention that 
economies “evolve along distinctive paths that are shaped by their own particular 
constellations of institutional structures” (p 3). In addition, Archer’s (1996) assertion 
that “the future is forged in the present, hammered out of the past inheritance by 
current innovation” (pxxvi) foregrounds the power of innovation in reshaping 
technological legacy and its relationship with regional change and continuity. Thus, 
                                               
3 To evidence this point, David highlighted the diffusion and retention of the QWERTY key board 
11 
 
institutions and innovation are positioned within the path dependence canon as 
primary factors of evolution.  
Tellingly, North (1990) identifies the potential for practical application of path 
dependence theory to understand the scope for change in an economy. He asserts 
that the path sets the possibilities and represents “a way to narrow conceptually the 
choice set and link decision-making through time” (p 258) and that path dependence 
“is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future” (p 259). 
North’s position infers that path trajectories are not pre-destined by inherited 
structures and, importantly for my research, opens the door to the possibilities of 
strategic social agency (Martin, 2010; Dawley, 2013; MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
However, there are shortcomings in the path dependency canon that diminishes its 
value for understanding regional economic change and the role of agency.  
Firstly, “lock-in”, a concept synonymous with path dependence, implies a more 
deterministic and constraining actuality than the possibilities for purposive agency 
that North infers (Martin and Sunley, 2006). Lock-in relates to a situation where 
“historical contingency and the emergence of self-reinforcing effects steer a 
technology, industry, or regional economy along one path rather than another” 
(Martin, 2010, p 3). There is indeed compelling empirical evidence of the lock-in 
phenomenon in recent economic history4. Even so, from a theoretical perspective 
Martin (2010) notes that lock-in sits uneasily with evolutionary economics contention 
that change is irreversible and equilibrium unachievable (Witt, 1997, 2006).  
A second related shortcoming is the contention that there is “positive path 
dependency” and “negative path dependency” (Stam and Garnsey, 2009). In the 
former, regional assets are readily combined with firm-led agency to create new 
industrial trajectories but in the latter, limited regional assets and firm-led agency 
constrain deviation from existing trajectories (Boschma, 2007). However, this 
contention produces a binary and static understanding of regional path dependence, 
which underplays the complex economic heterogeneity, including that of actors, and 
conditionality of circumstance across regions (MacKinnon et al, 2002, 2009; Pike et 
al, 2006, 2007; Dawley, 2013; McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013; Coenen et al, 
2015). Moreover, the positon does little to assist understanding of how to address 
                                               
4 For example, Scotland’s “Silicon Glen” was locked-in to lower value routinized foreign-owned IT manufacturing 
processes. Such lock-in ensured that the industry within Scotland never entered a period of cumulative 
reinforcement and qualitative re-orientation. An exogenous shock caused by the emergence of new 
manufacturing routines located in Central Europe and China rapidly reduced the industry in Scotland 
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uneven spatial development, “the fundamental concern of our discipline of 
evolutionary economic geography” (Martin and Sunley, 2013, p 32) and a key 
motivation of this research.   
A third shortcoming of path dependence relates to its theoretical contention that de-
locking is caused by an unpredictable spasmodic exogenous shock (Arthur, 1987, 
1994; David 1985, 1988, 2005; Martin and Sunley, 2006); a perspective rooted in the 
notion of cycles or waves of disruptive innovation for explaining economic change 
(Kondratiev, 1935; Schumpeter, 1942). Despite the potential validity of this position, 
there remains a paucity of research regarding the relationship between exogenous 
stimuli and regional industrial de-locking and change, notwithstanding some notable 
departures (Essletzbichler; 2012; Fornahl et al, 2012; MacKinnon et al, 2018). It is a 
deficiency at odds with a growing literature on the opportunities for disruptive socio-
technical transition to engender new industries (Markard and Truffer, 2008; 
Essletzbichler, 2012; Coenen et al, 2015). Therefore, there is a requirement for 
further research relating to how regional path dependence can be effected by the 
exogenous stimulus of transition. As regards my own research, this requirement will 
be addressed in the analytical context of the offshore wind sector. 
In summary, path dependence’s inherent inclination towards retrospection and 
continuity makes it better placed to act as a framework for contextual comprehension 
rather than one for exploring and identifying the dynamics and options for regional 
economic change. Moreover, although spasmodic exogenous shock which stimulates 
innovation is cited as a cause of path de-locking, limited theoretical attention has 
been paid to the relationship between extra-regional stimuli and regional path 
evolution. Thus, in separation from wider notions of path creation and evolution 
(Martin 2010), the value of path dependence for understanding regional industrial 
change is circumscribed. Finally, the prominence accorded to innovation for initiating 
and influencing industrial change is significant (Morgan, 2004; Howells, 2005). For 
example, all of Martin and Sunley’s (2006) “escape routes from regional lock-in” (p 
424) are dependent on the utilisation of innovation5. Therefore, it is apposite to 
provide further theoretical precision regarding the nature of innovation and its 
relationship with change, before moving on to more open and dynamic accounts of 
path evolution. 
                                               
5 These will be discussed further in section 2.2.4 
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2.2.2 Innovation and industrial change 
In evolutionary economic geography, innovation is commonly perceived as a future-
oriented process whereby novel knowledge is applied in a specific spatial context to 
enable the creation of new commercial products, processes and services (Asheim, 
1996; Cooke, 2002; Cooke et al, 2004; Morgan, 2007). Therefore, innovation is the 
means by which the future is enabled through reconfiguration of legacies in the 
present (Archer, 1996), thereby allowing regions to de-lock from their past. Or to put 
it another way, innovation is a source of openness and change in regions and 
associated industries. Accounts of how regions source such knowledge mirrors the 
tension between exogenous and endogenous accounts of regional development 
(Pike et al, 2017b).  
The source of novel knowledge for innovation is often presented as endogenous, 
emerging from micro-economic feedback processes (Howells, 2005; Karnoe and 
Garud, 2012; Cooke, 2013). This conceptualisation fits with the contention that the 
innovation on which regional path change is reliant is a “highly localised phenomenon 
dependent on place specific factors” (Martin, 2010, p 20). Alternately, the source of 
novel knowledge for innovation is conceived as exogenous, often relating to 
disruptive knowledge (Solow, 1956; Howells, 2005; Boschma, 2009; Cooke, 2013). 
This perspective aligns with the contention that regional path de-locking is caused by 
exogenous radical knowledge punctuating the prevailing technological equilibrium 
(Arthur, 1987; David 2005; Coenen et al, 2015; Boschma et al, 2017).  
However, a prevalence in the literature “for ignoring exogenous stimuli” (Trippl et al, 
2017, p 2) and privileging endogenous sources of innovation (Isaksen, 2014) has 
generated two orthodox assumptions that should be highlighted for my enquiry. 
Firstly, it is assumed that a primary barrier to regional industrial change is inadequate 
regional-level innovation capacity (Morgan and Nauwelars, 1999; Cooke et al, 2004). 
Secondly, that the promotion of such capacity should be a primary focus of public 
policy (Morgan, 2003; Cooke, et al, 2004; Asheim et al, 2011b). This theoretical 
perspective has had a profound influence on policy making despite the application of 
related regional development models, such as clusters, regional innovation systems, 
learning regions and university commercialisation (Porter, 1990; Cooke et al, 2004; 
Morgan 2007, 2013b; Goddard et al, 2012, 2013), having questionable success in 
changing the industrial fortunes of lagging regions. More recently, this endogenous 
emphasis has coupled with cognisance of regional heterogeneity to engender Smart 
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Specialisation as a dominant policy framework in the UK and EU (Hausman and 
Roderik 2003; Foray et al, 2011; McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013).  
Therefore, to summarise, innovation is recognised in the literature as a catalyst of 
economic change, connecting an economy’s past with its future in the present. 
However, there remains an ongoing theoretical debate on the source of novel 
knowledge and its application to engender innovation and regional industrial change. 
It is to further understanding the dynamic and conditional nature of regional path 
evolution that the chapter now turns.    
2.2.3 Path creation and agency 
Path creation accentuates the possibility of change in an economy and readily 
integrates conditionality and social agency, thereby tempering notions of determinism 
and binary scenarios of regional dynamism or inertia (Stam and Garnsey, 2009). The 
notion of path creation facilitates the concept of path as process (Martin, 2010); an 
ongoing evolutionary interplay of path creation, path dependence and path 
destruction. It is a concept that accommodates mindful deviation (Garud and Karnoe, 
2003, 2012) and purposive agency (Martin, 2010) of actors in effecting path 
outcomes, including scale, nature and timing. Given its emphasis on economic and 
industrial change, it is surprising that not more consideration is given to path creation 
in research and policy pertaining to regional industrial development (Neffke et al, 
2011), as compared with concepts such as clusters (Porter, 1990; Maskell, 2001). 
Hence, path creation is placed centre stage in my enquiry on the role of social 
agency in creating regional industries.  
Three explanations are commonly cited for the creation of new paths: creation occurs 
by “random chance”, such as the formation of a firm in a certain location (Krugman 
1991); creation occurs as a response to a “window of locational opportunity” – based 
on the notion that new industries have few established inputs and therefore their 
location is serendipitous (Storper, 1995); or creation occurs as a result of strategic 
purpose and deliberate action (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Martin, 2010). There is a 
curious contradiction inherent in the first two explanations when set against the 
broader church of evolutionary economic geography theory, given its contention that 
the future is contingent on a place’s past. This seems marginalised by the notions of 
“random chance” and “windows of locational opportunity”; explanations that “conflate 
ex-ante unpredictability with ex-post inexplicability” (Martin and Sunley, 2006, p 426).  
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Although the first two explanations align with a notion of unforeseen events being the 
catalyst for path de-locking (Arthur, 1987, 1994; David 1985, 1988; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006), they sit uneasily with empirical evidence that indicates that strategic 
purpose and deliberate action (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Martin, 2010) have created 
new “socio-economic-technological structures, socio-economic practices and 
development paths” (Martin and Sunley, 2006, p 408). In response, research has 
identified the importance of mindful deviation and purposive experimentation of 
actors for creating new path trajectories. Path creation theory has also slowly 
introduced to the analytical stage a broader set of actors. Path related concepts such 
as bricolage (Garud and Karnoe, 2003) and heterogeneous actor alignment (Binz et 
al, 2016) recognise the role of co-ordinated agency of multiple actors (although 
micro-economic and firm-centric accounts of change still predominate e.g. Boschma 
and Martin, 2010; Martin and Sunley, 2014a).   
Critically, however, there is still inadequate research pertaining to why path actors 
deviate from the past, strategize and experiment in the present and reimagine the 
future. Steen (2016) rightly contends that in order “to understand why particular paths 
emerge instead of others there requires more attention to agency and how actors 
respond to changes in the contexts in which they operate” (p 1608) and how 
expectations of outcomes shape collective and individual action. This mirrors the 
contention that economic actors have differing motivations for action shaped by 
institutions and institutional frameworks that manage expectations and uncertainties 
and co-ordinate interaction (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; MacKinnon et al, 2009; 
Bathelt and Gluckler, 2014; Evenhuis, 2017).  
It is posited that to understand why actors deviate “the agentic dimension of social 
action [needs to be] analytically situated within the flow of time…. Since social actors 
are embedded within many temporalities at once, they can be said to be oriented 
towards the past, the future, and the present at any given moment, although they 
may be more oriented toward one or another within anyone emergent situation…. 
manoeuvrability, inventiveness and reflective choice of social actions [is] in relation to 
the constraining and enabling contexts of action” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p 
963). In effect, actors choose in the present whether to break from their past by their 
expectations regarding the future: expectations shaped by the institutional 
environment in which their actions are set (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Bakker, 
2014; Steen, 2016). Moreover, given that path creation has been evidenced as a 
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product of distributed agency, the institutional generation of collective expectations 
and co-ordination assumes importance (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Bathelt and 
Gluckler, 2014; Binz et al, 2016). Furthermore, theoretical attention to institutional 
entrepreneurs - actors who mobilise resources, competences and power to create or 
transform existing institutions - indicates that individual agency should not be 
discounted (DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009; Boschma et al, 2017).  
This elasticity of agency (Peck and Theodore, 2007) has two significant implications 
for this research. Firstly, changes to the institutional environment in which agency is 
set may mean that actors or actor coalitions have more favoured or prominent causal 
roles in the process of path creation at different periods of time. Secondly, such 
changing actor roles and power may influence the dynamic of regional industrial path 
evolution and quantitative and qualitative outcomes over time (MacKinnon et al, 
2009; Gertler, 2010; Dawley, 2013; MacKinnon et al, 2018).   
Significantly in the literature, the notion of path creation as part of a temporal 
conjunctive process shaped by social agency has been integrated into Martin’s 
(2010) influential model of local industrial evolution (fig. 2.1) The model places 
emphasis on the “locally contingent nature of self-reinforcing economic development, 
particularly the quasi-fixity of technological change… and institutional forms” (Martin 
and Sunley, 2006, p 398), conceptualising change as primarily a region-specific, 
gradual process. 
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Source: Martin, 2010, p 21 
Figure 2.1: Model of local industrial evolution  
Martin’s model helpfully identifies a number of sequential phases which “evolve 
gradually by a changing mix of and orientation… of firms and their activities (p 14)”. 
By recognising this sequential process as open to social agency - albeit agency that 
is enabled or constrained by the institutional environment in which it is set - the 
model accommodates the contention that “at every step along the way there are 
choices” (North 1990, p 258) in regard to the path’s future. This indicates that 
ongoing opportunities exist for social agents to influence path scale and character 
(e.g. its place in the wider sector’s division of labour), thereby eschewing the 
determinism of path dependence.  
Martin’s path phases are: preformation; path creation; and path development. The 
model indicates that the path will either lead to eventual stasis (essentially lock-in) or 
ongoing adaptation. This process of change is facilitated by mechanisms “that 
operate at the micro-level to impart slow change” (Martin, 2010, p 14). In terms of this 
research, the focus of enquiry explicitly pertains to the path creation phase “whereby 
purposive or intentional experimentation and competition among agents leads to the 
local emergence of the new path” (p21). More recently, MacKinnon et al (2018) 
define path creation as the emergence of new development trajectories in a region 
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based upon the growth of new industrial sectors or new products, techniques and 
organisational forms.  
Although Martin’s model is a useful conceptual construct for understanding path 
change, it has three shortcomings that will be addressed in the context of this 
research. Firstly, it marginalises the potential role of exogenously sourced knowledge 
for regional path creation. Secondly, although not precluding non-firm actors, such as 
the state, it is experimentation within and between firms that is the model’s principal 
focus of enquiry. Thirdly, and crucially for this research, although Martin contends 
that “some localities seem more enabling of this process than others do…. [and] in 
other places the local environment may be less conducive, perhaps even 
constraining” (p 20), Martin provides little specificity, especially in regard to 
associated institutional contexts and settings. By way of insight, Martin parallels his 
notion of enabling and constraining environments with the somewhat static notion of 
regional positive and negative path dependency which was critiqued earlier (Stam 
and Garnsey, 2009). It is a perspective that limits understanding of how constraining 
environments could become enabling and vice versa. Dawley (2013) identifies that a 
“challenge still remains to specify further the contexts of enabling and constraining 
environments…. that explain the creation and geographic diversity of new paths” (p 
2). In the intervening years evolutionary economic geography literature has continued 
to identify a lack of specificity on how not only regional institutional environments but 
also extra-regional institutional environments and their interaction foster path creation 
(Dawley et al, 2015; Steen 2016; Evenhuis; 2017; MacKinnon et al, 2018). However, 
to comprehend what would represent an enabling or constraining institutional 
environment, there is firstly a need to delineate the path creating process that such 
environments mediate. 
2.2.4 Assets, actors and mechanisms of path creation 
Although Martin’s model (2010) has valuably illuminated the possible temporal 
stages of path evolution, of which path creation is one, it provides less insight into the 
dynamic, contingent process of path creation itself. Path creation can be 
conceptualised as the agentic interplay (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) of three 
commonly cited components: assets; actors; and mechanisms (Martin and Sunley; 
2006; Dawley, 2013; MacKinnon, et al 2018). In effect the process relates to pre-
existing regional assets being identified, harnessed and valorised by economic and 
organisational actors and the associated operation of path creating mechanisms 
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(MacKinnon et al 2018). It is to delineating these three path creating elements that 
this section turns.    
Regional assets encompass the knowledge, skills, competences, experiences and 
infrastructure inherited from previous paths and patterns of economic development 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006). However, they can also be less historically dependent 
and relate to the availability of land and proximity to natural resources (Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; Fornahl, 2012). Recognising such heterogeneity, regional assets can 
be conveniently grouped within five broad domains: natural assets; infrastructural 
and material assets; industrial assets; human assets; and institutional assets 
(Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; MacKinnon et al, 2018). Moreover, the utility of these 
assets vis-à-vis a region’s actual or potential economic competitiveness is likely to 
demonstrate a high level of correlation with their combined “value and rareness” 
(Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). 
The reconfiguration and valorisation of such assets is dependent on the strategic 
agency and mindful deviation of actors to realise expected outcomes. As previously 
noted, a number of accounts relating to path creation emphasise the collective and 
distributed nature of actor agency (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Binz et al, 2015). Even 
so, path theory has a tendency to stress the agency of firms and entrepreneurs, 
reflecting a micro-economic orientation of enquiry (Boschma and Frenken, 2006, 
2011; Boschma and Martin, 2007, 2010; Martin, 2010). Nevertheless, this focus has 
been broadened out by the discipline’s interest in the role of innovation in path 
creation which has encouraged the study of universities and research bodies in path 
evolution (Klepper, 2007; Simmie et al, 2008; Goddard et al, 2012, 2013). Tellingly, 
despite some notable exceptions (Dawley, 2013; Dawley et al, 2015; MacKinnon et 
al, 2018), there remains insufficient analysis of the role of the state in this agentic 
path creating interplay.   
Finally, the transformation of assets to enable actor expectations is commonly 
attributed to mechanisms associated with two types of path creating process: path 
de-locking (Martin and Sunley, 2006) and path branching (Boschma and Frenken, 
2009). Implicit within both conceptualisations is the notion of mechanisms being the 
means of facilitating innovation in regional economies by applying novel knowledge 
to inherited regional assets. Martin and Sunley (2006) identify five mechanisms that 
facilitate de-locking from historic industrial trajectories and engender new path 
trajectories (table 2.1).  
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Although all five mechanisms do not preclude the agency of a wider set of actors in 
engendering their operation (such as universities or the state), they more readily 
accord with the Schumpeterian notion of firm-led innovation. Furthermore, whilst the 
inclusion of transplantation accommodates exogenous sources of novel knowledge 
for path creation, the other mechanisms more readily accord with an endogenous 
perspective on path creation; reflecting the common emphasis on endogenous led 
analysis and prescription (Pike et al, 2017b; Trippl et al, 2017).   
Sources of New Path Associated Characteristics 
Indigenous Creation Emergence of new technologies and industries 
from within the region that have no immediate 
predecessors or antecedents  
Heterogeneity and Variety Diversity of local industries, technologies and 
organisations promotes constant innovation and 
reconfiguration, thereby escaping ‘lock-in’ 
Transplantation from elsewhere Importation of a new industry or technology from 
outwith region, which forms the basis of a new 
pathway of regional growth 
Diversification into (technologically) related 
industries 
An existing industry goes into decline but its 
core technologies are redeployed to provide the 
basis of related new industries in the region 
Upgrading of existing industries Revitalisation and enhancement of region’s 
industrial base via infusion of new technologies 
or introduction of new products and services 
Based on Martin & Sunley, 2006  
Table 2.1: Sources of new path creation 
Significantly, the mechanism of diversification (Martin and Sunley, 2006) aligns with a 
body of work in evolutionary economic geography regarding related variety and path 
branching (Boschma and Frenken 2009; Neffke et al, 2011; Cooke, 2012). Its 
theoretical contribution is based on the premise that regional industries can more 
readily evolve by branching into new industries that utilise related knowledge and 
technology; and extra-regional industries are more prone to enter and stay in a 
region if they are related to industries within it (Neffke et al, 2011). In short, existing 
regional industries and related technologies and knowledge “will affect the ways 
regions create new variety over time and transform and restructure their economies” 
(Neffke et al, 2011, p 261). Four branching sub-mechanisms have been identified 
that facilitate related industrial variety (Boschma and Frenken, 2009):  
 Firm diversification through new products, acquisitions and mergers;  
 Entrepreneurship facilitating spin-offs and start-ups;  
21 
 
 Labour mobility between firms and sectors;  
 Social networking.   
These four branching sub-mechanisms provide further insight into the notion of 
diversification as proposed by Martin and Sunley (2006) by placing more emphasis 
on the ownership dynamics of firms, such as acquisitions and mergers, and wider 
institutional forms, such as networks. Furthermore, although labour market dynamics 
are arguably implicit in the delocking mechanisms (2006), path branching recognises 
them as an explicit mechanism, building on Boschma’s (2005) observation that the 
capacity to innovate is embodied in workforce skills and routines. This 
acknowledgement of regional labour market dynamics accords with Kasabov and 
Sundaram’s (2016) assertion that local economies can “reinvent and regenerate…. 
repeatedly over time” (p 1530) by re-orienting path-dependent regional pools of skills 
to new value creating opportunities.  
Finally, it has been observed that the concept of mechanisms is often reductionist 
and narrow, with limited attention given to their relational and interactive properties 
(Jessop, 1997; Dawley, 2013). Recent research has also noted that the process of 
path creation does not privilege one type of mechanism but can occur through inward 
investment, sectoral diversification or the creation of firms (MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
Furthermore, consideration of mechanisms apropos non-firm actors such as the state 
seems marginalised (McKinnon et al, 2018). Finally, mechanisms need not operate 
like “clockwork” nor operate in an aligned or co-ordinated fashion (Dawley, 2013). 
Critically, they are contingent, their operation intimately bound with institutions (Daly, 
1991, Jessop, 1997; Dawley, 2013; Steen, 2016). Therefore, the next section of this 
chapter will consider how the institutional environment can enable or constrain the 
operation of mechanisms and their causal interplay with actors and assets.  
2.2.5 Path theory: summary 
Having considered pertinent literature relating to path theory, a number of promising 
lines of enquiry for the research have been identified. Although path dependence 
when coupled with path creation represents a powerful theoretical framework for 
understanding continuity and change in regional economies, there is limited analysis 
of how differing path dependences - sectoral, technological and regional – mutually 
shape regional industrial path creation (Boschma et al, 2017). Whilst Martin (2010) 
establishes path creation as part of a sequenced evolutionary process, his model 
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remains relatively deterministic and the possibilities and choices of social agents to 
shape path outcomes are somewhat opaque. Moreover, although path creation can 
be conceptualised as a causal interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets, 
orthodoxy privileges analysis of firms in this process at the expense of other actors.  
Crucially for this research, while it is theoretically advanced that some institutional 
environments are more amenable to path creation than others there is limited 
specificity on what represents an enabling or constraining institutional environment 
(Dawley, 2013; Dawley et al 2015; Evenhuis, 2017). Moreover, although Martin 
indicates that some local institutional contexts and settings are conducive to path 
creation, recent literature has indicated that for meaningful insight to be generated a 
multi-scalar institutional perspective needs to be adopted (MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the identified potential role of exogenous stimuli in path 
creation there is, despite some notable exceptions (Essletzbichler, 2012; Coenen et 
al, 2015), limited attention given to how multi-scalar institutions mediate the fusion of 
such path creating stimuli with a regional economy. Accordingly, to further position 
and assist my research regarding the theoretical gap apropos enabling and 
constraining institutional environments (Dawley et al, 2015), the chapter now turns to 
consideration of pertinent institutional literature.  
2.3 Institutions and Path Creation 
In order to address the theoretical missing link of how institutions enable or constrain 
path creating agency, this section reviews institutional literatures that may provide 
insights in to what ways such agency is activated, mediated and bounded. In doing 
so, the role and powers of institutions in facilitating economic and industrial change 
will be explored. Also, to respond to the privilege commonly accorded to regional and 
local level institutions in the literature (Lovering, 1990), the chapter seeks out multi-
scalar and broader relational perspectives. Thus before examining regional level 
institutions, there is consideration of the role of extra-regional institutions, especially 
the state, in shaping regional economic evolution (Christopherson, 2002; Peck and 
Theodore, 2007; Gertler, 2010). Subsequently, attention is given to economic 
geography’s institutional turn and its privilege of the regional scale in understanding 
change and continuity (Amin and Thrift, 1994b; Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; 
Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1995; Amin, 1999; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). By reviewing such 
literature, associated theory relating to institutions and the promotion of innovation is 
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consequently considered (Moulaert and Sekia, 2003). In this regard, regional 
innovation systems are used as a theoretical entry point (Cooke et al, 2004; Trippl et 
al, 2017). However, extra-regional and relational accounts of innovation which 
connect with broader technological and industrial dynamics are also assessed for 
insights regarding enabling and constraining institutional environments for path 
creation (Bathelt et al, 2004; Geels, 2004; Boschma, 2005; Asheim; Truffer and 
Coenen, 2012; Trippl et al, 2017).  
2.3.1  Institutions: pervasive but slippery 
Institutions wield a pervasive influence over the fortunes of economies (Peck, 1999; 
Martin, 2000; Amin, 1999; Christopherson, 2002; MacKinnon et al, 2009; Gertler 
2010). As previously noted, they incentivise and motivate actors to break with the 
past by facilitating future expectations and reducing uncertainty (Emirbayer and 
Mische, 1998; Steen, 2016); in effect regulating the tension between past, present 
and future for agents of change. Importantly, institutions not only enable or constrain 
action, they also provide stability (North, 1991; Geels, 2004), indicating that they are 
sources of both path dependence and creation. Moreover, their organisational 
qualities make the mutual alignment of collective and individual social agency 
possible (Evenhuis, 2017).  
Given that institutions regulate expectation, uncertainty and co-ordination amongst 
heterogeneous actors, they will critically have a bearing on actor deviation from past 
practice to attain future industrial outcomes and the subsequent degree to which 
mechanisms are operationalised and regional assets utilised to achieve these 
outcomes. Thus institutions have a significant bearing on the timing, scale and nature 
of path creation. However, the role of institutions has often been relegated in 
economic geography, a research predilection fostered by the ambiguity surrounding 
the term (Peck, 1999; MacKinnon, et al, 2009; Pike et al, 2016b).   
Although the term institution is widespread there is no definitional unanimity 
(Hodgson, 2006). However, they can be very broadly delineated as “systems of 
established and prevalent social rules that structure social interaction” (Hodgson, 
2006, p 3). These rules include formal regulations, legislation, policies, customs and 
norms that regulate the behaviours of economic actors (North, 1990; Gertler, 2010; 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). Moreover, institutions interact and evolve to create dynamic 
institutional frameworks that empower and privilege different agents through time and 
space (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Geels, 2004; MacKinnon et al, 2009). An 
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expedient utilitarian analogy is that the institutions represent the “rules of the game” 
(North, 1990; Peck, 1999; Geels, 2004; Gertler, 2010). These rules determine the 
“interaction between institutions and organisations that shapes the evolution of an 
economy. If institutions are the rules of the game, organisations and their 
entrepreneurs are the players” (North, 1990, p361). In other words, Smith’s (1776) 
agentic “invisible hand” is guided through time and space by its institutional 
environment.  
Martin (2000) helpfully identifies the co-existence of both an institutional environment 
(comprising formal and informal conventions) and institutional arrangements, whilst 
recognising a close symbiotic relationship between them. This taxonomy is 
summarised below.   
Institutional Regime 
Type 
Nature of the 
Systems 
Institutional Expressions 
Institutional 
Environment 
Formal 
Conventions 
Structures of rules and regulations, mostly 
legally enforced 
Informal 
Conventions 
Customs, norms, cognitive paradigms and 
social routines 
Institutional 
Arrangements 
Organisational 
Forms 
Firms, government bodies, higher education, 
research bodies, unions etc 
Based on Martin, 2000 
Table 2.2: Institutional conceptualisation   
Although, the causal properties of differing institutional frameworks have been 
evidenced, there has been a preponderance to focus on how institutional 
configurations at a specific spatial scale inform the elasticity of agency (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007), thereby promoting useful but somewhat partial accounts of the 
relationship between institutions and economic change. For example, research has 
illustrated how variegated national models of capitalism, such as national industrial 
investment, regulation and research, engender economies to evolve along distinctive 
paths at the national and sub-national levels (Reich, 1992; Christopherson, 2002; 
Peck and Theodore, 2007; Gertler, 2010). Contrastingly, much research has focused 
on regional level institutions and their influence on social agency and economic 
outcomes (Amin and Thrift, 1994b; Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; Ohmae, 1995; 
Storper, 1995; Martin, 2010; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). Tellingly, Schroder and 
Voelzkow (2016) have illustrated that regional industrial trajectories are conditioned 
by the interplay of national and regional institutions and that their mutual efficiency is 
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contingent on their level of complementarity. Even so, little research has been 
undertaken on the interplay of extra-regional and regional institutions on path 
creating agency and path outcomes (Dawley et al, 2015; Trippl et al, 2017). 
Therefore, my research regarding enabling or constraining environments should 
recognise this inter-scalar institutional interplay and the significance of their 
alignment.  
Furthermore, it is observed that institutions exhibit inertia and continue when they are 
no longer fit for purpose - thereby constraining social agency - and are inclined only 
to evolve by major episodic reconfigurations. Therefore, institutions can be carriers of 
history and are subject to path dependence (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2000). 
Thus, an important role for actors is to induce change in institutions to facilitate 
agency; a contention associated with the notion of the institutional entrepreneur 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009; Boschma et al, 2017).  Therefore, for this 
research, the causal relationship of the interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets 
with institutional continuity and change will give insight on enabling and constraining 
path creating environments. In addition, the latitude of actors to reconfigure 
institutions should be considered as part of such environments.  
2.3.2  The state: the omnipresent architect   
Although it has been observed that regional industrial development is mediated 
through multi-layered institutions of governance and government (Pike et al, 2007; 
Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016), the manner in which they interact to incentivise or 
disincentivise strategic social agency relating to path creation has received limited 
attention (MacLeod, 2001; Gertler, 2010; Dawley et al, 2015; Trippl et al, 2017; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018). However, understanding and exploring the nexus between 
the nation state and the region is critical for generating insights into institutional 
environments which enable or constrain path creation. In particular, appropriate 
consideration needs to be given to the role of the nation state in this interaction, 
despite its seeming relegation in much of the regional development literature 
(Lovering, 1999). 
This seeming marginalisation of the nation state and its interaction with the regional 
scale is arguably due to a misperceived diminution of its power (O’Neill, 2008); a 
perspective promoted in popular literature such as the “The End of the Nation State: 
The Rise of the Regional Economies” (Ohmae, 1995) and “World class: Thriving 
Locally in the Global Economy” (Kanter, 1995).  However, in terms of this research, 
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the motives for the nation state’s apparent marginalisation are significantly less 
important than the reasons for according the nation state due regard in 
comprehending an enabling or constraining environment for regional path creation.  
Notably, the nation state can play a crucial role in the construction, operation and 
regulation of markets and industries to achieve broader socio-political goals. It does 
so by prioritising, rationalising and regulating the conduct and power of actors 
(Jessop, 1990; Foucault, 1991; O’Neill, 2008). Thus by having the ability to design 
and apply rules that create the national institutional environment (Peck, 1999; Martin 
2000), the state is a key architect of a significant component of the wider socio-
economic “rules of the game”, those pertaining to market and industrial change at the 
national and sub-national levels (North, 1991). To further utilise this analogy, the 
nation state has significant influence in determining: who plays in this aspect of the 
game; when they play; the rewards received for playing; the power of players; and 
how the game is adjudicated.  
Therefore, nation state “rules” can influence the temporal activation of individual and 
collective agency through generating actor expectations, co-ordinating their 
responses and managing uncertainty (Geels, 2004). For example, Essletzbichler 
(2012) and Coenen et al (2012) evidenced how aligned state policy (e.g. relating to 
R&D) and regulation (e.g. subsidy) incentivised, co-ordinated and de-risked 
distributed agency to create new renewable energy markets and related industries. 
Therefore, a nation state can align its horizontal policies, such as energy policy, 
vertical industrial policies and territorial development policies to enhance actor 
deviation from past practice (Chang, 2014). Conversely, it is contended that the UK 
gives limited cognisance to the spatial consequences of non-spatial state policies 
and the economic and spatial efficiency of policy interaction (Barca et al, 2012; 
Martin and Sunley, 2015). Therefore, critically for this research, examination of nation 
state policy design and co-ordination should provide insights into the extra-regional 
institutional conditionality of the interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets in 
fostering new regional paths (Peck 1999).    
Notably, this potentially enabling and constraining institutional environment is 
dynamic. Episodic recalibrations of the “moral and philosophical” rationales for 
economic and industrial intervention by the state, such as the pursuit of growth, 
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development, efficiency and equity6, can be observed (Pike et al, 2007)7 . 
Consequently, differing governments adapt state “rules” (policies, regulations, norms 
and practices) to pursue their ideological predisposition pertaining to national and 
sub-national development (Pike et al, 2007). Currently, the UK state pursues its 
primary rationale for intervention, economic growth, through supply-side measures 
supporting labour market flexibility, enterprise and innovation (MacKinnon, 2012; 
Pike et al, 2016a). Therefore, to understand the construct of enabling or constraining 
environments for regional path creation, there is a need to connect such 
environments with fluid extra-regional political ambitions and institutional dynamics 
(MacKinnon et al, 2009; Pike et al, 2007, 2017).   
In addition, the nation state defines the parameters and power of regional economic 
development actors. For example, it is the primary arbitrator of “major episodic 
reconfigurations” of such actors (Martin, 2010), as evidenced by the abolition of the 
English RDAs and the Scottish Development Agency. Therefore, the nation state has 
a major bearing on whether a region is just a passive receptacle for economic activity 
or an empowered policy space (Scott, 1998; Pike et al, 2007; Hudson, 2007). 
Moreover, given the observed causal powers of the nation state to evoke “growth 
impulses” via horizontal and vertical policies (Trippl et al, 2017), it has been proposed 
that there is a need to critically reassess the relative role and power of regional state 
actors and institutions in facilitating economic change (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; Pike et 
al, 2017a). In support, Dawley et al (2015) observe that a crucial research gap 
relates to “how capacities of local policy makers are conditioned by national state 
strategies and wider political economic contexts”8. Therefore, for this research there 
is a need to understand the influence of the nation state on regional level powers and 
policies in shaping regional path creation.   
This requirement further foregrounds the need to explore multi-scalar institutional 
alignment and policy efficiency in economic geography. Gertler (2010) in his 
comparative analysis of the evolution of industries in the federal systems of Canada 
and the United States illustrated that multiple levels of government can interact 
                                               
6 Seemingly simple terms but ones whose meaning is contingent on ideological perspective and purpose 
7 Adam Smith, Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, would have recognised such moral contingency. 
He viewed the market as a form of social order to create “real improvements, through which mankind are 
benefited and human nature ennobled” (1776, p 229) 
8 Thus arguably questioning the limits of contextual, bottom-up policy tools and initiatives (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; 
Dawley et al, 2015; Pike et al, 2017b), such as Constructing Regional Advantage and Smart Specialisation 
(Hausman and Roderik 2003; Foray et al, 2011; McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013) 
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benignly to facilitate positive industrial change at the local level. This notion of 
institutional alignment supports Schroder and Voelzkow’s (2016) observation that 
regional industrial trajectories are conditioned by the degree of inter-scalar 
institutional complementarity. Furthermore, Rezvani (2016) identified that highly 
autonomous regions are more inclined to have higher levels of economic wealth 
creation than regions in highly centralised nation state structures. These are 
important findings for my research in regard to enabling and constraining institutional 
architectures, especially in the context of a UK unitary state pursuing asymmetric 
decentralisation of power from London to home nations and regions. Thus, there is a 
clear need for this research to “unpack the state and how its multi-dimensional and 
multi-scalar manifestation of its regulatory nature privileges some places over others” 
(MacLeod, 2001, p 1154) in relation to the path creating interplay of actors, 
mechanisms and assets.  
2.3.3  Institutions and new regionalism 
Reflecting the relationship between institutions and economic change, a new 
regionalist disposition gathered momentum in academic literature through the 1990s 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994b; Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1995; 
Amin, 1999). Advocates of new regionalism accord institutional primacy at the 
regional level and contend that a region’s institutional environment can best mediate 
regional economic change and enable a more qualitative process of economic 
development (Morgan, 2013b). The theoretical currency of new regionalism is also 
premised on the notion that the “national scale can be too distant, remote and 
detached” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013, p 1037)9. Critically for my research, this 
theoretical disposition promotes regions as heterogeneous, empowered and dynamic 
places rather than passive, homogenous arenas reshaped by international and 
national capital flows (MacKinnon et al, 2002, 2009). Therefore, new regionalism 
implies that it is at the regional level that policies are best designed to engender actor 
deviation and the operationalisation of mechanisms to utilise regional assets to 
create new regional industrial paths.   
Central to new regionalism is the role and power of heterogeneous regional 
institutional networks in shaping and regulating agency (MacLeod, 1997). Moreover, 
                                               
9 This is not a new sentiment. Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted: “The general objectives of all institutions must be 
adapted to meet local conditions” (1762, p 97) 
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new regionalism privileges the study of informal institutions over more formal ones, 
such as policy and regulation (Hudson, 1994; MacLeod, 2001; MacKinnon et al, 
2009; Rodrigeuz-Pose, 2013). This focus on place-specific institutional networks and 
their relationship with actor agency has facilitated concepts such as regional 
institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994, Amin 1999) and related innovation 
models (Storper and Scott, 1988; Porter, 1990; Camagni, 1991; Saxenian, 1994; 
Henry et al, 1996; Goddard et al, 2012, 2003) for understanding institutional 
mediation of social agency to engender regional economic outcomes. In tandem, the 
institutional turn has facilitated analysis of region-specific institutional barriers to 
economic change (Martin, 2010; Rodriguez Pose, 2013), such as rent seeking 
behaviour and institutional lock-in.  
Specifically in relation to regional institutional thickness, Amin and Thrift (1994b, 
1995) identify four key characteristics of such thickness: a concentration of diverse 
institutional arrangements (e.g. firms, research and training organisations, 
government agencies, trade and representative bodies); interactive networks that 
promote informal conventions; structures of domination and association that promote 
collective expectation; and mutual awareness of common purpose. Such 
characteristics indicate that a profusion of institutions is an insufficient measure of 
thickness and that dynamism and disposition are also of importance. Tellingly, Martin 
(2000) and Rodriguez-Pose (2013) observed that there are regional economies with 
limited institutional thickness that have created highly successful paths, such as in 
China (increasing its national share of global manufacturing from c. 3% to c. 25% 
within a generation10) and, conversely, there are regions with high institutional 
density that are synonymous with path dependency and lock-in, such as the 
Mezzogiorno. Therefore, in terms of this research, there is a need to critically 
appraise regional institutional thickness as a component of an institutional 
environment predisposed to enable or constrain path creating agency.    
More broadly, such empirical contradictions have led some researchers to question 
the validity of primarily focusing on regional institutional conditions to explain regional 
change, continuity and competitiveness. Critiques note a tendency for new 
regionalism to be based on: empirics relating to successful regions; the relegation of 
exogenous political-economic forces and inter-scalar power asymmetries; and an 
emphasis on informal institutions (Lovering, 1999; MacLeod, 2001; MacKinnon et al, 
                                               
10 The Economist, 14/3/15 
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2009; Pike et al, 2017). MacLeod (2001) articulates a common sentiment regarding 
new regionalism: “It is surely not enough to map the institutional architectures of 
particular regions without also examining the forces that reshape their economic 
evolution, whether they relate to firm behaviour, the role of the state at various 
scales, global money markets…. [whilst proponents] over emphasise the role of soft 
regional institutions” (p 1156).  
Even so, new regionalism responds to Todtling and Trippl’s (2005) concern that the 
specific strengths and weaknesses of regions concerning their industries, institutions 
and innovation capability are often ignored. By exposing the interplay of regional 
heterogeneity and strategic social agency, a new regionalist perspective highlights 
the deficiencies of “one size fits all” policies (Cooke and Ehret, 2010; Farole, 2011; 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). Subsequently this theoretical viewpoint has led to more 
contextually sensitive tools of regional analysis, such as Constructing Regional 
Advantage (Cooke and Ehret, 2010; Pike et al, 2017b).  
As regards my own research, new regionalism foregrounds the need for 
understanding how heterogeneous regional institutions and institutional networks 
mediate the interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms and subsequent path 
outcomes. Moreover, given the significance accorded to innovation for linking a 
region’s past to its future (North 1990), new regionalism has also engendered a 
notable research tradition regarding how regional institutional networks promote the 
exploitation of novel knowledge that is also germane to my research. 
2.3.4 Institutions, innovation and regional industrial change 
As previously noted, innovation, the process of applying novel knowledge to create 
new products, processes and services, is cited as a key influence on regional 
industrial change (Archer, 1996; Asheim, 1996; Cooke, 2002; Morgan 2007). 
Furthermore, it has been observed that regions have differing innovation capabilities 
and such variety is a determinant of regional economic performance11 (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Crescenzi and Rodriguez Pose, 2011). Given its importance, it is 
unsurprising that there is a significant body of theory relating to how institutions and 
institutional networks mediate and support innovation (Beccatini, 1987; Lundvall, 
                                               
11 Boschma (2009) observes that knowledge creation, generation of innovation and their application need not be 
spatially contiguous. Many EU regions excel in knowledge creation (Morgan, 1994; Fagerberg, 1996; Crescenzi 
and Rodriguez Pose, 2011) as evidenced by patent registrations, research spending, publications etc. However, 
the related application may happen in other regions, nations or continents   
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1994; Storper; 1995; Cooke et al, 2004; Morgan, 2007; Asheim et al, 2011). 
However, critically for this research, there remains a paucity of theory and empirics 
regarding how these enable or constrain the path creating interplay of actors, 
mechanisms and assets, and shape path outcomes. Moreover, in terms of socio-
technical transition there is only partial comprehension of how regional institutions 
facilitate utilisation of related exogenous knowledge or intercede to influence its 
development. Even so, current theory provides critical insights for shaping this 
enquiry. As an entry point to this literature, this section will first consider regional 
innovation systems (Cooke et al, 2004; Trippl et al, 2017). However, in response to 
an inherent bias towards the regional scale, it will subsequently consider more 
spatially open and relational interpretations of the institutional conditionality of 
innovation (Geels, 2004; Boschma et al, 2005; Truffer and Coenen, 2012). Thus 
framing the research in a multi-scalar context, one cognisant of extra-regional 
industrial and technological dynamics. 
In recent decades, the regional innovation system (RIS) concept has acted as a 
common focusing device for analysing how differing institutional set-ups promote 
innovation (Asheim et al, 2011b; Cooke et al, 2004; Grillitsch, 2015). Building on this, 
Evenhuis (2017) observes that the RIS concept promotes comprehension of how “the 
processes which underlie innovation (the generation, diffusion, application and 
exploitation of novel knowledge) are conditioned, facilitated or hindered by 
institutions at the regional level” (p 509). Although the literature recognises that 
institutionally centred innovation systems can operate at different spatial levels - 
global, national and regional - with overlapping, fuzzy borders, the dominant research 
focus has privileged the region (Nelson, 1996; Cooke et al, 2004; Asheim et al, 
2011b).  
In terms of antecedence, the RIS concept owes a debt of gratitude to Marshall’s 
theory of local industrial agglomeration (1890) given a common emphasis on place 
and relational determinants beyond the firm effecting industrial change (Lundvall, 
1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Although a number of differing but associated 
regional innovation models exist, the RIS concept has assumed a degree of 
analytical dominance (Moulaert and Sekia 2003; Cooke et al, 2004; Trippl et al, 
2017). A RIS can be summarised as an instituted framework in which collective 
learning and innovation activities are shaped by close inter-actor relations, support 
infrastructure and socio-cultural and institutional configurations (Asheim and Isaksen, 
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2002; Cooke, 2002; Todtling and Trippl, 2005). Moreover, RIS actors are often 
categorised within “three institutional spheres” of government, industry and 
universities, commonly known as the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; 
McAdam and Debackere 2017)12. Given the above, it could be presumed that a RIS 
would be a component of an enabling institutional environment for regional path 
creation given that they support heterogeneous actors apply novel knowledge which 
will utilise and valorise regional assets. Such capability would facilitate deviation from 
past economic practice by supporting future-oriented experimentation.   
Even so, a number of shortcomings have been identified in regard to RIS concepts, 
which given their theoretical association with new regionalism also mirror its 
deficiencies. Firstly, the RIS concept is largely predicated on empirics relating to 
successful regions (MacKinnon, 2009). Secondly, the emphasis on soft institutions 
makes observation and measurement challenging (Moulaert and Sekia, 2003). 
Thirdly, RIS theory reflects the enduring tension between endogenous and 
exogenous accounts of development (Pike et al, 2017b) privileging endogenous 
stimuli over exogenous ones (Trippl et al, 2017). Even so, recent research has 
engaged with these shortcomings. Trippl et al (2017) identifies a trio of RIS 
typologies that accommodate the existence of differing kinds of regions and adopts 
the utilitarian proxy of organisational density as a measure of system capacity. These 
three types are noted below: 
(i) Organisationally thick and diversified RIS in metropolitan and advanced 
technology regions (such regions are well endowed with a variety of 
different dynamic industries, strong research organisations and support 
infrastructure which are deeply rooted in external knowledge exchange);  
(ii) Organisationally thick and specialised RIS in old industrial regions (such 
regions are characterised by strong specialisation in established, often 
outdated, industries and inward-looking networks that limit interaction with 
extra regional knowledge);  
(iii) Organisationally thin RIS in peripheral regions (such regions are 
dependent on investments relating to natural resources, cheap labour and 
                                               
12 The recent inclusion of society as a fourth institutional sphere represents the Quadruple Helix (Kim et al, 2012; 
Leydesdorff, 2013) 
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land which require limited embedding in thin local knowledge networks and 
related exogenous and endogenous relationships are highly asymmetrical).  
In recognising such variation Trippl et al (2017) contend that it is in the second and 
third RIS types that the need for exogenous knowledge to facilitate innovation is the 
most pressing; mirroring recent findings that path renewal in old industrial regions 
requires access to such knowledge (Isaksen, 2014; Coenen et al, 2015). However, 
Trippl et al (2017) also identify a pressing need for research regarding how the path 
creating causal power of regional innovation systems are mediated and bounded by 
the extra-regional institutional frameworks in which they are set, particularly those of 
the nation state. Therefore, to enable my research on how institutional systems 
promote innovation and path creating agency, especially in challenged regions, there 
is a need for the research to augment these regional perspectives with wider 
relational viewpoints.  
To this end, it is important to also consider literature that recognises regional 
innovation as being embedded in and circumscribed by multiple, complex inter-
dependencies straddling a variety of scales (Oinas and Malecki, 2002; Pinch et al, 
2003; Morgan, 2014; Binz et al, 2016; Boschma et al 2017). Such literature is 
premised on the “de-territorialisation of closeness” (Howells, 2002); the decoupling of 
geography and proximity. Five proximities that enable regional innovation have been 
by identified by Boschma (2005), as summarised below (table 2.3). 
  
34 
 
Type of Proximity  Contribution to the innovation process  
Cognitive For innovation to be identified and exploited there is a minimum 
level of knowledge required between differing actors.    
Organisational  
Organisational arrangements facilitate the transfer of novel 
knowledge between actors. A continuum exists from no formal ties 
between actors to integrated supply chains. 
Social 
Social relations between actors at a micro level engender trust 
based on personal relations, culture and common experience, 
thereby encouraging knowledge sharing.  
Institutional  
Formal institutions, such as regulations, and informal ones, such 
as values, govern dynamics of inter-organisational relations. As 
such, institutional arrangements can enable or constrain 
knowledge transfer and innovation. 
Geographic 
Short distances bring people together, promoting exchange of tacit 
knowledge. Even so, it must be combined with cognitive proximity. 
Also, other forms of proximity can substitute for geographic 
proximity. 
Based on Boschma, 2005 
Table 2.3: Types of proximity  
This conceptualisation of differing proximities aligns with literature on the “globalising 
of regional development” (Coe et al, 2008), in which inter-scalar networks can be 
conceptualised as “global pipelines” (Bathelt et al, 2004) through which transactions 
and partnerships connect local actors, often in routinized nodes, with extra-regional 
novel knowledge that facilitates innovation. Thus paralleling the contention that path 
creation is an “alignment process where heterogeneous actor networks mobilise 
knowledge and financial investment, market access and technology legitimacy” 
played out on a broad global scale (Binz et al, 2016 p 174). In such a networked 
environment, the role of foreign owned firms in mediating regional access to novel 
knowledge assumes prominence (MacKinnon et al, 2002; Coe, et al, 2008; Dawley 
2010; Elola et al, 2013; Dicken, 2015). In short, the region is only one geographic 
scale that facilitates knowledge sourcing and utilisation, thereby positing questions 
for my research relating to: firstly, the causal power and primacy of regional 
institutions and frameworks in promoting innovation to enable path creating agency; 
and secondly, extra-regional and regional institutional configurations best suited for 
harnessing novel knowledge for regional path creation. 
35 
 
2.3.5 Institutions, socio-technical transitions and industrial change 
By accepting the utility of broader relational concepts for this research, theory 
pertaining to socio-technical transitions is also brought in to view (Geels, 2004; 
Markard and Truffer, 2008). These literatures relate to the occurrence of profound 
change to the prevailing socio-technical paradigm, such as decarbonisation of the 
energy system or artificial intelligence, echoing theoretical precursors such as 
disruptive storms of innovation and technological waves (Kondratiev, 1935; 
Schumpeter, 1942). Tellingly for this enquiry, its two core concepts, the Multi-Level 
Perspective (MLP) and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS), foreground such 
transition as an instituted process with no set priori territorial boundaries (Truffer, 
2014).  
Central to MLP is its conceptualisation of three levels of transition (see fig. 2.2). 
Firstly, a Socio-Technical Landscape represents the macro manifestation of the 
socio-technical system in society (e.g. the built environment) and is highly path 
dependent (Geels, 2004). Secondly, a Socio-Technical Regime (Geels, 2004) is a 
meso level construct composed of the rules (institutions) of differing interacting sub-
regimes (e.g. government, technology, industries, markets) that is also inclined to 
path dependence. Finally, a niche represents a space with least path dependence 
where transition can engender new technological paths (Geels, 2004; Geels and 
Schot, 2007b; Boschma et al, 2017).  
Niches represent protected environments where institutional “shielding, nurturing and 
empowerment” from powerful incumbent forces allows actors to deviate and 
experiment (Smith and Raven, 2012). Moreover, it is proposed that such protected 
institutional environments can be created by “strategic niche management” (Schot 
and Geels, 2007), a process dependent on “system builders” (Hughes, 1987; Geels, 
2004). System builders connect the domains of economics, technology, research and 
politics, co-ordinating these spheres into a functioning techno-industrial system by 
working with and adapting existing rules, regimes and institutions which provide 
constraining and enabling contexts for actors (Geels, 2004). Therefore, these agents 
of change facilitate institutional reconfiguration of the prevailing rules (e.g. policies, 
regulations, norms) in order to allow actors to deviate and utilise novel knowledge 
that creates new technological paths. Although the predominantly non-territorial 
notions of a niche and system builders are problematic for regional research, they 
represent useful concepts for further exploring the institutional conditionality and 
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relational contexts of new industrial paths, particularly those relating to transition 
(Coenen et al, 2012; Essletzbichler, 2012; De Laurentis, 2013).  
 
Source: Geels 2004, p 915 
Figure 2.2: A dynamic multi-level perspective on system innovation  
The associated Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) concept privileges analysis 
of the interplay of institutions, actors and technology in creating new industrial paths 
via transition (Truffer and Coenen, 2012; Truffer, 2014). Again the perspective is 
essentially aspatial, examining how “strategic agency in heterogeneous actor groups 
jointly act upon locked-in structure and mobilise resources to create a new industry” 
(Boschma et al, 2017, p 36). The TIS concept contends that obstacles to territorial 
renewal are not necessarily unique to a region, emphasising that path dependence 
can apply to both technology and place (Coenen et al, 2015; Boschma et al, 2017). 
However, proponents of TIS (as with MLP) note that undifferentiated 
conceptualisations of space and scale and differing levels of government power 
makes it application to territorial development problematic (Truffer and Coenen, 
2012; Truffer, 2014).  
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Even so, aspects of both MLP and TIS concepts can bring valuable, alternate 
perspectives regarding the role of disruptive socio-technical transition and associated 
institutions in engendering regional industrial path creation, and what could constitute 
an enabling and constraining environment. Such perspectives primarily relate to: the 
instituted and relational nature of transition; the need for institutional alignment to 
foster transition and related industrial change; and the role of institutionally protected 
space to challenge broader technological path dependence.   
2.3.6 Institutions and regional economic and industrial change: summary 
Having considered theory relating to institutions and economic change, a number of 
key theoretical aspects and gaps indicate key lines of enquiry for the research.  As 
previously noted institutions can incentivise future-oriented actor deviation by 
shaping expectations, facilitating co-ordination and reducing uncertainty. However, 
there is a research preponderance to focus on one institutional scale and type (e.g. 
soft institutions at the regional scale) rather than understanding how the elasticity of 
path creating agency is shaped by the multi-scalar interplay of institutional types or 
how wider institutional path dependence shapes regional path creation. This has led 
to limited consideration of how nation state “rules” interact with the regional level to 
mediate path creating agency or condition the latitude of regional economic 
development actors. Moreover, although innovation is recognised as being 
institutionally contingent, a focus on regional institutional configurations has limited 
consideration of how the multi-scalar and relational institutional environment 
regulates the utilisation of novel knowledge at the regional level. However, more 
open spatial conceptualisations of the interplay of actors, institutions, networks and 
knowledge, such as niches, promise insight into what constitutes an enabling 
environment for path creation vis-à-vis socio-technical transition. Finally, a deficiency 
of analysis regarding multi-scalar institutional interplay has occurred despite empirics 
indicating that strategic efficiency in achieving industrial change and development is 
contingent on the degree of institutional complementarity.  
2.4 Analytical Framework: Institutional Environments and Path Creation   
Having reviewed the literature relating to path creation theory and the relationship 
between institutions and regional change, the analytical framework can now be 
presented. The framework is a device for informing and focusing my enquiry into the 
nature of enabling and constraining institutional environments for regional industrial 
path creation. It has been shaped by the theoretical and conceptual insights 
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generated by the literature review. In this section, I will describe the theoretical 
content and assumed relations within the analytical framework (figure 2.3).    
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 2.3: Regional industrial path creation: analytical framework 
The analytical framework presupposes the role of innovation in linking a region’s past 
with its future through the application of novel knowledge (Archer, 1996). In doing so, 
it contends that socio-technical transition (Geels, 2004; Markard and Truffer, 2008), 
in this case the introduction of offshore wind to the UK’s energy system, is a catalyst 
for the application and utilisation of novel knowledge within a region which triggers 
the path creation process (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Neffke et al, 2011). Furthermore, 
the framework has been developed to understand the positive effect that energy 
transition can have on regional industrial reorientation and not the negative 
consequences (e.g. the costs of decarbonisation) on broader industrial dynamics and 
systems.    
The framework foregrounds the path creating interplay between actors, mechanisms 
and regional assets (MacKinnon et al, 2018). The representation assumes that the 
greater the activation and interaction of these components, the more pronounced are 
the process and outcomes of path creation. In terms of delineating actors and related 
agency, the framework, to overcome a seeming bias towards the role of firms in path 
theory (Boschma and Frenken, 2006, 2011; Martin, 2010), accommodates the role of 
both firms and non-firm actors, such as the state and universities and research 
bodies (Goddard et al, 2012; Dawley et al 2015; Pike et al; 2016b; MacKinnon et al, 
2018). In addition, consideration of the role of distributed, collective and individual 
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agency is accommodated (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Binz et al, 2015). The 
framework does not privilege one type of mechanism but recognises that differing 
mechanisms can contribute to path creation e.g. diversification and transplantation 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma and Frenken, 2009). Moreover, it is assumed 
that actor agency and associated mechanisms enable valorisation and 
reconfiguration of heterogeneous regional assets relating to: natural assets; 
infrastructural and material assets; industrial assets; human assets; and institutional 
assets (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; MacKinnon et al, 2018).       
The path creating interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets is represented as 
bounded and mediated by the multi-scalar institutional environment (both formal and 
informal) in which it is set. In presenting this environment as multi-scalar, the 
interplay of regional and extra-regional forces on path creation is accommodated, 
thereby mitigating the tension between endogenous and exogenous accounts of 
regional change (Pike et al, 2017b). Also, it is presumed that extra-regional “rules” 
(MacLeod, 2001; Geels, 2004; Gertler, 2010), especially in relation to policy and 
regulation, are not only mediating regional industrial path creation but also the wider 
process of sectoral and technological development in which the regional industrial 
path is embedded. Thus, this contention permits exploration of the interaction of 
extra-regional sectoral and technological path dependences with regional level path 
dependences (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma et al, 2017). Additionally, at the 
regional level, institutional thickness and systems relating to industrial change and 
innovation are accommodated within the framework (Amin and Thrift 1994b, 1995; 
Asheim et al, 2011; Cooke et al, 2004; Trippl et al, 2017).  
It is proposed that this mutable multi-scalar institutional context can represent a 
changing enabling and constraining environment for path creation, regulating the 
agency of path actors and their interplay with mechanisms and assets over time. In 
turn, such institutional conditionality will shape path phasing, through the generation 
of key causal moments of path creation, thereby illuminating the need to carefully 
follow the path through time and space (Pike et al, 2016b). Moreover, it is proposed 
that such institutional interplay will also mediate subsequent path outcomes in terms 
of path scale and character e.g. in terms of path quality and its position in the wider 
sector’s division of labour (MacKinnon et al, 2018). Consequently, this will have a 
bearing on the broader process of regional economic development and regional path 
dependence.  
40 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
By reviewing the literature relating to the process of regional industrial path evolution 
and the role of institutions in mediating it, the chapter has identified key departure 
points for the research regarding enabling and constraining environments for path 
creation. Moreover, the review has led to the development of an analytical framework 
that integrates path research objects (e.g. regions, industries), subjects (e.g. path 
creation, socio-technical transition) and scales (e.g. nation states, regions) into a 
holistic research framework (Martin and Sunley, 2013). By applying this framework to 
the research, the interplay of exogenous novelty with the institutionally mediated 
process of path creation (the interaction of actors, mechanisms and assets) can be 
examined and the influence on path outcomes assessed. In doing so, insights for 
theory and policy regarding the opportunities and means of creating new regional 
industrial growth paths will be generated.  
  
41 
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology   
3.1 Introduction 
Having framed my enquiry regarding enabling and constraining environments for 
regional industrial path creation within the literature and developed the related 
analytical framework, this chapter details the methodology of research. It reflects 
Coffey and Atkinson’s observation that “research problems, research design, data 
collection methods and analytic approaches should all be part of an overall 
methodological approach and should imply one another” (1996, p11). In doing so, the 
chapter firstly explores the Critical Realist and Geographical Political Economy 
informed positioning of the research. In turn, there is an explanation for selecting and 
developing a bespoke case study approach and, subsequently, justification of the 
cases of regional industrial path creation selected. The chapter then turns to detailing 
the mixed methods deployed, including an account of the empirical research process 
and interview programme, before explaining the post field work analysis.   
3.2 Philosophy of Enquiry 
How a researcher perceives and interprets the world needs to be explicitly noted to 
allow the audience to position and contextualise the research vis-à-vis its underlying 
assumptions of reality (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Massey and Meegan, 1985; 
Yeung, 1997, 2003; Scott, 2000; Pike et al, 2016b). In undertaking this research I 
have adopted a Critical Realist (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 1992; Yeung, 1997) 
philosophy of enquiry complemented by the perspective of Geographical Political 
Economy (Pike et al, 2016b).  However, before explaining this selection it is worth 
exploring why ontological and epistemological demarcation is required.  
Grix (2002) identifies that a lack of philosophical transparency has meant that 
academics are often arguing past each other. For example, methodologies reflecting 
the equilibrist structural perspective of neo-classical economics will facilitate differing 
empirical enquiry and interpretation from ones that privilege non-deterministic social 
perspectives relating to agency and transformation (E.F. Schumacher, 1973; Malecki, 
1997; Sheppard, 2011; Chang, 2014).  Furthermore, economic geography 
specifically has not been immune to the contestation of philosophical perspectives 
and, in turn, methodological choices. As noted by Scott (2000): “Economic 
geography has behaved quite differently from what might be expected of a rationally 
ordered discipline pursuing some pre-ordained epistemological mission” (p 484). 
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Although the positivism (Wittgenstein, 1921) of post-war regional science 
represented a quantitative research dominance based on “identifying the regularities 
of the neo-classical space economy” (Scott, 2000, p 486) such hegemony was 
challenged from the 1960s onwards by diverging philosophical perspectives and 
turns predicated on social interpretation (Scott, 2000; Barnes et al, 2007; Pike et al, 
2016b).  Consequently, there is no one size fits all methodology in economic 
geography, rather the researcher must select a method that is apposite for facilitating 
their specific enquiry (Peck and Theodore, 2012; Pike et al, 2016b). For this 
research, as noted previously, a Critical Realist ontological and epistemological 
position has been selected. A number of inherent presuppositions, elaborated below, 
makes this choice appropriate.  
My research reflects the Critical Realist premise (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 1992; 
Yeung, 1997) that events are generated through mechanisms embedded in wider 
social, economic and political structures (Lawson, 1989; Sayer, 1992; Del Casino Jr 
et al, 2011; Edward et al, 2014). This creative process is understood to be 
“contingently realised in specific time space contexts” (Hudson 2006; p 377). 
Therefore, a potential predilection to identify “universal laws” is mitigated by the 
requirement to understand the unique contexts in which outcomes occur (Sayer, 
1982; Edward et al, 2014). Thus, Critical Realism aligns with my research interest in 
industrial path causality in heterogeneous regions and its relationship with multi-
scalar institutions over time. My research also adheres to the philosophy’s 
recognition of the duality of structure and agency, the dynamic reciprocated 
relationship of causality (Sayer, 1982; Duncan and Ley, 1982; Giddens, 1984). It is a 
methodological perspective that facilitates exploration of the relationship between 
path creating agency and its multi-scalar institutional environment; mitigating the risk 
of the enquiry being monopolised by determinism or voluntarism (Duncan and Ley, 
1982; Giddens, 1984).  
In addition, a Critical Realist informed methodology has been complemented by the 
utilisation of a Geographical Political Economy (GPE) perspective; an analytical 
outlook that foregrounds the political-economic nexus (MacLeod, 2001; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; MacKinnon et al, 2009; Pike et al 2017) in which path creation is 
embedded. It is an approach which analyses how the spatialities of capitalism co-
evolve with economic, political and social processes (Sheppard, 2011). GPE neatly 
connects empirical enquiry relating to industrial economic evolution to broader 
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questions of value creation, institutional variance and uneven actor power across 
spatial scales and time (Pike et al, 2016b). Thus reflecting that “micro-entities are 
never isolated atoms but are shaped by their meso and macro-environments” 
(Essletzbichler, 2009, p 162).  Additionally, by adopting this analytical paradigm, the 
enquiry is better attuned to unpack the state and its multi-dimensional and multi-
scalar roles (MacLeod, 2001; MacKinnon et al, 2009) in path creation vis-à-vis 
transition. Finally, by combining a GPE perspective with a Critical Realist 
methodology, partial and generic accounts of regional change that overplay either 
exogenous or endogenous interpretation are mitigated (Hudson, 2006; MacKinnon et 
al, 2009; Pike et al, 2017b).   
Before turning to research design, brief consideration of the moral sentiment 
embedded in methodological choices is appropriate (Hume, 1740; Smith, 1759).  
Scott (2000) rightly notes “the immensely real substantive issues” (p 496) that are at 
stake in economic geography and the “extraordinarily rich collection of insights into 
the spatial and locational foundations of economic life” (p 484) that is generated by 
the discipline. However, Gregory’s (1994) adjunct that geography should “seek not 
only to make social life intelligible but also to make it better” (p 10) is important. 
Research, from my perspective, should be accessible and valuable to policy makers - 
as well as academics - and should be vested with moral mission. Given that 
addressing the policy challenges of geographically uneven development (Asheim et 
al, 2011; Martin and Sunley, 2013) is a central motivation for this research, GPE is 
well placed to meet the material research needs of the economic development 
community. GPE engenders methodological engagement with and insight in to a 
real-world in flux, removing evolutionary theories from a world of abstraction to one of 
policy and practice (Massey, 1984; Martin and Sunley, 2014). By fusing GPE with 
Critical Realism, the economic geographer can fulfil their important societal task of 
making abstract and invisible but vital relationships regarding change and continuity, 
located within space and time, tangible and visible13.  
3.3 Selecting and Applying a Research Design  
Having detailed the ontological and epistemological choices underpinning my 
research, the selection of research design can now be addressed. In order to 
understand the institutionally mediated, multi-scalar, multi-actor process of regional 
                                               
13 With thanks to Josef Koudelka, Czech landscape photographer, for this insight 
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industrial path creation, there is a need to “get inside” (Clarke, 1998) and “follow” 
(Pike et al, 2016b) the unfolding phenomenon. Such a requirement lends itself to a 
case study approach, facilitating the deep contextualisation required of the 
methodological combination of Critical Realism and GPE approaches. This section 
will: firstly, detail the merits of the case study method for the research; secondly, it 
will explain the design of the case study model; and, finally, establish the rationale for 
case selection.  
Yin (2009) observes that a case study approach should be adopted when the:  
a. Focus of study is to answer the questions relating to the “how” (apropos the 
process of path creation), the “why” (apropos the cause of path creation) and 
the “who” (apropos the path actors), thereby, facilitating insight into the 
contingency and causality of path creation;     
b. Researcher wants to address contextual conditions because they are relevant 
to the phenomenon under study, thereby aligning with the enquiry’s interest in 
spatial and institutional contextual contingency; and 
c. Boundaries are unclear between the phenomenon and its context, thereby 
reflecting the enquiry’s interest in the relationships between regional industrial 
path creation and its interplay with wider regional and sectoral and 
technological path dependences.  
Complementing these methodological strengths, a case study approach is well suited 
to the generation of practical, concrete, context-specific knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006), 
a quality that is pertinent given the enquiry’s ambition of generating findings of both 
theoretical and policy utility. Furthermore, a case reflects a phenomenon occurring in 
a bounded context (Miles and Huberman, 1994), thereby enabling application of the 
analytical framework within a specified region within a specified timeframe. Moreover, 
reflecting Yin’s (2009) observation that a case study is “an empirical inquiry about a 
contemporary phenomenon set within its real-world context” (p 18), the case 
approach also accommodates the wider, multi-scalar environment in which it is 
nested. Finally, although the case is temporally bounded and defined by the 
phenomenon of path creation, it will be historically contextualised and placed within 
its preformation state (see Chapter 4).  
In order to enable comparative analysis, two cases of regional industrial path creation 
will be selected. This approach responds to calls from within the discipline for greater 
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utilisation of comparative analysis to better understand the influence of differentiation, 
diversity and heterogeneity in the economic landscape on regional economic change. 
Moreover, such comparison enables empirical and, in turn, deductive and inductive 
“cross-referencing” over space and time (Boschma and Frenken 2009; Coe, 2010; 
Gertler, 2010; Pike et al, 2016b).  
Two common models of case comparison can be identified in the literature, namely a 
Single Case with Embedded Units and a Multiple Case approach (Baxter and Jack, 
2008); see figures 3.1 and 3.2 below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Model of single case study with 
embedded units of analysis (EUA) 
Figure 3.2 Model of multiple case approach 
Based on Baxter and Jack (2008) 
Both models have merit but also deficiencies. A Single Case with Embedded Units 
has convenience in that it attempts to group research entities (i.e. regional industrial 
paths) into a shared case and contextual framework. However, Baxter and Jack 
(2008) contend that where the context for each case is different, a multiple-case 
study approach is appropriate. Given that a key aspect of the research relates to how 
regional heterogeneity (e.g. regional assets, regional institutions) effects regional 
industrial path creation, contextual variability needs to be accommodated. However, 
although a multiple case study model can readily reflect differing regional contexts, 
the regional industrial paths being examined should not be treated as wholly isolated 
occurrences given the existence of common extra-regional influences (e.g. nation 
state institutions, wider sectoral dynamics). Therefore, the notion of “incorporated 
comparison” (McMichael, 1990) is adopted in recognition that the regional industrial 
path cases are also embedded in relatively similar extra-regional settings 
(MacKinnon et al, 2009; Pike et al, 2016b). This multi-scalar relational perspective 
facilitates comprehension of how extra-regional dynamics, such as those relating to 
socio-technical transition, interact with regional specificities. It also complements the 
EUA 1 
CONTEXT 
CASE 
EUA 
1 
EUA 
2 CONTEXT 
CASE 
CONTEXT 
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notion of regions as “zones of policy implementation” (Peck and Theodore, 2012); 
places where extra-regional policy interacts with regional heterogeneity resulting in 
differing regional path outcomes. As Massey and Meegan (1985) observe: “A Single 
national policy, may well produce one effect in one situation and a completely 
different effect in another” (p 9).   
Consequently, the research has adopted a hybrid case study model (figure 3.3) that 
is sympathetic to distinctive regional contexts whilst explicitly accommodating the 
multi-scalar relations and dependencies in which both cases are embedded. Thus 
“following the path” creation process wherever it may lead (Pike et al, 2016b). This 
Critical Realist and GPE informed case model aims to illuminate the “deep-seated as 
well as wider relations, positions and contexts of agents and inter-related structures” 
(Pike et al, 2016b, p 132) that shape path creation, and in doing so generate insight 
into the nature of enabling and constraining environments for regional path creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration (broken lines denote porous nature of relations) 
Figure 3.3: Two cases of regional industrial path creation placed within respective regional 
contexts nested in their extra-regional context  
 
3.3.1  Selection of two cases 
Two cases were selected based on their instrumental value in relation to the 
analytical framework (Burawoy, 1998; Baxter and Jack, 2008) reflecting Flyvbjerg’s 
(2006) observation that a small number of varying cases that allow in-depth 
practicable exploration of the significance of contingent conditions and outcomes 
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offer greatest insight. However, the level of case variance was tempered by the 
recognition that the cases had to be sufficiently similar to facilitate credible and 
relevant comparative analysis in regard to regional industrial path creation linked to 
transition (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). Moreover, given the desire to 
adopt incorporated comparison apropos nation state “rules”, the two cases required 
to be embedded in the same nation state context (making international case 
selection inappropriate).  
Furthermore, case selection was also based on the recognition that if a small number 
of cases are selected judiciously, lessons with broader applicability can be generated 
through inference (Yeung, 2003; Yin, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2005; Pike et al, 2016b). 
Similarly, selection was informed by the desire not to sacrifice empirical insight for 
empirical breadth, thereby limiting the ability to “follow the path” in required detail 
(Pike et al, 2016b). The process of case selection was also informed by Peck and 
Theodore’s (2012) observation that by selecting appropriate cases the researcher 
can seek to create and reconstruct theory, not just test it. Therefore, the cases 
selected permitted the interplay of deductive and inductive approaches (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009; Pike et al, 2016b).  
In summary, the selection of two cases was based on information-oriented selection 
(Flyvbjerg, 2005) with regard to evidence of:  
 The emergence of regional industrial paths related to the stimuli of energy 
transition, namely offshore wind, thereby ensuring instrumental case 
relevance;   
 Regional contextual variance, for example in terms of regional assets and 
institutions, which are correspondingly interacting with similar extra-regional 
sectoral dynamics, thereby promoting incorporated comparison;  
 The operation of similar nation state “rules” at the regional level (i.e. policy and 
regulation relating to offshore wind), thus allowing each case region to be 
treated as a “zone of policy implementation”. 
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3.3.2  Relevance of Glasgow and Humberside cases 
In 2014, Michael Fallon14, a UK Government Minister, stated that the establishment of 
a new UK Government innovation body in Glasgow, Offshore Renewable Energy 
Catapult (OREC) and a Siemens manufacturing facility on Humberside represented 
key milestones for the UK Government’s offshore wind strategy and the development 
of the industry. However, these two regional industrial paths are not only relevant due 
to shared political and industrial significance and corresponding ability to offer entry 
points for understanding the role of national policy on creating regional industries, 
they are also appropriate given their evident case variation.  
Both cases allow for insight into the role of regional heterogeneity on the path 
creation given differing pre-formation contexts (Martin, 2010). Moreover, both cases 
vary in terms of their respective qualitative positions in the broader national and 
international offshore wind’s division of labour, facilitating insights into how the 
character of new paths is shaped. Additionally, although the regions are embedded in 
a similar nation state context they have differing levels of institutional thickness (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994b, 1995) and forms of regional innovation systems (Trippl et al, 
2017), promoting exploration of the importance of regional level institutional 
frameworks on path creation. Finally, the Glasgow case is set within the devolved 
Scottish context whilst the Humber case is embedded within a less devolved 
institutional sub-national context, thereby allowing exploration of how differing multi-
scalar institutional architectures influence path creation (Gertler, 2010; Schroder and 
Voelzkow, 2016). To expand:   
 Glasgow and Humberside exhibit differing economic histories and resulting 
economic structures, assets, competences and practices (Martin and Sunley, 
2006) - even so, both regions have experienced economic decline making 
them relevant for understanding path creation in lagging regions (Pike et al, 
2006; Dawley, 2013; McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013; Coenen et al, 2015);  
 Glasgow’s path creation is less dependent on geographic proximity to natural 
resources (offshore wind farm sites), whereas Humberside is highly dependent 
on such proximity (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Fornahl et al, 2012);   
 Differing divisions of labour in relation to the broader sectoral path are evident 
(MacKinnon et al, 2018) – routine operational and manufacturing functions are 
                                               
14 REALPOWER: News from the wind and marine energy industries, Issue 36, Spring 2014 
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evident on Humberside, whilst higher value knowledge functions are more 
evident in Glasgow;  
 Contrasting sub state institutional contexts are evident in relation to both paths 
(Gertler, 2010) e.g. the Glasgow path is also nested within and subject to 
devolved Scottish Government’s institutions and powers; 
 Differing forms of UK state activism (Dawley et al, 2015) can be identified - 
Glasgow hosts the HQ for the UK Government’s technology and innovation 
centre, Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult (OREC), while Humberside is 
the location of a significant inward investment by Siemens facilitated by the 
UK state; 
 Divergent local innovation capacities pertaining to the industry are evident in 
both regions – Glasgow exhibits characteristics associated with an 
organisationally thick and specialised regional innovation system (Trippl et al, 
2017), including a university recognised internationally for electrical power 
engineering research, whereas, Humberside exhibits characteristics of an 
operationally thin regional innovation system (Trippl et al, 2017).   
Corroborating this final point, The Economist (2011)15 observed that both Glasgow 
and Humberside were two regions in the UK well placed to benefit from the 
emergence of the Offshore Wind industry. However, it noted that the two regions’ 
offerings were markedly different; Glasgow’s predicated on knowledge and research 
and Humberside’s on proximity to the natural resource and excess port infrastructure. 
In short, the two cases of regional industrial path creation are pertinent for empirical 
observation to permit assessment and comparison of the respective multi-scalar 
processes of path creation in heterogeneous regional contexts. Thus providing fresh 
insight into what represents enabling and constraining environments (Martin, 2010; 
Dawley, 2013; MacKinnon et al, 2018) for path creation in relation to socio-technical 
transition. 
The temporal framing of the two cases of regional industrial path creation within the 
analytical framework relates to an approximate period of ten years between 2006 and 
late 2015. 2006 was the year in which an electricity utility firm established the first 
offshore wind team in Glasgow and, in the same year, Grimsby was identified by 
                                               
15 The Economist, 17/2/11 
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offshore wind project developers as an O&M base. In 2015, the end year for both 
cases, a significant change to the UK subsidy regime for offshore wind energy 
occurred (see Chapter 4). Although the cases are temporally bounded by these 
events relating to path creation, each is historically positioned in the following chapter 
in order to connect the cases to their regional preformation states and illuminate 
respective regional path dependences, assets and institutions.  
3.4  Research Method 
The research method implied by the analytical framework favours intensive and 
qualitative primary case research supported by secondary data analysis (Sayer, 
1992; Parsons and Knight, 2005; Peet, 1998; Pike et al, 2016b), enabling exploration 
of the “complex, fuzzy and difficult to isolate relations between institutionalised 
processes and economic outcomes” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013, p 1038).  Moreover, the 
employed research method enables comparative analysis and cross referencing of 
the empirical evidence across the cases to facilitate theoretical review and 
development. Secondary data sources are utilised to assist description of the two 
cases within their contexts, identify and position sources of primary research and 
augment and corroborate the primary research findings. This approach reflects mixed 
methods (Yeung, 2003), whereby the researcher uses differing “data collection, 
analysis and inference techniques, for the purpose of breadth of understanding and 
corroboration” (Johnson et al 2007, p 123). The approach reflects Yeung’s (2003) 
recommendation that the researcher adopts a methodology that facilitates 
triangulation; whereby distinct but complementary research methods corroborate 
research findings.  Given the limited availability of longitudinal quantitative data 
relating to each of the regional industrial paths an emphasis on qualitative enquiry is 
required. 
3.4.1  The Interplay of Primary and Secondary data 
Interviewee Identification 
In order to explore the path creating causal relations between path actors, assets and 
mechanisms, mediated by multi-scalar institutions, forty-nine actor interviews were 
undertaken to garner primary data. This section will firstly explain the interviewee 
selection process, which was crucially informed by secondary data, and then 
describe the preparation for and execution of these interviews.       
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Reflecting the multi-actor perspective (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Binz et al, 2016; 
MacKinnon et al 2018) of this research three broad path actor types were identified 
for interview in relation to each regional industrial case:  
 Firm actors (including representative bodies);  
 Non-firm actors relating to the state;  
 Non-firm actors relating to research.  
In addition, to reflect the enquiry’s multi-scalar perspective and facilitate a research 
process that can “follow” the unfolding paths (Pike et al, 2016b), actor selection was 
not restricted to those whose operational domain was at the regional level16. 
Therefore, to operationalise multi-scalar empirics, actors were also divided into three 
groupings reflecting their: relevance to one of the two selected industrial path cases 
(Glasgow or Humberside); or their relevance to the wider sector in which both cases 
were embedded. However, as inferred by the case study model (figure 3.3), a degree 
of porosity in regard to these actor groupings was accepted; for example extra-
regional sectoral path actors would have germane insights on the regional industrial 
cases and regional path actors would have germane insights on the broader sector.     
Additionally, given a key aspect of the research pertains to understanding strategic 
agency in the process of path creation, senior executives and policy makers with 
power to effect change were selected for interview. Furthermore, reflecting the 
analytical framework, interviewees were also selected according to their knowledge 
or representation of aspects of the institutional and/or sectoral and technological 
contexts in which the paths were set.   
Interviewees were identified via personal networks and secondary data. In 
recognition that job titles can misrepresent what a person does and their power within 
an organisation (Harvey, 2011), in-depth research regarding their relevance was 
undertaken, especially for potential interviewees outside my own industrial and 
government networks. This was largely done via utilisation of social media (primarily 
LinkedIn), organisational websites, published minutes, reviewing media sources, and 
discussion with my industry and government contacts. In short, in-depth utilisation of 
secondary data was crucial for identifying appropriate sources of primary data. 
                                               
16 London represented a spatial concentration of actors with a bearing on the wider sector’s development 
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This was a time intensive process and researching each potential interviewee could 
take upwards of half a day. Subsequently a spreadsheet was populated, thereby 
facilitating consideration of interviewee coverage in terms of the following factors:  
 Actor type (firm, non-firm state, non-firm research);  
 Case perspective (regional industrial path or broader sector);  
 Professional function and career history; 
 Institutional and technological knowledge; 
 Participation in industry networks and governance bodies; 
 And level of authority / power to effect change.  
Fifty interviewees were identified and forty-nine were subsequently interviewed in 
relation to the Glasgow and Humberside cases and the wider offshore wind sector 
(the latter largely undertaken in London). Comprehensive coverage in relation to the 
above noted factors was met.  
In particular, the quality of those interviewed was notable in terms of their seniority, 
knowledge and perspective. Many interviewees were key influencers within their 
respective actor types and across actor types. Also, many had chaired or participated 
in UK, Scottish and regional industrial, government and partnership fora: 
 Eight interviewees were at Principal / Vice Chancellor, Ministerial, CEO levels 
(the latter in both private and public organisations);   
 Thirteen were at senior director and director level in OEMs, utility companies 
and public bodies, such as Iberdrola, Siemens, Scottish Power, Scottish 
Enterprise, SSE; 
 Twenty-five were at senior manager or manager level in firms and public 
bodies, such as Associated British Ports, Atkins, BIS, Crown Estate, DECC, 
Innovate UK, local government, Scottish Government, The Treasury; 
 Three were executives in public bodies, such as the Welsh Government and 
local government.  
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 summarise the breakdown of the primary research interviewees.    
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Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 3.4: Interviewees by seniority  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 3.5: Interviewees by geography and actor type  
A more detailed summary of the actors that participated in the primary research is 
detailed in tabular form in the appendices, divided in to the two regional paths and 
the broader sectoral path and utilising the three path actor classifications 
(Appendices A, B and C). Anonymity for interviewees was adopted to encourage 
engagement and candour in interview. Therefore, a code was subsequently given to 
each interviewee that is utilised in the following case study chapters.        
 
54 
 
Positionality and Ethics 
The cohort of interviewees represented an elite (Zuckerman, 1972; Harvey, 2011) 
and therefore consideration of research positionality was required. An elite is defined 
as those who hold “important social network, social capital and strategic positions 
within social structures and are able to exert influence” (Harvey, 2011, p x) and who 
have “significant decision-making influence within and outside” organisations 
(Zuckerman, 1972, p 11). Given such status, there was the potential for those 
approached to feel suspicious or threatened by a request to be interviewed about 
matters that could be interpreted as professionally, commercially or politically 
sensitive. Therefore, I needed to elicit trust from my initial approach and 
subsequently during the conduct of the actual interview (Valentine, 2013).  Elite’s 
also have a high degree of vested interest in the status quo and therefore 
questioning needs to explore and challenge such positional perspectives without 
triggering withdrawal and detachment (Zuckerman, 1972; Clark, 1989; Cochrane, 
1998; Harvey, 2011).  
In regard to my own positionality, I have worked in economic and industrial 
development at management and director levels for over two decades. I am also the 
Chair of the Economic Development Association of Scotland (EDAS). This was 
advantageous as I am familiar with the culture and circumstance of the interviewees 
and positioned the research to enhance engagement and candour and mitigate their 
perception of the interviewer as supplicant (Desmond, 2004; Harvey, 2011). 
However, throughout the research process I had to be conscious of the need to 
manage the dialectic tension of “involvement and detachment” (Clark, 1998; 
Cochrane, 1998), which accordingly informed my interview preparation, approach 
and execution (Valentine, 2013), which is subsequently explained in this chapter. In 
particular, I managed the tension of occupying a space between being an insider and 
an outsider by ensuring that each interview followed a standard and structured 
sequential set of themes and questions derived from my analytical framework based 
on the literature review (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009).        
In addition, given my desire to engage with powerful and insightful actors and 
generate research findings which could have subsequent bearing and profile within 
their respective professional communities, my default position was that all interviews 
were anonymous in order to promote candour. This was explained in the letter of 
approach and at the start of the interview. If in exceptional circumstances there was 
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an unforeseen need or preference to name a contributor, I stated that their explicit 
permission would be sought. 
Interview Preparation and Approach 
The pre-planned interview discussion themes and questions were semi-structured in 
nature to enable the research interview to be a conversation with a purpose (Eyles, 
2008). The lines of enquiry were informed by the themes of the analytical framework. 
By utilising a non-rigid interview structure, opening up new lines of related enquiry or 
giving prominence to rewarding ones during the interview could be accommodated 
(Clark, 1998; Cochrane, 1998; Eyles, 2008; Valentine, 2013). Also, by deploying 
more open-ended questions, I was better placed to explore contending accounts of 
the relationships between causality, contingency and outcome with the interviewee, 
while still allowing scope for following up with close-ended questions to generate 
specific data. The discussion themes and questions were tailored to meet the 
specificities of three interviewee groupings – the Glasgow and Humberside industrial 
paths and the wider sector - with sufficient commonality retained to allow subsequent 
comparison (see Appendices D, E and F). A small number of initial pilot interviews 
were undertaken at the outset of the interview programme in December 2015 and 
following review the interview questions and process were adjusted to enhance 
generation of relevant data. This pilot process also tested and duly demonstrated the 
value of audio recording of the interviews in order to observe and respond to the 
subject and effectively manage the interview (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Harvey, 
2011; Valentine, 2013).   
Interviewees were approached via an emailed letter sent from my university account 
that detailed the nature and purpose of the research and emphasised its potential 
positive societal impact for government, industry and academia. The letter also 
clearly stated that their knowledge and insights would be beneficial. There was also 
reference to my own professional background: noting that I had worked in economic 
and industrial development for over twenty years (including senior positions with 
Scottish Enterprise and Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult) and that I was the 
Chair of the Economic Development Association of Scotland. By stating the potential 
societal impact of the research regarding awareness of the industry’s importance to 
national and regional development and also explaining my background, it mitigated 
the potential perception of the interviewer as supplicant (Desmond, 2004; Harvey, 
2011). Additionally the letter explained that their input would be anonymous. One 
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hour of time was requested for the interview and, if amenable, it was noted that a 
convenient date and location would be sought. It was stated that the recipient could 
withdraw from the process at any stage, in order to lessen any sense of pressure or 
obligation.  
Specific arrangements were either confirmed via email or telephone call, sometimes 
via their personal assistant. Due to the working practices of the interviewees some 
meetings were rearranged at short notice and flexibility was required (one interview 
took place in central London at 08.00hrs and a number of interviews were 
undertaken after normal working hours) but all took place, bar one. Furthermore, all 
were undertaken in person with the exception of two interviews that were conducted 
by telephone after being rescheduled on a number of occasions due to interviewees 
having to participate in meetings at short notice.   
Finally, prior to interview, I returned to secondary data collation, primarily 
contemporary media reports regarding the interviewee’s organisation, to understand 
current issues relating to their organisation that may influence or prejudice their 
responses and frame their reference. Such research also allowed me to demonstrate 
a knowledge and interest in their organisation during the interview. I also ensured 
that I was attuned to the current issues and sensitivities within the wider industry, 
such as the longer term prospects of the industry given significant changes to the 
government subsidy regime in 2015.  
Interview Execution  
The interviews were primarily undertaken over a six month period from December 
2015 to end May 2016, thereby ensuring a similar temporal context. However, there 
was a degree of phasing in the interview execution to ensure that I concentrated on 
one geographic focus at a time. This not only allowed me to prepare for and research 
one cohort of interviews in an efficient and sequential manner, it also ensured that I 
remained focused on the subsequent generation of and initial reflection on primary 
data from these specific geographies in a delineated fashion. Broadly speaking, 
Glasgow interviews were conducted between December 2015 and end January 
2016, wider sectoral interviews (primarily in London) were conducted in February 
2016 and Humberside interviews were conducted between March and May 2016.    
Most interviews took place in the interviewee’s place of work. The interview “warm-
up” (Valentine, 2013) consisted of providing an account of who I was and why I was 
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undertaking the research and underscoring its relevance to the development and 
understanding of the offshore wind industry, and explaining the importance of their 
input to the research in non-academic language. I then asked the interviewee to sign 
the consent form that I also counter signed. I then asked if it was acceptable to 
record the session. No interviewee refused and most quickly lost any inhibition. Only 
on two occasions did audio recording effect interview dynamics with one interviewee 
acceding to being recorded but then subsequently acting in a more guarded manner, 
while another asked me to stop the audio recording in order that they could expand 
on a sensitive commercial matter.  Before commencing the semi-structured interview, 
I summarised the sequence of the interview themes and noted that the interview 
should be concluded within the hour.    
Having researched personal career backgrounds, professional networks and current 
organisational issues pertaining to the interviewee, I was able during the course of 
the interview to demonstrate a knowledge of their professional and corporate 
positionality that gained me a degree of respect as an informed interlocutor and 
promoted interviewee candour (Desmond 2004; Harvey, 2011). This allowed for 
more challenging questions and lines of discussion to be explored in an affable 
manner. Also, during the interview, I did not lead the interviewee but I did encourage 
further exploration and validation of the utility of their contribution by using phrases 
such as “that’s useful” and “that’s interesting”. I also gave a sense of progress by 
communicating interview milestones (“moving on to the next theme” “we’re now 
moving on to the latter part of the interview”, “nearly finished”), in order that the 
interviewee did not become anxious about interview drift and poor time keeping by 
myself.  This also allowed the interviewee to communicate whether they were 
bounded by the pre-agreed one hour interview timeframe. In reality, most interviews 
lasted approximately one hour and fifteen minutes with a small number lasting for 
nearly two hours. 
During the interview “warm down” (Valentine, 2013), I informed the interviewee that I 
had switched off the audio recorder. This period of the interview was the most 
informal and facilitated discussion pertaining to the interviewee’s often more personal 
views, as opposed to more corporate ones. It was at this stage, I would also offer 
some of my own views informed by my research and career, before thanking them for 
their insights and time. This closing five or ten minutes was important for conveying 
respect and appreciation for their inputs. Many of the interviewees said the process 
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had been valuable for them, allowing them to step back and consider the 
development of the industry from a broader perspective. A small number of 
interviewees called the process “cathartic”. Most said I could contact them again and 
asked if the findings could be shared with them. Immediately after the interview, I 
made a note of the meeting to capture initial post impressions of the interview and 
transcribe any relevant points that had not been captured by audio recording (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2009). 
3.4.2  Sources and utilisation of secondary data 
Secondary data was utilised to situate and describe the Glasgow and Humberside 
regional industrial path cases in their wider historical, regional and sectoral contexts. 
As previously noted, this data also informed the research design, such as the 
interview preparation. Subsequently, secondary data facilitated corroboration of the 
primary research. Specifically, utilisation of these secondary sources provided: 
 Data on the preformation contexts of the two case study regions, including 
regional assets and previous patterns and paths of economic development, in 
order to place them in their historical and path dependent contexts;    
 Accounts of the development of the offshore wind industry both at the regional 
and the broader national and international sectoral level;  
 Data on the formal institutional environment (e.g. energy, industry and 
territorial policies and related regulation);  
 Information on power and functions of relevant path actors and data on the 
related informal institutional environment (e.g. networks, conventions); 
 Data on technological environment (e.g. offshore wind technologies and 
related practices);     
 A means to identify potential interviewees, shape the research questions and 
corroborate subsequent empirical findings.    
Secondary data was sourced from government at the local/regional, Scottish, UK and 
EU levels and business, industry and corporate publications, journals and media. 
Industry and business representative bodies at the regional level (including 
Chambers of Commerce), the national level (including Renewables UK and Scottish 
Renewables) and the international level (including the European Wind Energy 
Association) also represented important sources of data. Public records were also 
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utilised, such as Parliamentary reports and records17 and Board papers of economic 
and industrial development organisations.  Also, public data collected while working 
in the industry and attending UK Government, Scottish Government and European 
Commission meetings was utilised. However, the interpretation and application of 
these sources was tempered by Flowerdew and Martin’s (2013) recognition of the 
innate nature of such data: “Secondary data is a cultural artefact, produced for 
administrators with priorities and ways of seeing the world that may be very different 
from those underpinning your dissertation” (p 58). Finally, as noted, the ad-hoc 
nature of statistical evidence and inadequacy of longitudinal data sets, such as 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), relating to the offshore wind industry across 
spatial levels informed and delimited selection of research techniques (Clark, 2013).   
3.5  Data Analysis  
In order not to privilege a deductive or inductive approach in regard to the collation of 
the data from the interviews, thereby prejudicing subsequent analysis, two collation 
methods of interview data were adopted (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Crang, 
2013; Pike et al, 2016b). These were applied to the Glasgow interview data in the 
first instance and then Humberside. 
Firstly, a list of codes informed by the analytical framework was created to plot 
pertinent transcribed data for each case study derived from the interviews with the 
respective case actors and broader sectoral actors. The codes facilitated data 
collation in relation to: key path actors and types; operation of mechanisms; 
valorisation and reconfiguration of regional assets; utilisation of novel knowledge 
relating to the path; related influence of formal and informal institutions; interaction 
with dynamics of wider sector; key causal moments; and the scale and nature of the 
emergent regional industrial path and relationship with wider regional economy (see 
Appendix G). Against each of these primary categories, key outputs from my 
interviews were plotted and collated. This was done by summarising key data relating 
to the above categories on post-it notes and grouping recurrences on a wall 4 meters 
by 1.5 meters. 
                                               
17 For example, a record of a debate in the House of Commons on the evening of 9th February, 2016 relating to 
the development of the UK’s offshore wind industry that I attended 
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In order to utilise a more inductive approach, open coding was also adopted. This 
allowed for the transcribed data to be collated around emergent themes and 
meanings, thereby allowing interview data to be utilised in the identification, 
description and classification of patterns excluded by the former approach (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2009; Crang, 2013). In this method, post-it notes were grouped into 
emergent configurations. In turn, this approach generated, for example, fresh insights 
into the mutability of common purpose (as regional actors often defaulted to 
perceiving such purpose at a national or a local level, not a regional one), the 
relationship between strategic social agency and collective path narratives and 
conceptualisations (the metaphysical connection between words, things and action18) 
and cited counterfactuals of regional industrial path creation outcomes (i.e. 
interviewee perspectives on what could have been).  
In parallel, to these collation processes primary data was considered alongside 
secondary data for corroboration, context and auxiliary insight (Crang, 2013). 
Moreover, secondary data was also plotted along a timeline divided into years 
between 2006 and 2015 (inclusive) to identify temporal dynamics of the path and key 
instances of actor agency, institutional developments and technological change, and 
consider these against the primary research evidence (see Appendix H for a 
Glasgow example). 
This synthesis of primary and secondary data was then employed in the conceptual 
construction of the respective regional industrial path case studies pertaining to 
Glasgow and Humberside. The Glasgow case study was the first to de developed 
and drafted. Both case studies were developed to follow the respective journeys of 
path creation (Pike et al, 2016b), thereby facilitating exploration of the influence of 
multi-scalar institutions on enabling or constraining path creation. Driving this 
evolutionary narrative was the path’s manifestation delineated through time and 
space. Key observed episodes of path creation and related key instances of agency, 
identified through the data collation processes noted above, acted as temporal 
focusing devices for the application of the analytical framework. By adopting such an 
approach, empirical data relating to objects, subjects and levels could be identified 
and grouped within a segmented but integrated temporal framework (Martin and 
Sunley, 2013) and buried, deep-seated relations, positions and contexts of agents 
and inter-related structures revealed over time and space (Pike et al, 2016b). In 
                                               
18 With thanks to Rene Magritte, “Ceci n'est pas une pipe” 
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effect, each selected instance of path creating agency acted as a “Petri dish” to allow 
comparison within and across the respective cases on the influence of institutions on 
enabling or constraining path creation and the related interplay of differing actors, 
mechanisms and assets. 
In turn, this immersive but structured account of the phenomena (Clark, 1998) 
facilitated detailed comparative analysis of the two cases and utilisation of both 
deductive and inductive approaches (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Pike et al, 
2016b). This dualistic interplay of approaches ensured that theory contained in the 
literature review was confronted, refined and developed and its transfer from a world 
of abstraction to one of policy and practice facilitated (Martin and Sunley, 2014; Pike 
et al, 2016b).     
3.6 Communication of Findings 
Given a key aim of the research is to generate knowledge that is useful to policy 
(Gregory, 1994, Scott, 2000; Yeung, 2000; Martin and Sunley, 2013; Pike et al, 
2016b) and which has societal impact (REF, 2014) there is an intent to disseminate 
findings beyond academia. A programme for communicating the findings will be 
developed and progressed. In turn, the findings will be summarised and circulated to 
interviewees and other relevant stakeholders in the form of a policy briefing. Given 
that the research has focused on the multi-scalar nature of path creation, the findings 
will be circulated to relevant policy makers at the UK, Scottish and regional levels. In 
addition, a policy focused seminar for disseminating the findings will be held under 
the auspices of the Economic Development Association of Scotland and I will also 
utilise the findings in the context of my membership of the steering group for the 
Scottish Government’s Centre for Regional Inclusive Growth. I am also pursuing 
options in regard to publication and presenting at RSA conferences19.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained my ontological and epistemological approach to the 
research. In adopting a Critical Realist perspective complemented by the analytical 
position of Geographical Political Economy, my research is well placed to consider 
the relationships between agency and structure in a manner which links spatial-
industrial economic evolution to broader questions of power, value creation and 
                                               
19 Initial findings were also shared at a CURDS internal seminar and the AAG Conference in Boston, 2017 
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uneven development across scales. By developing a hybrid case study model that is 
sympathetic to distinctive regional contexts whilst explicitly accommodating the 
broader multi-scalar relations and dependencies in which both cases are embedded, 
the regional path’s evolution and related enabling and constraining institutional 
environments can be explored through time and space. Moreover, the Glasgow and 
Humberside cases were selected for their instrumental value regarding the influence 
of transition on heterogeneous regional contexts, albeit ones effected by the same 
nation state “rules”. It is to understanding the broader sectoral and regional 
preformation case settings that the study now turns. 
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Chapter 4: Positioning the Cases within Sectoral and Regional 
Contexts   
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it positions both cases in the broader, 
longitudinal process of socio-technical energy transition, particularly in relation to the 
development of offshore wind (Geels, 2004; Markard and Truffer, 2008). Secondly, it 
frames both cases in their respective pre-formation regional contexts (Martin, 2010). 
This dualistic contextualisation facilitates subsequent case analysis of the interaction 
of broader sectoral dynamics and regional heterogeneity to engender path creation 
and the role of institutions in mediating this interaction (Boschma et al, 2017; Trippl et 
al, 2017; MacKinnon et al, 2018).  
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first delineates and considers the 
institutions, actors and technologies which mediated energy transition, especially 
relating to offshore wind. In doing so, it will initially consider the formation of the 
offshore wind market between 1990 and 2015, a process that was primarily state-led, 
before turning to the related formation of the industrial value chain, a process that 
was primarily firm led. The second part of the chapter explores Glasgow and 
Humberside’s unique path pre-formation contexts, including regional assets (Maskell 
and Malmberg, 1999; Martin and Sunley, 2006), which had the potential to interact 
with the dynamics of the broader offshore wind sector. Also, regional institutional 
contexts that shaped continuity and change in both regional economies are explored 
(MacLean, 2001; MacKinnon et al, 2009; Evenhuis, 2017). Finally, there is a 
concluding reflection on the importance of sectoral and regional positioning of the 
cases prior to presentation of the Glasgow and Humberside case studies.    
4.2 Development of Offshore Wind Sector Part 1: Formation of the Market 
4.2.1 Overview  
The offshore wind energy market is a product of the global political drive to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and is a distinct and notable aspect of the broader 
process of socio-technical energy transition. Since the 1990s an explicit and 
calibrated relationship between government institutions and the offshore wind 
market’s evolution has been evident, reflecting the contention that energy transition is 
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an instituted process (Essletzbichler, 2012; Truffer and Coenen, 2012; Coenen et al, 
2012). This section will consider the emergence of this market between 1990 and 
2015. It will do so by initially exploring how institutions incentivised mindful actor 
deviation and experimentation to create a terrestrial wind market, the antecedent of 
offshore wind (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Martin, 2010: Steen, 2016). It will then 
consider how changes to these institutions, particularly policy and regulatory “rules” 
(North, 1990; Peck, 1999; Geels, 2004; Gertler, 2010) produced consequent actor 
deviation to create an offshore wind market, with particular focus on the UK, including 
consideration of the devolved Scottish context. Finally, it will identify the resulting 
scale of the offshore wind market at the UK and EU levels; thereby setting the scene 
for an account of the development of the related industry value chain.    
4.2.2 Multi-scalar institutions and energy transition  
The international commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, initiated by the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992, fostered new 
energy markets and enabling technologies to counter global carbon-based energy 
path dependence (David, 1988,1994; Arthur; 1987, 1994; Geels, 2002; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006). In 2007, European Union member states agreed a collective target of 
reducing greenhouse gases by 20% from the 1990 level by 2020, subsequently 
revised to a 40% reduction by 2030. This EU level intent was paralleled in individual 
member states. For example, in the UK, the Climate Change Act of 2008 set an 80% 
cut in the UK’s carbon emissions by 2050; and by doing so, the UK became the first 
country in the world to introduce long-term legally binding targets.  
In order to meet these ambitions, targets relating to the generation of renewable 
energy were also introduced. The EU’s Renewables Energy Directive of 2009 set a 
legally binding target of 20% of electricity from renewables by 2020; a target revised 
upwards in 2014 to 27% by 2030. Again these commitments were played out at a 
sub-EU level. For example, Denmark in 2011 set a target of 100% of electricity from 
renewable sources by 2035 and, in the same year, the Scottish Government set a 
target of 100% by 2020. However, the renewable energy technologies on which the 
attainment of these targets was dependent were commercially uncompetitive at their 
introduction. Therefore, the process of global energy transition required significant 
public subsidy and support to engender renewable energy markets. To facilitate this 
65 
 
transition, circa $88bn of public subsidy per annum (EWEA, 2013) was being 
awarded to the European renewables energy sector by 2011.  
One particular disruptive technology, onshore wind, emerged as key to delivering 
targets cost-effectively. A number of related economic and technological factors - 
especially investor confidence derived from public support and the scaling up of the 
generating power of the standard turbine model (the single rotor horizontal axis) - 
allowed the cost of terrestrial wind power to fall by a factor of three over two decades. 
By 2015 the cost of generation in the UK was £55 pMWH compared with a wholesale 
price of £40-£50 (ORE Catapult, 2015). Such encouraging economics allowed the 
global cumulative capacity of this disruptive technology to rise from 5 gigawatts (GW) 
in the early 1990s to over 432 GW in 2015 (Global Wind Energy Council, 2016). 
However, with such scaling up came concerns about the reliability of the onshore 
wind resource, the finite nature of development sites and environmental impact.  
In light of these concerns, the benefits of larger and more consistent offshore wind 
resources harnessed by adapting an onshore technology that had evidenced 
impressive cost reduction was compelling. As summarised by Ernst and Young 
(2015, p 6): “Power fluctuations are small due to the constant and consistent nature 
of wind offshore. Thanks to its improved predictability and reliability, offshore wind is 
also better suited than onshore wind to provide operating reserve capacity to the 
electricity network”. The first offshore wind turbines became operational in Danish 
waters in 1991, and were introduced to UK waters in 2000, demonstrating the 
viability of the technology, if not the market.  
The emergence of a viable market was both enabled and constrained by changing 
nation state disposition. Concern regarding the financial burden of subsidies on 
domestic and industrial consumers has led to fluctuating levels of policy and 
regulatory support for renewable energy in EU states, especially post 2008. As 
observed by EWEA (2013, p 9): “Weakened legislative frameworks, economic crises 
and austerity measures implemented across Europe are hitting the wind industry.”  
For example, Germany in 2014 addressed the cost of renewable energy subsidies - 
which had grown to 16bn Euros in 2013 – by revising its Renewable Energy Sources 
Act to limit renewable energy surcharges.  The Journal of Offshore Wind (2014, p 12) 
noted that Germany’s reform “means a more gradual shift to the adoption of 
renewable energy such as offshore wind”. In other EU countries with offshore wind 
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ambitions, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, this measured approach was also 
evident. Therefore, government prioritisation directly impacted on the size, speed and 
geographic manifestation of the market. It is to specifically exploring policy in the UK 
and its impact on market manifestation that the chapter turns. 
4.2.3 UK state institutions and energy transition 
Since the emergence of the “Big Six”20 electricity utility firms from the privatisation of 
state assets in 1990, enabled by the Conservative Government’s Electricity Act of 
1989, UK energy policy has been premised on market liberalisation and competition. 
The UK, unlike countries with nationalised utility companies, in essence forfeited the 
ability to directly manage the electricity market.  Therefore, changes to the energy 
system that were not commercially competitive were incentivised through subsidies 
for private firms. As part of the Electricity Act of 1989, a Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
(NFFO) was introduced. The NFFO required electricity suppliers to buy electricity 
from renewable electricity generators and guaranteed purchase at fixed prices for 
fifteen year contract periods. Even so, suppliers demonstrated high levels of path 
dependence (David, 1994; Arthur; 1999; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010; 
Boschma et al, 2017) in relation to the established carbon-based energy regime and 
by 1999 onshore wind generated only 344 MW of electricity, less than 0.15% of 
national consumption.  
However, by 2014 this terrestrial energy source was generating 12 GW, an increase 
of over thirty fold on the 1999 figure, contributing almost 9.5 % to national 
consumption.  This step change was contingent on institutional factors incentivising 
actors to deploy this disruptive energy technology by creating expectations of future 
reward and minimising future uncertainty (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2014; Steen 2016; 
Evenhuis, 2017).  Notably, these included: 
 The UK’s UNFCCC and EU obligations and related enabling legislation 
(Energy White Paper, 2003; Energy Review, 2006; Climate Change Act, 2008; 
etc.) signalled long-term state commitment to decarbonisation;  
 A significant proportion of the UK’s carbon and nuclear power generating 
infrastructure was nearing end of operational life and wind power was seen by 
                                               
20 British Gas/Centrica (UK owned), EDF Energy (French owned), E.On (German owned); RWE Npower (German 
owned), Scottish Power (Spanish owned), SSE (UK owned) 
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policy makers as a credible, clean and increasingly cost-efficient contributor to 
securing supply.     
However, one institutional factor in particular should be singled out for enhancing 
expectation of reward and mitigating uncertainty amongst the UK’s electricity 
generators, thereby incentivising adoption of this disruptive technology. In 2002, the 
Renewables Obligation (RO) subsidy was introduced in the Utilities Act (2000). 
Through the RO, the UK Government placed an obligation on suppliers to source a 
proportion of their electricity from renewable energy sources. Electricity suppliers met 
this obligation by purchasing Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs), either from 
renewable generators or from the ROCs market, the cost of which was borne by 
consumers21. The twenty year support period for the generators within the RO regime 
compared favourably with the fifteen year period of the NFFO; generating sufficient 
long-term confidence to encourage purposive agency via experimentation (Martin, 
2010) amongst electricity utility firms and their institutional investors. Subsequently, 
to promote the development of alternate disruptive technologies, differing RO 
bandings were introduced in 2009 with offshore wind receiving 2 ROCs per MWh 
compared with 0.9 ROCs per MWh for onshore wind.  
Complementing this benign subsidy environment for the UK’s Offshore Wind Market 
was one particularly significant institutional innovation. In 2001, The Crown Estate, 
the owner and landlord of the UK’s seabed, launched its first leasing round for 
offshore wind farm sites in the knowledge that geographic factors, such as water 
depths and wind conditions, around much of the UK’s coast were conducive to 
development. Given the infancy of offshore wind technologies, this first leasing round 
focused on lower risk shallow, near to shore sites that were economic to develop. 
Crown Estate leases for these sites and the related planning consents, granted by 
DECC on the recommendation of the UK Planning Inspectorate, were awarded to 
project developers, usually large electricity utility firms, deviating from their terrestrial 
business models. In 2003, given the positive response to the first round, a second 
one was launched by The Crown Estate. Buoyed by the anticipated more generous 
RO subsidy to be introduced in 2009 and project developer appetite for the previous 
rounds, The Crown Estate in 2008 launched its final UK round to date. Round 3 
                                               
21 Although the cost of this subsidy was paid for by consumers, a period of real term wage increase allowed this 
consumption levy to be increased with limited consumer anxiety, thus minimising political concern 
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offered nine large offshore zones for development, some of which gained consents 
for windfarms in excess of 1 GW (figure 4.1). In short by 2009, the UK state had 
successfully aligned leasing, consenting and subsidy.  
 
             Source: The Times, 2008   
Figure 4.1: Location of Crown Estate rounds 
Given the interaction of favourable institutional and geographic factors, the purposive 
agency (Martin, 2010) of all the “Big Six” private electricity utility firms was triggered. 
These UK project developers were supplemented by European energy companies, 
such as the state owned firms of Dong (Danish), Statoil (Norway) and Vattenfall 
(Sweden) and private firms such as Mainstream (Ireland) and EDP (Portugal). In 
particular, Dong became a dominant developer with an exclusive or shared stake in a 
third of Round 1 and 2 operational windfarms (Renewables UK, 2013). Moreover, as 
offshore wind technology matured driven by a growing publicly subsidised market, 
international institutional investors and lenders became more active in the financing 
and refinancing of offshore wind farms. However, as noted by European Wind 
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Energy Association, this led to developers further aligning their interests with those of 
institutional investors who favoured lower risk projects with higher and faster rates of 
commercial return premised on the application of tried and tested technologies 
(EWEA, 2015). The implications of this business model for the technological path 
dependence of the industry were profound (David, 1994; Arthur; 1999; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; Boschma et al, 2017).  
4.2.4 Austerity and the UK’s offshore wind market 
Following the financial crisis of 2008 many EU Governments pursued policies of 
austerity that adversely effected market development relating to energy transition. 
Likewise, the UK’s Coalition Government formed in 2010 framed its programme for 
government in the doctrine and convention of austerity (Martin, 2000; Evenhuis, 
2017), signalling its intent to reduce the cost of offshore wind by establishing the 
Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Task Force in 2011. Subsequently, the Energy Act of 
2013 reversed the perceived largesse of the ROC regime by introducing a Levy 
Control Framework (LCF) capping subsidies for renewable technologies. Linked to 
this, DECC in 2014 introduced a new subsidy regime, Contracts for Difference (CfD) 
based on an industry Strike-Price model for low carbon generation22. The Strike-Price 
ensured that if the average market price for offshore wind electricity fell below the 
pre-agreed figure a generator would receive the difference in subsidy during a fifteen 
year period (rather than the more generous twenty year period offered to developers 
by ROCs)23. Between 2014 and 2017, DECC indicated that the Strike-Price should 
fall from £155 per MWh to £140 MWh for offshore wind.  Moreover, the allocation of 
the CfD subsidy was based on competitive bidding between developers. This auction 
saw bids of less than £120 per MWh being accepted by DECC for two offshore wind 
projects scheduled for commencement in 2017/18. However, these two projects 
represented only 1.1GW of the 25 GW of offshore wind projects in development. 
Lawyers, Burness Paull, commented (Ward, 2015, blog): “With offshore developers 
said to be spending in the region of £15m to £20m on their projects to simply get to 
the auction stage, a funding pot that does not provide the necessary levels of comfort 
or certainty is an unattractive and risky proposition”. This new phase of state support 
                                               
22 A transitional subsidy, Final Investment Decision Enabling for Renewables, FIDER, was introduced in 2013 
23 At times when the market price exceeds the strike price the generator is required to pay back the difference 
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for market creation led to institutional divergence between leasing and subsidy, 
thereby creating many doubtful projects in the UK’s project pipeline.  
In 2015, a Conservative government was elected. Soon after, the Secretary of State 
for Energy and Climate Change announced24 that gas, nuclear and offshore wind 
electricity generation were to be the key components of UK’s electricity mix. 
However, the Minister emphasised that government support for offshore wind was 
conditional on steep cost reduction and signalled a non-binding commitment to no 
more than three additional CfD auction rounds by 2020, facilitating a total cumulative 
capacity of 10 GW. Concerns regarding increasing policy uncertainty became evident 
in the industry. Niall Stuart, Chief Executive at Scottish Renewables, an industry 
body, told the Energy and Climate Change Committee at Westminster: “If you’re an 
offshore wind developer, you know there is an intention to have three allocation 
rounds in this parliament, but we don’t know the exact timescales. People are scaling 
back investment or freezing investment altogether on projects that they don’t see a 
clear market for” (Energy Voice website, 2016). In short, institutional triggers were 
now insufficient to stimulate market creation on a scale that had been previously 
anticipated. 
4.2.5 The Scottish institutional context and the offshore wind market 
To frame the Glasgow case there is a need to explore the devolved institutional 
context in which it was also nested. As evidenced by its globally significant 
renewable energy targets, the Scottish Government aimed to be an international 
leader in renewable energy generation, including offshore wind. This ambition was 
matched by the scale of the offshore wind energy resource, estimated at 25% of the 
European total (Scottish Government, 2013) and the presence of mature offshore 
engineering capability relating to oil and gas. 
Despite the size of resource, political will and relevant know-how, challenging 
oceanographic conditions, such as water depths, and prejudicial distance from large 
UK urban markets, a disadvantage compounded by the prohibitive charging model of 
the National Grid, were impediments to exploitation. Even so, the SNP Government 
from assuming office in 2007 promoted market development through the institutional 
means at its disposal, initially relating to spatial consenting and planning. To address 
the lack of Scottish sites in The Crown Estate’s first and second leasing rounds, the 
                                               
24 Amber Rudd’s “Course Correction” speech of November 2015 
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Scottish Government worked with The Crown Estate to launch the dedicated Scottish 
Territorial Waters (STW) Round in 2009, promoting ten development zones with a 
combined potential generating capacity of over 6 GW (figure 4.2). In the following 
year, the Scottish Government established a new agency, Marine Scotland, to 
oversee marine management and planning, including the licencing and consenting of 
offshore wind farms. In 2011, Marine Scotland published a marine planning 
framework for offshore wind. The document represented a global first and was 
commended by the European Commission.  
 
                                                                                              Source: The Crown Estate, 2013 
Figure 4.2: Scottish territorial water sites 
Consequently, in 2013 the Scottish Government utilised its Renewables Obligation 
Scotland (ROS) powers, which were devolved from the UK ROCs subsidy 
framework25.  The Scottish Government incentivised innovative projects by setting a 
band of 2.5 ROCs for offshore wind test and demonstration sites and a band of 3.5 
ROCs for pilot projects relating to floating turbines. These higher rates, as compared 
                                               
25 A devolved power that was withdrawn by Westminster in 2017 through the UK Energy Act of 2013 
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with the rest of the UK, were introduced to encourage turbine innovation and, 
particularly, floating foundation innovation to negate the need for costly conventional 
foundations in deeper waters. Given the targeted nature of the SRO, the devolved 
government was arguably a market adaptor rather than a market creator, creating a 
protected space from market norms akin to a niche (Smith and Raven, 2012), in 
which disruptive technologies could be developed and demonstrated. 
4.2.6 Scale of the international and UK offshore wind energy market 
As noted, fluctuating institutional responses shaped the emergence of the offshore 
wind energy market. In 2015, the Global Wind Energy Council observed that the 
creation of the global offshore wind market was a slower, more truncated process 
than envisaged. By the end of that year, just over 12 GW was installed globally. Of 
this, over 11GW was located in the waters of eleven European countries with almost 
70% being located in the North Sea (fig 4.3). 
 
Based on EWEA, 2016 
Figure 4.3: European installed cumulative capacity by sea basin 
In 2015, the UK was the world’s largest offshore wind market accounting for 5.1 GW 
of generation with c. 1,500 turbines, representing 46% of the European total, followed 
by Germany with 3.3 GW with c. 800 turbines, representing 30% of the European 
total (table 4.1). However, to put the EU’s total roll-out of installed capacity of 11 GW 
in the perspective of earlier expectations, DECC (2013) had anticipated 10 GW solely 
in UK waters by 2015 and the Crown Estate (2010) had projected 15GW by 2015 as 
possible, with 30GW by 2020. The anticipated momentum was just not there. 
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Country BE DE DK ES FI IE NL NO PT SE UK Total 
No. of farms 5 18 13 1 2 1 6 1 1 5 27 80 
No. of 
turbines 
182 792 513 1 9 7 184 1 1 86 1454 3230 
Capacity 
installed 
(MW) 
712 3295 1271 5 26 25 427 2 2 202 5061 11027 
 
Based on EWEA, 2016 
Table 4.1: No. of wind farms and turbines and capacity installed in European waters by end 
2015 
The UK’s leading position was a product of a spurt of installation based on Round 1 
(2001) and 2 (2003) projects being progressed in the context of an actuating and 
aligned leasing, planning and subsidy framework; benign conditions further 
emphasised by the third Crown Estate leasing round and the increase in state 
subsidy in 2009 (fig 4.4).  
However, the degree of UK industrial benefit associated with offshore wind was not 
commensurate with the UK’s leading market position. It is to understanding this 
relationship the chapter turns. 
 
         Based on EWEA, 2016 
Figure 4.4 Cumulative and annual European offshore wind installations (MW)  
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4.3 Development of Offshore Wind Sector Part 2: The Industrial Value Chain                                   
4.3.1 Overview 
The second part of this section considers the institutions, actors and technologies 
that shaped the scale, nature and timing of the offshore wind’s industrial value chain 
with a particular focus on the UK. At the outset, there is consideration of the factors 
that facilitated and delimited industrial diversification from onshore wind to offshore 
wind technologies. Consequently, the section considers the role of industry policy 
with particular foci on the UK nation state and Scottish devolved government 
contexts. Finally, it concludes by presenting the resulting shape and scale of the 
industrial supply chain and economic benefit.  
4.3.2 Institutions, technological selection and diversification 
As noted, onshore wind experienced a significant cost reduction trajectory achieved 
by the scaling up of the principal wind turbine design (the single rotor horizontal axis 
turbine).  Although alternates designs were deployed, rapid adoption and subsequent 
economies of scale ensured it became the incumbent technology for onshore wind; 
with the average onshore wind turbine size growing from 0.5MW in 1990 to 3 MW by 
2012 (EWEA, 2015). This disruptive terrestrial technology and its rapidly maturing 
research and supply chain relationships were to have a significant influence on the 
nature of the offshore wind industry. 
The first offshore wind farm was constructed in Danish waters in 1991. Although the 
challenge of designing, installing and maintaining such a facility in a maritime 
environment should not be under-estimated, this technological first was predicated 
on diversification of a terrestrial incumbent technology (the single rotor horizontal axis 
turbine) to a marine environment. Offshore wind did not represent a wholly distinct 
new technology but rather the diversification of a terrestrial one. Moreover, in Europe 
this technology was dominated by a few OEMs with mature supply chains with 
industrial concentrations in Denmark, Germany and Spain (Garud and Karnoe, 2003, 
2012; Forhahl et al, 2012; Elola et al, 2013). Critically, a number of cost-related 
factors promoted technological path dependence in the emerging offshore wind 
industry: 
 Shallow, near to shore waters were preferred by developers due to such 
conditions readily favouring economic and lower risk diversification of 
terrestrial technology; subsequently, shallow water technologies dominated 
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(e.g. mono-pile foundations accounted for 80% of substructures by the end of 
2015, as compared with deeper water floating substructures which accounted 
for only 0.1% ). This predisposition to deploy in shallow waters remained 
dominant in the UK (fig 4.5). 
 
               Based on EWEA, 2016 
Figure 4.5: Water depth, distance to shore and size of wind farms in construction in 2015 
 Given terrestrial incumbent technology was commercially proven, institutional 
investors favoured diversification and scaling of the generating capacity of this 
technology rather than the introduction of radical new technology (in 1991 
offshore wind turbines were less than 0.5 MW in capacity but by 2015 the 
largest had a capacity of 8MW – fig 4.6). 
 Government priorities emphasised affordability, energy security and 
decarbonisation ensuring subsidy regimes privileged rapid incremental scaling 
of proven technology, thereby dis-incentivising longer term non-
commercialised radical technologies. 
76 
 
 
       Based on Dong Energy, 2016 
Figure 4.6: Increasing size of offshore wind turbines (from 0.45MW to 8MW) 
4.3.3 The industrial value chain    
This section will consider how firm-led agency, mediated by state institutions, shaped 
the development of the industry’s value chain. It was one that largely mirrored its 
terrestrial antecedent, composed of a deployment chain and a manufacturing chain 
running in parallel with multiple points of interaction. Not only was the structure of the 
value chain similar, so too were many of the key actors within it. The diagram below 
is a representation of the value chain (fig 4.7).    
 
Source: Lema et al 2011, p 10 
Figure 4.7: The industry value chain 
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In Europe, due to high entry costs, the deployment chain was rapidly dominated by 
incumbent terrestrial actors, typically energy utility companies. By 2014 DONG, 
Vattenfall, E.On and RWE generated over 50% of European offshore wind electricity 
(EWEA, 2015). In the UK, the “Big Six” were early actors, augmented by European 
energy companies, such as the state owned Danish firm, Dong. 
These energy companies in the role as offshore wind project developers maintained 
relationships with their terrestrial suppliers. Subsequently, the parallel manufacturing 
chain became dominated by two prominent onshore wind OEM actors: the German 
firm Siemens, which was awarded all UK offshore turbine orders in 2011 
(Renewables UK, 2013); and the Danish firm Vestas. The absence of competition 
was largely a result of changing state energy policies leading to a smaller offshore 
wind market than projected (e.g. UK market projections fell from 30GW to 10 GW for 
2020 between 2011 and 2014). Thus, state derived future expectations of reward 
(Steen, 2016) amongst potential rival OEMS and new entrants were insufficient to 
encourage or sustain their deviation to develop new offshore wind turbines (Garud 
and Karnoe, 2003).  
In turn, uncertain market size and political pressure to achieve cost reductions led to 
the few OEMs active in the market pursuing economies of scale via consolidation. 
The table below (table 4.2) details key instances of OEM amalgamation in Europe 
that led to Siemens and MHI Vestas having nearly 90% market share by 2015 (figure 
4.8). Thus, the resulting industrial value chain could be characterised as oligopolistic 
in nature and predisposed to technological path dependence and spatial 
concentration in existing manufacturing and research hubs, especially in Denmark 
and Germany (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Binz et al, 2016; Boschma et al, 2017). 
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TIME 
 
Bonus (Denmark) in 1991 
supplies turbines to first OW 
farm 
 
Siemens (Germany) in 2004 
purchases Bonus 
 
Siemens (2015) enters 
negotiations to purchase 
Gamesa and potentially Adwen 
Gamesa (Spain) in 2014 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 
Adwen (2015) created via 
joint venture between  
Gamesa and Areva 
 
Areva (France) in 2009 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 REPower (Germany) in 2001 
introduces its first OW turbine 
Suzlon (India) in 2007 
purchases majority 
shareholding: renamed 
REPower Senvion 
Centerbridge (USA) in 2016 
purchases Senvion from Suzlon 
Mitsubishi (Japan) in 2010 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 
MHI Vestas (2013) created via joint venture between Vestas & 
Mitsubishi 
 
Vestas (Denmark) in 2002 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 GE (USA) in 2004 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 
GE (2015) purchases Alstom 
Alstom (France) in 2012 
introduces its first OW turbine 
Nordex (Germany) in 2006 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 
 
Nordex (2012) withdraws from OW; purchases Acciona 2015 and 
offers to sell 6MW OW turbine design in 2015 Acciona (Spain) in 2013 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 
Samsung (South Korea) in 
2013 
introduces its first OW turbine 
 
Samsung (2015) withdraws from OW 
Clipper Windpower (USA) in 
2008 
announces plan for OW turbine 
 
 
United Technologies (US) purchase major stake in Clipper 
Windpower; 2011 withdraws from OW 
Doosan Babcock (S. Korea) in 
2011 announces plan for OW 
turbine 
 
Doosan Babcock (2012) withdraws from OW 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 4.8: Consolidation of wind turbine firms in Europe   
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                 Based on EWEA, 2016 
Figure 4.9: OEM share of cumulative number of turbines connected to the grid by end 2015  
Reflecting the underlying logic of the industrial system (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; 
Martin and Sunley, 2006), the parallel value chain comprised not only the energy 
utility firms and OEMs but also firms relating to pre-deployment functions (including 
assessment, planning and design), construction functions (including production and 
installation of foundations, towers, cabling and electrics) and finally operations and 
maintenance. These varied functions exhibited differing levels of spatial mobility. 
Construction and assembly functions required to be as close to an offshore wind farm 
site as possible, whilst higher value pre-deployment, manufacturing and research 
functions, were often concentrated in a small number of locations embedded in extra-
regional and regional knowledge networks  (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Bathelt et al, 
2004; Boschma, 2005; Trippl et al, 2017). Furthermore, given the oligopolistic hue of 
the industry, offshore wind innovation was increasingly characterised by bounded 
collaborative incremental innovation as compared with open dispersed radical 
innovation (Karnoe and Garud, 2012; Elola et al, 2013).  
Finally, given that no national markets of the previously anticipated scale were 
created, firms re-calibrated their plans and focused on supplying the pan-European 
market rather than just national ones. This led to supply chain investments being 
concentrated in a small number of European manufacturing and research hubs, such 
as Bremerhaven, Hamburg and Cuxhaven in Germany, Brande, Aalborg and 
Engesvang in Denmark and Hull in the UK.  
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To summarise, the domination of the parallel value chain by a small number of firms 
whose relationships often pre-dated offshore wind diversification rapidly created 
technological path dependence (David, 1994; Arthur; 1999; Geels, 2004; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; Boschma et al, 2017). This outcome was fostered by austerity-oriented 
horizontal state energy policies and regulation that stymied projected market growth 
and placed emphasis on cost reduction. It is to understanding state vertical industrial 
policies, especially in relation to the UK, that the section turns. 
4.3.4 Industry policy and the development of the offshore wind industry 
Since the early 1990s renewable energy has been promoted by the state as a means 
of promoting industrial development, thereby assuaging public concerns over the 
costs of energy transition. At the European level, the EU’s Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan (EC, 2008) forecasted the creation of 250,000 jobs in onshore and 
offshore wind industries by 2020, whilst the opportunity of energy transition became 
central to the spatial development strategies of DG REGIO and DG MARE. Similarly, 
successive UK Governments and the Scottish Government have been bullish about 
the potential industrial and economic benefits of offshore wind. 
In 2009, the UK Labour Government promoted offshore wind in its document 
“Building Britain’s future – New Industry, New Jobs” (UK Government, 2009) which 
set out its vision for economic recovery post financial crisis. From 2010 onwards, 
offshore wind was enfolded within the Coalition Government’s policies for industrial 
development and economic rebalancing. Such prioritisation was founded on studies 
indicating that the economic benefit from this new transition industry could be 
substantial. One Government report (ORE Catapult, 2014) estimated that a 15 GW 
roll-out of offshore generation could create 34,000 direct jobs and an additional £6.7 
billion per annum of GVA by 2020. In addition, the report stated that (p 10):  
“The UK will benefit from investment in strategically important technologies 
and markets, economic diversification, increased international trade and 
greater economic competitiveness. The UK benefits generated in terms of 
wealth and employment creation will not be concentrated in one or two regions 
but will be dispersed across many local economies in the UK.”   
Yet, despite the UK leading the world in offshore wind electricity generation, it was 
estimated that only 15% of the related capital expenditure went to UK companies, 
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compared with 70% for oil and gas (ORE Catapult, 2014). An in-depth survey 
concluded the UK supply chain was partial and reliant on foreign owned companies 
(BVG, 2013).  
Furthermore, this lack of an indigenous supply chain was reflected in patent activity. 
Between 1999 and 2008 Germany submitted over 800 related applications to the 
EPO for wind energy and the UK 127 (OECD, 2013)26. Although UK researchers 
published more papers than those in any other EU member state much of this output 
related to theoretical blue-sky research (Wieczorek et al, 2013). Given the pressing 
government priorities of affordability, security of supply and decarbonisation, 
developers and their tier one OEM suppliers were applying and commercialising 
research that was closer to market.   
To address the limited economic benefit derived from both the UK’s leading market 
and research positions, the Coalition Government in 2013 launched the Offshore 
Wind Industrial Strategy (OWIS). Given that the first Crown Estate leasing round was 
launched twelve years before and enhanced subsidies for offshore wind projects 
introduced four years earlier, the seemingly belated strategy does indicate a 
tardiness on the part of the UK Government in co-ordinating vertical and horizontal 
policies (Barca et al, 2012; Dawley et al, 2015). Despite this interval, the first section 
of the strategy strikingly stresses the significance of regulation and subsidy in 
creating the conditions for capital investment and enterprise development. Thereby 
echoing BVG’s observation (2012) that supply chain development, market growth 
and subsidy are inextricably interlinked. There are three other themes relating to 
investment and enterprise development in the strategy that are worthy of illumination. 
These are considered in the table below (4.2). 
Inward 
Investment 
The OWIS established the Offshore Wind Investment Organisation (OWIO) to 
promote inward investment. This response reflected the observation by the 
main industry body that “the UK needs to secure significant inward investment 
from first tier manufacturers to build upon the limited manufacturing base, in 
contrast to our competitors who already have supply chains built from onshore 
wind”27. In tandem, six regional Centres of Offshore Renewable Engineering 
(CORE) were established to attract such investment. The COREs were 
investment sites to be promoted by partnership between national and local 
government and LEPs. 
                                               
26 Data refers to both offshore and onshore patents 
27 Renewables UK, Annual Report, 2013 
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Supply Chain 
Development / 
SME support 
Given the low levels of UK content, a central aim of the OWIS was to increase 
UK sourcing, reflecting a Government ambition of 50% of content to be UK 
sourced.  A UK Government supply chain review in 2013 identified opportunities 
but also challenges for UK companies to attain such an increase, especially for 
SMEs, including limited scale, capability and relationships. In 2014, a regulatory 
means for delivering this ambition was introduced. As part of the new CfD 
subsidy regime, bidders had to submit a supply chain plan. Government 
guidance (DECC, 2014) stated that the plans were to encourage an open and 
competitive UK supply chain and the promotion of innovation to drive down 
costs. Also due to OWIS, national and regional SME support programmes were 
introduced.  
Innovation The most evident example of OWIS’s commitment to encouraging innovation 
was the creation of the Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult (ORE Catapult).  
The technology and innovation centre, headquartered in Glasgow and with test 
and demonstration facilities in North East England, represented a Government 
investment of £50m over five years. The centre was tasked with engendering 
innovation via collaboration between industry, academia and government28 and 
aimed to build a bridge between the close to market research needs of industry 
and the more theoretical focus of universities. ORE Catapult also promoted 
innovation in specific industry knowledge areas, such as electrical 
infrastructure, foundations and sub-structures, performance monitoring and 
O&M. 
Source: Own elaboration 
Table 4.2: Investment and enterprise themes of OWIS 
The informal conventions (Martin, 2000) of the UK Government also influenced 
policies and practices that shaped the industry’s nature, scale and spatial 
development. The UK pursues a liberal market model of capitalism characterised by 
a disinclination to industrial planning (Dicken, 2015; Chang, 2014). Although the 
nation state leased and consented the offshore wind sites and enabled subsidy for 
generation, the UK Government was cautious about assuming an overtly directive 
role. In effect, although the state incentivised, reduced uncertainty and co-ordinated 
“the game”, thereby making it the market maker, it sought a role that was more akin 
to primus inter pares than an industrial champion.   
To oversee the OWIS, the Offshore Wind Industry Council (OWIC) was established in 
2013. Like the Offshore Cost Reduction Task Force and its successor, the Offshore 
Wind Programme Board, only a few dominant firms were represented on OWIC 
alongside government. Sir Jonathon Porritt, a decarbonisation advocate, observed 
that such oligopolistic-oriented institutional arrangements promoted “locking the 
                                               
28 The BIS Catapult centres are based on the German Fraunhofer model of bringing together industry, academia 
and government. They also aspire to similar funding principles of the Fraunhofers:  the intention being that they 
generate one third of their funding from UK Government, one third from competitively won external public source 
e.g. H2020 and one third from industry contracts 
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electricity system into a status quo that boosts firm profits” (The Independent, 2015). 
Moreover, the OWIC was bounded by The Treasury’s austerity agenda that 
dominated Whitehall. In 2015, the Minister of State at DECC stated that: “Further 
[government] support will be strictly conditional on the cost reductions we have seen 
already accelerating…. and, if costs, come down, new offshore wind will help us 
meet the challenge of decarbonisation” (DECC, 2015). Additionally, security of supply 
also increasingly shaped state thinking. By 2015, private and public under investment 
had led to the UK’s margin of spare electricity capacity falling to nearly 1% (The 
Financial Times, 2015). As a Treasury interviewee observed (S-UKGov3, author’s 
interview, January 2016): “The bottom line is a government minister can’t let the 
lights go out, they can’t risk it…. They’ll back the technology that will deliver”. 
Therefore, the incumbent offshore technologies utilised and controlled by a small 
number of firms were further favoured. In short, government culture and the hard-
nosed reality of politics were reinforcing technological path dependence.   
Finally, the Government’s adherence to a liberal market model and supply side 
measures marginalised industrial spatial planning and promotion of industrial 
agglomeration. Illustratively, the Department for Communities and Local Government, 
the department responsible for local spatial development, had negligible input to the 
formulation of the OWIS and was not represented on related industry forums. In 
short, there was limited cognisance of or regard for the spatial consequences of non-
spatial state policies (Barca et al, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015).   
4.3.5 Scotland’s industry policy and the emergence of the offshore wind 
industry 
In 2010, Scottish Enterprise, the economic development body for lowland Scotland, 
published research indicating that offshore wind could create additional GVA of 
£7.1bn and 28,300 jobs in Scotland within a decade (IPA Economics, 2010). To 
realise this opportunity the Scottish Government utilised its powers to develop an 
interventionist programme of industrial support that was distinct from London. 
Following the creation of a Scottish Government offshore wind team in Glasgow in 
2009, the same year as the Crown Estate’s Scottish Territorial Waters leasing round, 
the devolved administration launched an industrial development route map and 
national infrastructure plan for offshore wind in 2010. In turn, Scotland’s inward 
investment agency, Scottish Development International, pursued investments from 
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OEMs that could act as foci in the creation of a new national industry. However, 
despite five memorandums of understanding being concluded with OEMs between 
2010 and 2013 uncertainty caused by changing UK policies negated these 
proposals, as summarised below:  
i. Doosan Babcock shelved plans for an R&D and manufacturing facility near 
Glasgow; 
ii. Areva halted plans for a manufacturing facility in Scotland;  
iii. Gamesa moth-balled its R&D operation, near Glasgow, within two years of 
locating and did not progress plans for a manufacturing facility in Leith;  
iv. Mitsubishi dropped proposals for a centre of industrial excellence in Glasgow;  
v. Samsung disposed of its 7 MW test turbine off the Fife coast.  
Simultaneously, the Scottish Government attempted to shield, nurture and empower 
firms from dominant institutional and technological forces in order to stimulate 
innovation and counter sectoral technological path dependence (Smith and Raven, 
2012; Boschma et al, 2017). For example, it made £50 million of funding available to 
encourage firms to deviate and experiment (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Martin, 2010) 
in regard to innovative floating and turbine technologies. Moreover, these innovation 
funds were aligned with the devolved administration’s subsidy (ROS) powers to 
incentivise the adoption of these technologies by firms. Such institutional innovation 
led to novel projects including: 
 Three world-leading floating wind projects; 
 Terrestrial offshore turbine test facilities at Hunterston; 
 Offshore test facilities for new turbine technologies adjacent to Fife and 
Aberdeenshire; 
 New deeper water foundations, including “jacket” sub-structures. 
Finally, from 2010 onwards, given the formation of the UK’s Coalition Government, 
the Scottish Government’s overarching policy rationale increasingly diverged from 
the rest of the UK. A case in point was Scotland’s Economic Strategy (Scottish 
Government, 2007, 2012, 2015), a document premised on the inter-related objectives 
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of sustainable economic growth and equity. It was a development orientated 
paradigm that did not mirror Whitehall’s increasing focus on austerity.  
4.3.6 Scale and manifestation of the international and UK industry 
By 2015, 91% of all offshore wind farms were located in EU waters, thereby 
concentrating the industrial value chain in Europe. Between 2009 and 2014 
European employment in offshore wind trebled to 75,000 FTEs (Ernst and Young, 
2015). During the same period, investment in the European industry averaged 6bn 
Euros per year, peaking at 13bn Euros in 2015 (EWEA, 2016). Of the installed 
capacity the UK had the largest share with 46% and Germany the second largest 
share with 30%. Over the period 2010 to 2015 both countries saw nearly 20bn Euros 
of investment in new offshore wind farms (EWEA, 2016). However, this didn’t 
generate corresponding economic impact. By 2015, the UK’s offshore wind industry 
had created 13,000 UK jobs, (BVG, 2015), compared with 20,000 in Germany, two 
years earlier (BWE, 2015). This mismatch between installation and economic benefit 
was reflective of the industry life cycle. At the final Operations and Maintenance 
stage, the UK secured over 70% of purchases and in the initial development and 
planning stages it secured nearly 60% (BVG, 2015). However, in the manufacturing 
and deployment phase, the stage of greatest capital expenditure, UK content was 
only 18% (BVG, 2015). The UK was dependent on OEM transplantation to trigger the 
development of an indigenous industry and secure a greater share of content. ORE 
Catapult (2014, p 5) calculated that “at 15 GW a tipping point will have been 
surpassed encouraging a step change in the UK supply chain’s development via 
international and national investment”. 
Nonetheless, a marked cooling in UK and other European offshore wind markets led 
to firm consolidation and the development of pan-European supply chains rather than 
dedicated national ones. For example, Siemens announced plans to invest in a 
manufacturing facility in Hull in 2010 but delayed construction until 2015 during which 
time it reduced the plants planned functions to integrate with its Europe-wide supply 
chain. Table 4.4 below summarises how such factors impacted on OEM investment 
plans relating to the UK by 2015. 
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Alstom (France)  
 
 GE purchases Alstom in 2015 after failure of its own technology 
 Abandons plans for UK facility post purchase 
Areva (France)  
 
 Abandons plans for turbine and blade manufacturing in Scotland 
following creation of Adwen Joint Venture with Gamesa in 2015 
Clipper Windpower 
(USA) 
 Abandons plan for turbine manufacturing in NE England in 2011 
Doosan Babcock 
(South Korea) 
 Abandons plan for turbine manufacturing near Glasgow in 2012 
 
Gamesa (Spain)  
 
 Abandons plan for blade and electrical component manufacturing at 
Leith, Scotland in 2015 after JV with Areva (creating Adwen) 
 R&D centre outside Glasgow moth-balled in 2013  
Mitsubishi (Japan)  
 
 Abandons plan for a major research centre in Scotland 
 Announces UK activity will be conducted through MHI Vestas JV 
Samsung (South 
Korea)  
 Abandons plan for research & manufacturing facility in Fife in 2014 
 
Siemens (Germany)  
 
 Rationalises plan for manufacturing facility on Humberside in 2014; 
redesigns Hull site for blade manufacture and installation  
 A new facility for turbine manufacturing at Cuxhaven, Germany, is 
announced in 2015  and additional blade manufacturing capacity is 
introduced at Aalborg and Engesvang in Denmark  
Vestas (Denmark) 
 
 Abandons plan for turbine manufacturing facility at Sheerness, Kent in 
2012, consolidating production in Denmark 
 2013, announces activity will be conducted through MHI Vestas JV 
 MHI Vestas announces blade facility on the Isle of Wight in 2014  
Source: Own elaboration 
Table 4.3: Abandonment and scaling back of OEM investment plans in the UK 
Although by 2015 there were significant supply chain actors in the UK in addition to 
Siemens and MHI Vestas - such as OSB foundations on Teesside, JDR Cables in 
Hartlepool, BiFab in Fife - the supply chain that emerged was partial, truncated and 
precariously linked with future government market support. In turn, there was limited 
opportunity for clusters of manufacturing activity to emerge that would facilitate 
cumulative causation and economic impact commensurate with the level of 
installation. 
4.3.7 Summary: formation of the offshore wind sector 
Energy transition was and is an instituted process at both the international and 
national levels. Moreover, the formation and subsequent dynamics of the UK’s 
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offshore wind market and related industrial value chain were mediated by the formal 
“rules” (policy and regulation) and informal conventions of the state (North, 1990; 
Peck, 1999; Martin, 2000; Gertler, 2010). This dynamic institutional environment 
continuously shaped actor expectations and incentivised and co-ordinated firm 
deviation but often in a seemingly bounded manner, as for example in relation to 
actor and technological selection, thereby shaping the development of the industrial 
value chain. Moreover, it also dis-incentivised deviation, for instance a decrease in 
subsidy led to a contraction in projected market size which, in turn, influenced the 
potential number of OEM turbine manufacturing inward investors (fig 4.10).  
Although, opportunities for alignment of horizontal UK energy policy (which largely 
influenced offshore wind market dynamics) and vertical industry policy (which largely 
influenced the industrial value chain) were evident, a significant time lag in such co-
ordination was apparent, leading to a sector that exhibited oligopolistic 
characteristics, technological path dependence and a partial supply chain with 
constrained economic benefit. In addition to nation state institutions, the strategic 
agency of devolved government and the innovative use of devolved powers was 
evident, although these powers could be denoted as secondary as compared with 
those of the nation state in terms of causal orders of importance.  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 4.10 Projected market size and the UK’s industrial value chain 
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4.4 Unpacking Glasgow and Humberside’s Preformation Contexts    
Having provided an account of the longitudinal process of energy transition and the 
related development of the offshore wind sector in which both cases are embedded, 
this section provides descriptions of both regions pre-formation settings. By revealing 
these distinct regional environments (in relation to economic legacies, assets and 
institutions) subsequent case analysis can consider their interaction with extra-
regional factors to shape regional path creation. Therefore, such comprehension is a 
pre-requisite for the application of the analytical framework and related case study 
methodology to facilitate both exogenous and endogenous comprehension of 
regional industrial path creation (Pike et al, 2017).  
The accounts pertaining to Glasgow and Humberside are divided in to three parts. 
Firstly, for each region there is an historic overview of their economies in order to 
frame their respective path creation processes within a longitudinal perspective of 
regional economic change and continuity. Secondly, given that path creation is 
contingent on valorisation and reconfiguration of legacy assets inherited from 
previous patterns and paths of economic development, an assessment of these 
region specific resources is provided (Maskel and Malmberg, 1999; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; Fornahl et al, 2012). Thirdly, there is consideration of pre-formation 
regional economic development institutional arrangements (Martin, 2000; Dawley, 
2013; Evenhuis, 2017) which had a bearing on subsequent path creation. In turn, this 
final section also considers long standing regional institutional path dependences 
which shaped continuity and change in both regions (Martin and Sunley, 2006).  It is 
to the Glasgow case context that the section first turns. 
4.4.1 Glasgow’s preformation regional economy: miles better? 
In the 1930s the city of Glasgow’s population peaked at over 1 million and then went 
into decline, falling to 580,000 residents by 2006 (National Records of Scotland, 
2012) contained within a wider regional population of c. 1.8 million. This demographic 
contraction is associated with long-term deindustrialisation. The perilousness of the 
region’s overdependence on heavy industry was recognised in numerous reports 
from the 1930s onwards. However, as noted by Vince Cable in 1975, a future UK 
Secretary of State for Business and Industry, then a Glasgow City Councillor: “There 
is now a great deal of documentary evidence available which indicates that despite 
many years of regional policy, Glasgow’s economic problems remain second to none 
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in Britain” (Brown, 1975). During the 1970s manufacturing employment contracted by 
over a third and in the following decade manufacturing jobs fell by another two thirds 
(GCPH, 2006). As a proportion of the city’s jobs, manufacturing fell from 22% in 1984 
to 6.8% in 2004 (GCPH, 2006). The consequences of the broader city region’s lock-
in (Martin and Sunley, 2006) to declining industries was bleakly predicted in an SCDI 
report of 1974: “To lose traditional industries with comparative international 
advantages is to court a perpetual dynamic of decay” (Harvie, 1997). Moreover, the 
city of Glasgow did not greatly benefit from Scotland’s oil and electronic assembly 
booms of the mid-1970s onwards due to its position on the opposite coast from the 
oil reserves29 and a lack of green field sites for inward investment. Such economic 
decline combined with deprivation engendered ingrained health problems which 
became synonymous with the “Glasgow Effect” (the unexplained low life expectancy 
of Glasgow residents compared to the rest of the United Kingdom and Europe). In 
2006 the city had around half of Scotland’s most deprived communities and 
nationally significant levels of unemployment and economic inactivity (Glasgow 
Economic Forum, 2006). 
Even so, there were indicators that contradicted the prediction of a “perpetual 
dynamic of decay”. In the decade before 2006, over 60,000 additional jobs were 
created and Gross Value Added (GVA) growth averaged 3%-4% per annum, well 
above the Scottish average (Glasgow Economic Forum, 2006). However, a marked 
expansion of public sector employment provided Glasgow with the moniker of “Public 
Sector City” (Tomlinson, 2018). In terms of GDP per capita, Glasgow in 2004 stood at 
£33,000 compared with a figure of £43,000 for Edinburgh (Glasgow Economic 
Forum, 2006). An economic assessment (Glasgow Economic Forum, 2006, p 15) 
observed that Glasgow had: “a lack of knowledge-intensive, highly productive firms 
able to compete outside their local area [and that] growth in service-sector jobs has 
been disproportionately large in personal services and sales occupations, rather than 
in managerial and professional posts. There has been progress on development of 
the knowledge economy in Glasgow, although this relies heavily on public sector 
employment.” In short, Glasgow required new industries, such as offshore wind, to 
                                               
29 Although the British National Oil Corporation was briefly headquartered in the city from 1975 until its 
privatisation 
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create knowledge intensive, private sector employment that would drive regional 
development.  
Specifically, in terms of the electrical power generation and distribution industry, 
Glasgow has maintained discernible regional strengths for over a century. In the late 
nineteenth century in response to demand for electricity from a rapidly expanding 
industry and population, Glasgow developed a municipal power generation and 
distribution industry. The industry was restructured under the Electricity 
Reorganisation Act (Scotland) in 1954, leading to the establishment of the South of 
Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB), headquartered in Glasgow. SSEB generated, 
transmitted and distributed electricity throughout the south of Scotland and northern 
England.  The other organisation created by the Act was the North of Scotland Hydro 
Electric Board. Through privatisation in 1990, the former became Scottish Power 
and, the latter, became Scottish and Southern Energy, based in Perth. Given 
Glasgow’s nationally significant role in electrical engineering training and research, 
many of SSE’s managers and engineers had close links with Glasgow.   
Furthermore, notable innovations pertaining to renewable energy and electricity 
power generation and distribution occurred in the city. For example, the inventor of 
the wind turbine, Professor James Blyth, was an academic at Anderson College 
(Strathclyde University’s precursor) in the late 19th century and the first turbine was 
built by a Glasgow engineering firm based on his designs. Moreover, in the 1930s, 
Glasgow industrialists, engineers and politicians played pre-eminent roles in creating 
the UK’s hydro-electricity industry and national grid system. Whilst in the 1980s, a 
Glasgow based firm, Howden, designed, manufactured and supplied the first large 
scale wind turbines to the UK electricity industry and was the first European company 
to export turbines to California, the earliest large-scale market in the world30. Finally, 
by 2006, two of the largest planned European onshore windfarms were adjacent to 
Glasgow31. 
Preformation regional asset base 
As will be explored in the case study, the emergence of the offshore wind path was 
predicated on the valorisation of three distinct regional assets of value and rareness 
                                               
30 Due to a lack of UK regulatory support, Howden withdrew from the wind turbine industry 
31 Scottish Power’s Whitelee and SSE’s Clyde Valley projects 
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(Maskell and Malmberg, 1999): labour market and skills; research and training; and 
embedded, networked organisations with power. Firstly, in 2006 Glasgow had c. 
10,000 engineers (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 2010) working in utilities, 
engineering services, manufacturing and defence in the city region. This skills base 
underpinned the city’s capacity to supply the workforce for a large locally based 
national electricity utility firm and a network of related auxiliary firms. Furthermore, 
the scale of this regional resource provided local firms with the flexibility to readily 
respond to new market opportunities, such as onshore renewable wind energy 
stimulated by the ROCs subsidy of 2002.  A director in an electricity utility firm 
observed (G-Dev 1, author’s interview, January 2016): “Glasgow is an assemblage of 
capabilities and know-how which evolve based on changing energy markets [and] 
there are very few cities in the UK where you can have a long-term career path in 
utilities…. and a breadth of career options”. In short, by 2006 the regional labour 
market in regard to electrical generation and distribution was a unique asset of scale.     
Another notable legacy asset of Glasgow’s industrial past was the presence of a 
higher education and research sector that was recognised nationally and 
internationally for engineering excellence, including electrical engineering. Given this 
history, local universities housed significant research assets relevant to wind power 
generation and distribution, both terrestrial and marine, such as a power distribution 
test facilities and oceanographic lab tanks. In 2006, the University of Strathclyde was 
ranked as one of the best UK universities for research and training in electrical 
engineering (Universities Scotland, 2008). Furthermore, the long-standing 
educational and research relationships that the university had with the local electricity 
industry led to the university being perceived as “a neutral space for collaboration” 
(cited by G-Dev 1, January 2016). These close links informed the university’s 
educational and research offering, shaping the skills pipeline for local industry. 
Moreover, an innovation manager within a utility firm (G-Dev 2, author’s interview, 
January 2016) observed that the relationship between Strathclyde University and 
local electricity utility firms had allowed the university exceptional access to private 
sector data and infrastructure for its researchers. Given these features, an innovation 
system had emerged by 2006 that can be described as a localised phenomenon, 
dependent on region specific institutional arrangements and actor collaboration which 
promotes knowledge transfer and application (Asheim and Isaksen, 2002; Moulaert 
and Sekia, 2003; Todtling and Trippl, 2005; Martin, 2010). Thus, in many respects, 
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Glasgow reflected an organisationally thick and specialised regional innovation 
system in an old industrial region (Trippl et al, 2017).  
Thirdly and finally, the presence of Scottish Power and Strathclyde University, 
embedded networked organisations of scale vested with power to respond to 
opportunity, was another critical legacy asset by 2006 for the emergence of the 
offshore wind path. Additionally, these powerful actors were augmented by local 
auxiliary firms and government (the Scottish Government’s industry department and 
principal development agency were located in Glasgow). A Director in a utility firm (S-
Dev1, author’s interview, February, 2016) observed that such a phenomenon, 
indicative of institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995), fostered “a rooted, close 
knit community that rubs off each other…. retaining technical and project know-
how…. [which] provides national reach”.  
Economic development and institutions: exceptionalism seeking coherence 
By 2006, the roots of contemporary active government intervention in the local 
economy could be traced back three decades. In 1976, the recently formed Scottish 
Development Agency (SDA) established the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) 
initiative, an area based response to counter the socio-economic effects of de-
industrialisation. In many respects, GEAR was a precursor to the urban development 
corporation model (Maclennan, Waite and Muscatelli, 2018). Subsequently, to 
mitigate the city’s negative external image, the City Council launched the Glasgow’s 
Miles Better brand in 1983. The campaign acted as a catalyst for reassessing 
Glasgow’s economic future and a focus for a new development narrative (Keeting, 
1988). Such repositioning led to the city hosting the Glasgow Garden Festival in 1988 
and European City of Culture in 1990, events that encouraged leisure and 
commercial investment.  
Glasgow’s subsequent emergence as a centre for service industries enabled new 
private public partnerships to be forged that side stepped a legacy of political 
radicalism rooted in its manufacturing past. In 1991 with the formation of Scottish 
Enterprise, the city gained its own Local Enterprise Company, the Glasgow 
Development Agency (GDA). It was an organisation predicated on public and private 
partnership, shifting the SDA’s focus from spatial regeneration to business support 
(Maclennan, Waite and Muscatelli, 2018).  Although Scottish Enterprise’s national 
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HQ was co-located with the national inward investment agency and the Scottish 
Office’s32 industry department in Glasgow, there remained a perceived policy deficit 
regarding the region’s development. In 2006, an earlier observation that “Scotland is 
a divided land and the Clyde Valley (the Glasgow region) is Scotland’s greatest 
weakness” (The Economist, 1973) arguably retained currency. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to consider the region’s long standing institutional path dependence in 
order to frame the subsequent regional industrial path creation case in the context of 
the broader preformation regional development challenge. 
Glasgow’s enduring socio-economic narrative is one of dissonant disruption, unlike 
nearby Edinburgh where the enduring functions of government, banking and law 
have provided greater continuity. Metamorphosing from its longstanding medieval 
ecclesiastical and academic roles, Glasgow became a global centre of 
industrialisation, innovation and commerce. In little over a century, the city conceived 
two epoch defining energy technologies - steam and wind power - and the philosophy 
of modern capitalism. Frenetic transformation was accompanied by rapid 
demographic expansion and the presence of the worst slums in Western Europe. 
Glasgow’s regional economic path narrative can be characterised as one of spasms 
of disruptive change accompanied by socio-economic disjunction. Diverse labels 
such as The Dear Green Place, Second City of the Empire, No Mean City, Red 
Clydeside and European City of Culture infer such complexity and the limits to glib 
generalisation. 
Moreover, economic and industrial change was habitually met with inadequate 
institutional rejoinders. While the decline in Glasgow’s industrial base from the Great 
Depression onwards made the city an exceptional problem for successive UK 
Governments, there is ample evidence of inapt institutional responses. For example, 
although the Scottish Development Council that was established in 1931 to chart a 
new economic direction for Scotland was headquartered in Glasgow, its focus was 
more national than regional (a paradox mirrored in the contemporary concentration of 
outward facing national development organisations in Glasgow). Also, when in 1934 
four Scottish “Special Areas” were identified by the UK Government for state 
intervention, the city of Glasgow was specifically excluded, although it represented 
the largest concentration of unemployment in Scotland (Slaven, 1975). The historian 
                                               
32 The Scottish Office was the UK Government Department charged with Scottish matters prior to devolution 
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Christopher Harvie ruefully observed that: “To declare the Second City a distressed 
area was too much [for politicians and policy makers]” (Harvie, 1998, p 50).  
Moreover, for three decades after the Second World War incoherent policies 
between differing levels of government were promoted. The UK government pursued 
a shrink Glasgow, shrink the problem philosophy, as embodied in the creation of 
three west of Scotland new towns (products of the state sponsored Abercrombie 
Clyde Valley Regional Plan of 1946), whilst city government simultaneously pursued 
radical regeneration predicated on comprehensive neighbourhood demolition and 
development of peripheral estates and motorways (products of the city government’s 
sponsored Bruce Plan of 1945). Subsequently, uncoordinated state policies curtailed 
the development of new industrial opportunities; for example, in the 1980s the 
Conservative Government’s energy policies led to the closure of the headquarters of 
the national oil corporation in the city and the withdrawal of one of the region’s last 
major indigenous engineering firms from wind turbine manufacturing. In the absence 
of the required coordinated multi-scalar institutional intervention, the City Council, 
given limited development levers, embarked on successful but disputably transitory 
place making strategies and events, such as European City of Culture in 1990, 
salving Glasgow’s painful transition to its supply-side post-industrial reality. A 
pressing question in 2006 was could multi-scalar government institutions provide the 
coherence to harness Glasgow’s exceptional assets for a new regional industrial path 
that could create the sought after quality, private sector jobs?   
4.4.2 Humberside’s preformation economy: lonely northern daughter 
The Humber estuary has two principal settlements, Hull and Grimsby; the former 
being significantly larger throughout their histories. The words by the poet Philip 
Larkin referring to Hull as England’s “lonely northern daughter” could arguably be 
applied to either settlement, as both have been relatively isolated throughout their 
histories, looking outwards to distant ports and fisheries. Herbert Morrison the former 
Cabinet Minister who was appointed High Steward of Hull in 1956 observed: “Hull is 
part of the county of York but it seems to be sort of a Kingdom of its own. It is a 
remarkable place with an individual character” (Hull City Council, 2013). In terms of 
population sizes, Hull and Grimsby’s populations peaked at c. 310,000 and 92,000 
residents, respectively, at the outset of the great depression in 1931. In line with its 
economic fortunes, Hull’s population had fallen to 266,000 by the 1990s, contained 
within a wider Humberside County population of 858,000 (ONS, 1993). Moreover, 
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contrasts between the four local authorities which constitute Humberside were and 
are significant. For example, whilst the East Riding has the largest land area of any 
unitary authority, neighbouring Hull on the north bank is one of the most densely 
populated English local authority areas with limited possibilities for green field site 
development.  
Prior to the financial crash in 2008, the Humber was already experiencing 
employment decline, with a net loss of 4% (14,000 jobs) in Hull in the preceding five 
years while employment nationally continued to rise (Centre for Cities, 2009). In the 
decade between 1998 and 2008 the public sector drove employment expansion with 
public jobs growing by 27%, while the private sector declined by 4% (Humber LEP, 
2014). Moreover, given its ready access to natural resources accessed via its ports, 
such as fish and timber, and from its rural hinterland, the region retained a notable 
concentration of low value manufacturing jobs, such as food processing and caravan 
manufacture. This disposition was reflected in the region having about half the UK 
average for private sector knowledge intensive jobs in 2006 (Humber LEP, 2014). 
Mirroring a low skill, low wage regional economy, the Humber had significantly less 
residents with degree-level qualifications and many with no formal qualifications. For 
example, 17% of the working age total who lived within 18 kilometres of Hull in the 
first decade of the new millennium held a degree, the 8th lowest level of 63 British 
cities (Centre for Cities, 2009). Moreover, preceding 2006, Hull, like North East 
Lincolnshire (Grimsby’s local authority area), had a high proportion of people of 
working age who were unemployed, ranking 354th out of 376 local and unitary 
authorities within England and Wales (ONS, 1993).  
Specifically, in terms in terms of maritime related industries and logistics, the Humber 
had and has maintained discernible regional strengths. For many centuries, the 
Humber has acted as a major portal for the transshipment of goods, resources and 
people based on trade with the Low Countries and the Baltic, and by the outbreak of 
the First World War Hull was the third port in the UK in value of trade (Hull City 
Council, 2013). Additionally, in the decades leading up to 1914, Hull played a major 
role in the transmigration of European emigrants travelling to North America. In 
unison, Wilson Line of Hull became the largest privately owned shipping company in 
the world. On the opposite southern bank of the estuary, Grimsby was reputed to be 
the largest fishing port in the world by the 1950s. However, changing transport 
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patterns and rapidly decreasing fisheries put paid to these respective global 
accolades. Even so, in 2006, the combined Humber ports was the largest seaport 
complex in the UK and fourth largest in Europe (Humber LEP, 2013).  
By 2006, much of the Humber ports’ activity was predicated on the carbon economy 
through the import of coal, oil refining and the transshipment of cars.  In the first 
decade of the millennium, Humber ports imported over a third of the UK’s coal and 
exported a quarter of the UK’s refined oil (Bondholders, 2011), thereby providing the 
region with its Energy Estuary marque.  Such a history bequeathed Humberside a 
unique concentration of maritime related infrastructure, as evocatively described in a 
poem by Philip Larkin: “A filigree of wharves and wires, ricks and refineries, her 
working skyline wanders to the sea”.  
Preformation regional asset base 
As will be explored in the case study, the emergence of the offshore wind path was 
primarily predicated on the valorisation of three distinct regional assets of value and 
rareness (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999): adjacency to natural assets favourable to 
the offshore wind industry; relevant infrastructure; and labour market and skills. 
Firstly, due to favourable oceanographic and wind conditions in the North Sea, the 
Humber’s estuary is in close proximity to one of the largest global concentrations of 
economically exploitable offshore wind energy resource. Moreover, it is estimated 
that over half of the entire European offshore wind energy resource is within twelve 
hours sailing of the sheltered mouth of the Humber. Reflecting on its proximity to this 
resource, a Crown Estate interviewee (G-CE, author’s interview, December 2015) 
referred to the region as the “lucky Humber”, observing that the adjacent “nearshore, 
shallow waters, good geologic conditions for [turbine tower] foundations and reliable 
wind speeds were the low hanging resource for the new industry…. [one] close to big 
power hungry urban markets”. In terms of future wind farm development and 
servicing, a former local O&M manager (H-O&M2, author’s interview, May 2016) 
recalled that an early exploratory study in the 1990s that “looked at every inlet and 
port from the Norfolk coast up to Bridlington in East Yorkshire, placed Grimsby 
almost midway between the Northern and Southern limits of their search”. 
Combined with this proximity to resource, the Humber in 2006 had the UK’s largest 
ports complex. The water depths, quayside lengths and shore-side infrastructure 
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offered across the principal ports of Grimsby, Hull and Immingham could 
accommodate a wide spectrum of vessel types, including all vessels associated with 
the emerging offshore wind sector. Moreover, it was an underutilised asset. Excess 
capacity had been created by decreasing levels of coal imports due to Government 
energy policy from the 1990s and the decline of the fishing industry from the 1970s. 
Such spare capacity ensured that diversification was already being sought by ABP 
(Associated British Ports), the monopoly port operator, which in 2005 progressed 
plans for a container facility and a cruise terminal.  As observed by a LEP manager 
(H-RDA, author’s interview, February 2016): “ABP was a looking for a new 
industry…. Immingham was a coal port…. [they wanted] a means by which to future 
proof their business”. A similar process was underway in Grimsby, a director of a 
local council (H-LA3, author’s interview, May 2016) recalled: “The town had a 
rundown port estate that was looking for a role beyond vehicles, storage and 
timber…. and the fish quay that had received investment was under-utilised”. 
Furthermore, a waterfront green field development site of circa 1,000 acres, eight 
miles up the south bank from Grimsby, earmarked for coal fired power station lay 
unused due to changing energy policy.  
The industrial legacy of the Humber also led to the region maintaining a nationally 
significant concentration of maritime and logistics skills with nearly 15,000 employees 
in the transhipment sector, accounting for 5% of regional employment in the first 
decade of the new millennium (Centre for Cities, 2009). In addition given the 
availability of inputs from its ports and rural hinterland, manufacturing employment 
was more than double the national average and the Humber had the largest 
concentration of food processing and caravan construction in the UK. In the first 
decade of the new millennium, the combined regional employment of these two 
manufacturing industries was in excess of 70,000 people (Centre for Cities, 2009; 
LMI Humber, 2017). These nationally significant concentrations of economic activity 
offered potential investors a ready variety of relatively cheap skills for routinized 
manufacturing, transshipment and extractive-related type functions.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the structure and history of the regional economy – as a 
low skill extractive, processing and transhipment economy – led to weak institutional 
relationships between Hull University and industry and government to promote 
knowledge transfer and application (IBM-PLI, 2006).  Thus, the region exhibited 
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pronounced characteristics of an organisationally thin regional innovation system in a 
peripheral region, dependent on investments associated with natural resources, 
inexpensive labour and land, with limited requirements for local knowledge networks 
(Trippl et al, 2017).  
Economic development and institutions: bisected portal seeking institutional 
coherence 
In 1999 the four Humberside local authorities created by the dissolution of 
Humberside County Council33 were included within the geographic locus of the newly 
created Regional Development Agency, Yorkshire Forward. The pan-Yorkshire 
development body was augmented at the Humber level by the Hull and Humber 
Chamber of Commerce and Team Humber Marine Alliance (established in 1995 to 
promote marine related enterprises). However, conspicuously the most powerful de 
facto Humber-wide development body was Associated British Ports (ABP), the 
estuary’s monopoly port operator, authority and developer, privatised by the 
Conservative Government in 1981.       
Of the four local authorities, Hull had the most noteworthy history of development and 
regeneration. For example, in 1945, Hull Corporation commissioned Patrick 
Abercrombie to redesign Hull, although the subsequent proposals were deemed both 
too costly and radical and shelved. More recently, in the new millennium, the City 
Council partnered with Yorkshire Forward to create an Urban Development Company 
(Hull Citybuild), an institutional arrangement which generated local contention given 
the organisation’s emphasis on the development of retail, leisure and services in a 
city with a non-populous hinterland and a low wage economy (cited by H-LA1, 
author’s interview, July 2016). This in turn led to the City Council commissioning IBM 
Global Business Consultancy to review the city’s economic development in 2006. 
The resulting action plan noted that “the creation of quality jobs should be at the 
forefront of every economic development activity in Hull and the sub region…. Hull 
should follow a more regionally integrated approach and certainly market itself as a 
region, north and south of the Humber” (IEDC, 2007, p 4).  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to consider the region’s long standing institutional path dependence in 
relation to regional disunion in order to frame the subsequent regional industrial path 
creation case in the context of the historic regional development challenge. 
                                               
33 East Riding, Hull, North Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire. The County Council was disbanded in 1996 
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Strikingly, although Humberside’s regional economic function is a product of it being 
a major portal for goods, resources and people, the geography of the estuary has 
also bisected the region. This division has led to institutional distinctiveness between 
the estuary’s two main communities, Hull and Grimsby. Reflecting on their separate 
histories and institutional identities (Hull is in Yorkshire and Grimsby in Lincolnshire) 
and the implications for the utilisation of regional assets for collective regional benefit, 
an industrial representative in Grimsby noted (H-O&M2, May 2016) that perceived 
socio-cultural differences and local allegiances made region wide strategies and 
promotion highly problematic.  A former UK civil servant (H-UKGov1, March 2016) 
also noted of the regional institutional environment and its limited regional 
institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995): “There are limitations to leadership 
across the Humber given the number of relatively small inward looking single 
authorities”. To try and overcome such fragmentation and promote pan-Humber 
spatial development Humberside County Council was established in 1974. However, 
local antipathy to this ahistorical construct led to its abolition in 199634. A telling 
metaphor for the new County Council was the Humber Bridge which opened in 1981; 
a bold means of unifying the Humber but one with tolled barriers. Although Yorkshire 
Forward was intended to bring strategic coordination across the area, Humberside’s 
local authorities remained sceptical of its commitment to their individual needs. 
Significantly, it was a privatised monopoly actor, ABP, which was vested with 
foremost power and means in the form of its waterfront assets to determine the 
development of the estuary. However, since its privatisation in 1981, ABP had been 
through the hands of various consortiums of extra-regional owners35, including 
Goldman Sachs and the Singapore Investment Corporation, whose priority was profit 
maximisation rather than regional industrial development. A pressing question in 
2006 was could state institutions provide the coherence to harness the bisected 
region’s assets to create a new industrial path and the sought after quality jobs?      
4.4.3 Summary: regional preformation contexts   
 Although both Glasgow and Humberside can be broadly classified as lagging 
regions (Pike et al, 2006; Dawley, 2013; Coenen et al, 2015) they exhibit contrasting 
                                               
34 Local antipathy to coordinating institutions was witnessed twenty years later when all four local authority areas 
voted for Brexit, even though the estuary’s fortunes are linked with Europe 
35 In contrast to the stable public ownership model of Rotterdam, Europe’s busiest port on the opposite side of the 
North Sea 
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economic structures, competences and practices inherited from previous paths and 
patterns of economic development (Martin and Sunley, 2006). Such divergence is 
evident in the assets possessed by both regions. For example, Glasgow retains high 
value skills and research networks in relation to electrical engineering linked to 
exceptional higher education assets, such as those in the University of Strathclyde, 
whilst Humberside has lower value skills and limited research networks reflecting an 
extractive, processing and transhipment orientated economy. Accordingly, Glasgow 
exhibits characteristics of an organisationally thick and specialised regional 
innovation system and Humberside exhibits characteristics of an organisationally thin 
regional innovation system (Trippl et al, 2017). Finally, both regions have been 
subject to state policies to counter historic industrial decline. Recently such policies 
have been aimed at creating higher value private sector jobs, thereby reorienting the 
qualitative character of both economies and reducing their dependence on public 
sector employment. However, in the past their respective institutional circumstances 
have hindered regional economic development. 
4.5 The Importance of Context: Summary 
This chapter has framed the Glasgow and Humberside cases of regional industrial 
path creation within their sectoral and regional preformation settings. By adopting this 
approach, analysis of the interplay of the stimuli of energy transition, relating to 
offshore wind, with regional heterogeneity in the subsequent cases is facilitated. 
Thus endogenous and exogenous understanding of regional industrial path creation 
will be promoted. Moreover, by accommodating and delineating broader sectoral and 
regional settings, a more comprehensive relational understanding of enabling and 
constraining institutional environments for regional industrial path creation can be 
constructed, one that acknowledges the interplay of extra-regional sectoral, 
technological and institutional path dependences (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma 
et al, 2017) and regional path dependences (Stam and Garnsey, 2008; Martin, 2010). 
Having established the respective case settings, it is to case enquiry that the 
research turns.   
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Chapter 5: Glasgow Case Study - From Imagined “Global Hub” to 
Ancillary Knowledge Node 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines three episodes of regional industrial path creation pertaining 
to offshore wind in Glasgow from 2006 to end 2015. By exploring these delineated 
stages of path creation, the causal interplay of path actors, assets and mechanisms 
is considered, whilst the role of multi-scalar institutions in enabling or constraining 
path creating agency is illuminated. In addition, the case study facilitates exploration 
of the related conditionality of the resulting path’s scale and character. By following 
the path, the “deep-seated [and] wider relations, positions and contexts of actors in 
inter-related structures unfolding over space and time” (Pike et al, 2016b, p 132) are 
exposed, providing insight on the interplay of exogenous and endogenous forces. 
For each of the three episodes, a short description of the path’s evolution and 
identification of associated key foci of enquiry sets the scene for my analysis. In turn, 
for each of the related analytical foci there is exploration of the mindful deviation 
(Garud and Karnoe, 2003) and experimentation (Martin, 2010) of path actors and 
their utilisation of mechanisms to reconfigure and valorise regional assets 
(MacKinnon et al, 2018). In addition, there is consideration of the causal relationship 
of this interplay with the institutional context in which it is set. The chapter concludes 
with a description of the scale and character of the resulting path and its effect on 
regional development and regional path dependence.  
There are three temporal episodes germane to the application and illumination of the 
analytical framework. During the first, 2006 to 2009, an embryonic regional offshore 
wind path premised on the diversification of electricity utility firms emerged. By the 
end of the first episode, Glasgow contained an internationally significant 
concentration of approximately 150 skilled jobs relating to offshore wind project 
development and research. In the second period, 2009 to 2013, bullish sectoral 
projections encouraged more pronounced interplay between assets, actors and 
mechanisms, involving a wider set of actors, linked to diversification and inward 
investment. Although the levels of job creation remained relatively modest at about 
300 direct jobs, the qualitative nature of the new path was sufficient for international 
publications to comment on Glasgow’s “burgeoning offshore renewable industry” 
(The Economist, 2011).  In the third and final phase, 2013 to 2015, more muted firm-
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led path creation was evident. However, private sector attenuation was mitigated by 
a significant UK state investment in the region, the Offshore Renewable Energy 
Catapult.    
5.2 Episode 1: Path Emergence, 2006 – 2009 
In this first episode the regional offshore wind path emerged from Glasgow’s mature 
electrical power generation and distribution industry. As will be demonstrated, its 
emergence was predicated on the interplay of the exogenous stimulus of energy 
transition with pre-existing regional assets relating to regional skills, research and 
training, and embedded networked organisations. During this initial period, the 
process of path creation was led by a relatively narrow set of firms, supported by 
higher education and state actors (see fig. 5.1), utilising mechanisms associated with 
diversification to valorise the aforementioned assets (Martin and Sunley, 2006; 
Boschma and Frenken, 2009).  
In this initial episode of emergence, there is limited evidence of meditated strategic 
co-ordination to create a new regional industrial path (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; 
Martin, 2010). Rather, actor experimentation and strategizing for future reward 
(Steen, 2016) was primarily framed within national and international sectoral 
contexts. Reflecting the regional path’s positioning within a wider extra-regional 
process of socio-technical transition (Geels 2004; Truffer and Coenen, 2008) there 
was no common regional narrative amongst actors regarding the emergent path, 
despite an internationally significant  concentration of approximately 150 high value 
jobs in the region by 200936. This broader framing of actors and assets may account 
for interviewees describing the regional path’s emergence as “hidden”, “organic” and 
“serendipitous”. (respectively: G-RDA1, December, 2015; S-R1, December, 2015; G-
Rep2, January, 2016). 
There are three key foci of enquiry for this episode of emergence. Firstly, the 
diversification by electricity utility firms to create offshore wind project development 
teams in Glasgow will be explored. Secondly, there will be consideration of the 
related diversification (Martin, 2010) of the regional research base and related actors 
to support this process of firm branching (Neffke et al, 2011). Finally, the 
                                               
36 Based on figures provided by interviewees 
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establishment of the Scottish Government’s offshore wind team in Glasgow will be 
assessed in terms of its effect on the regional path. 
 
Figure 5.1: Key path actors in Glasgow city centre 2006-09 
5.2.1 Utility firms’ diversification initiates path 
This analytical focus relates to the creation of offshore wind project development 
teams in Glasgow, representing the first notable instances of path creation in the 
region. The creation of these teams was the product of electricity utility firms 
mindfully deviating from terrestrial to offshore wind power generation, premised on 
the exogenous stimulus of new offshore markets and technologies. During this 
episode, these core path actors primarily employed sub-mechanisms associated with 
path branching (Boschma and Frenken, 2009), including corporate diversification and 
acquisition, which facilitated valorisation and reconfiguration of pre-existing regional 
assets.  
A primary path actor at the outset of this episode was Scottish Power, one of the 
UK’s “Big Six”. In 2006 it created a dedicated offshore wind team in its Glasgow HQ. 
A former manager in a utility firm (G-Con1, author’s interview January 2016) 
recounted that the team chiefly  “grew out of the existing onshore team that was 
leading on a range of [onshore] wind farm projects…. allowing the new team to link in 
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to existing corporate services, such as legal, finance and strategy.” Moreover, given 
the pre-existing skills and functions of the Glasgow HQ office, the new team focused 
on project deployment: appraisal; design; funding; planning; and project 
management. Such activities were associated with the higher value functions of the 
new sector’s national and international division of labour37.   
Scottish Power’s mindful deviation (Garud and Karnoe, 2003) from terrestrial activity 
and accompanying experimentation and strategization was incentivised by an 
increasingly benign UK energy policy and regulatory environment that enhanced 
expectation of commercial reward (e.g. the Utilities Act, 2000; Energy White Paper, 
2003; Energy Review, 2006). A former manager within an offshore wind team (G-
Con1, December 2015) recounted that in 2006 “the UK was recognised as the most 
joined up country in the world for offshore wind…. for leasing, consenting and 
subsidy”. In addition, a Director in a utility firm (S-Dev1, author’s interview, February 
2016) reflected on the correlation between firm deviation from past practice and 
institutionally created expectation: “Onshore renewables [firms] did not want to miss 
out on this new massive opportunity…. a new growing market with government 
support”. Moreover, such incentivised diversification was dependent on institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009), as evidenced by the Crown 
Estate’s packaging and promotion of seabed sites via three UK leasing rounds in 
2001, 2003 and 2008. A manager within an electrical power firm (G-Dev2, January, 
2016) contended that these leasing rounds triggered and structured the activation of 
firm agency by “setting the tempo, the agenda, providing finite timeframes for us 
[electrical power firms]”. Nevertheless, a quote by a Crown Estate manager (S-CE, 
author’s interview, February 2016) indicates the co-dependent interplay between firm 
and state agency:  
“Developers said where they wanted to go [in terms of offshore development 
sites], nobody understood the market. We [The Crown Estate] had no 
experience of releasing the seabed, so went with developers views…. The 
developers went where they wanted, primarily near shore. We then came up 
with the concept of identifying zones in order to allow the developers to assess 
larger areas and pick out the sweet spots.”  
                                               
37 The team led on the early West of Duddon Sands project in the Irish Sea 
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These perspectives indicate that firm-led agency was triggered by interaction 
between government and firms creating a temporal-spatial framework that 
incentivised and co-ordinated firm diversification in specific heterogeneous regional 
settings, in this case Glasgow. Tellingly, a range of interviewees recounted the 
importance of The Crown Estate maps which plotted the potential offshore 
development sites. These institutionalised spatial representations of opportunity were 
a key device for engendering firms and government actors with a visceral sense of 
opportunity and expectation. 
Conspicuously, although Scottish Power’s initial diversification from terrestrial wind 
was incentivised by the institutional environment, it was further enabled by its 
takeover by a large Spanish utility firm, Iberdrola. Notably, it was a purchase that had 
been encouraged by the Spanish state’s Renewable Energy Plan of 2005 which 
provided Iberdrola with sufficient domestic expectation and certainty of future reward 
to mitigate the uncertainty of international expansion. Therefore, the interaction of UK 
and Spanish institutional environments incentivised the creation of Europe’s third 
largest electricity utility firm and, importantly for the Glasgow path, increased Scottish 
Power’s access to international capital and networks (Bathelt et al, 2004; Coe et al, 
2008; Binz et al, 2016) with which it would further reconfigure and valorise regional 
assets.  An innovation manager in a Glasgow based utility (G-Dev2, January 2016) 
recalled:  
“The tie up with Iberdrola increased Scottish Power’s scale of ambition with 
the company moving from 50 to 100 MW projects to 1 to 2 GW projects…. and 
increasing its offshore ambitions…. and team. The financial engineering 
aspects, the complex funding packages of equity, debt, partnership, 
investment banking became so much easier with a parent company with a 
massive balance sheet.”  
In 2007, the UK nation state’s policy and regulatory environment which had 
incentivised Scottish Power’s diversification encouraged another utility firm to 
transplant key functions to Glasgow. Airtricity, an Irish firm that was soon to 
commence construction of the Greater Gabbard project off the Suffolk coast located 
its UK HQ in Glasgow. A previous Airtricity employee (G-Dev3, author’s interview, 
August 2016) observed that the Irish firm’s investment decision was conditioned by 
the interplay of regional assets, relating to skills and perceived regional institutional 
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thickness (see Fig 5.5), with an extra-regional institutional environment that was 
enabling market creation: 
“They [Airtricity] recognised Glasgow as a centre of capability in the rapidly 
moving renewables market, including offshore…. and key players in the 
company were from the west of Scotland and knew many of the players…. 
[they were] familiar with the area’s benefits…. and close networks”.  
Airtricty’s investment decision further valorised the skills within the regional labour 
market by recruiting 60 staff, half of which would work on offshore projects; thereby 
contributing to the reconfiguration of the region’s path dependent pool of skills and 
knowledge (Kasabov and Sudaram, 2016). However, just as Iberdrola had been 
incentivised to reimagine its future, so too had another large utility firm. Encouraged 
by the institutional environment, Perth-based Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) 
acquired Airtricity in 2008. It was a decision according to a director of an electricity 
power firm (S-Dev1, February 2016) that was based on the need to “further develop 
SSE’s capability in regard to renewables [and] access the city’s skills and know-how 
and address lack of a serious design engineering presence of Perth”. 
With Glasgow now being the home to two offshore wind development teams, 
embedded in well-resourced utility firms with evident ambitions for the future, 
expectations of future reward amongst associated regional energy and engineering 
consultancies, such as Atkins and Sgurr Energy, encouraged their diversification via 
intra-firm micro-evolution (Martin, 2010).  A manager in a consultancy (G-Con2, 
author’s interview, July 2016) reflected that this adaptation occurred in a “cautious, 
calibrated manner” shaped by their utility firm clients’ expansion plans. Moreover, the 
same interviewee also tellingly illuminated the importance of local assets in 
facilitating firm diversification: “Practically all the graduates in our [offshore wind] 
team are Strathclyde [University] graduates.”  
In summary, mindful deviation by firms from past practice created the emergent 
elements of an embryonic, high value industrial path. Moreover, this process was 
stimulated by the institutional environment in which it was set. Conspicuously, path 
emergence was primarily predicated on firm-led diversification, linking the exogenous 
stimulus of energy transition with regional assets recognised as being of value and 
rareness both nationally and internationally (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999).   
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5.2.2 University supports firm-led diversification    
Another notable analytical focus in relation to the path’s emergence relates to the 
role of the University of Strathclyde. During this episode, increasing collaboration 
between the university, firms and government to utilise novel knowledge relating to 
offshore wind signified adaptation of the regional innovation system (Cooke et al, 
2004; Asheim et al, 2011b). In this episode, the university played an important role in 
testing and modifying the disruptive technology on which regional firm diversification 
was premised. However, despite having a growing reputation for blue sky research38, 
it was not itself a source of radical research and knowledge for regional path firms. 
This was largely due to the evolving RIS, in which the university was embedded, 
being largely circumscribed by extra-regional technological dynamics and networks.  
The diversification of the University of Strathclyde’s terrestrial wind research and 
training capability towards offshore wind was enabled by the ESPRC’s39 SuperGen 
Wind research programme in 2006. This UK Government funded initiative was 
described by an energy advisor to the Welsh Government (S-R1, author’s interview, 
December 2015) as “a research-led response to the UK’s position in offshore wind…. 
[one to] capitalise on Strathclyde’s and the UK’s leading blue sky wind research”.  In 
turn, during this episode, the university also established a Centre of Doctoral Training 
in Wind Energy Systems. An innovation manager (G-Dev2, January 2016) in a local 
utility firm explained the importance of the university in this episode for the embryonic 
regional path: 
“In offshore wind the driver is so innovation focused that it is a necessity and 
not a nice to have to be able to test the technology. Anybody [the project 
developer] who has the money needs to be in charge. With onshore wind, it’s 
off the shelf. It’s hard to go in to Siemens or Vestas and ask them to design a 
better onshore turbine but you have to have these discussions with offshore. 
We go to Siemens and Vestas with our ideas about installation, sub-
contractures, manufacturing, materials and research. Academia is part of the 
supply chain for offshore wind, hence we work with the university…. 
Strathclyde University is a good source of high calibre expertise [for offshore 
wind] and we get them into the company to work on issues or shape research 
                                               
38 The university was in the top three universities in the UK for wind citations and research 
39 Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
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programmes…. or secondments. In this space it could be like a Siemens 
providing a turbine to do the research, Scottish Power providing user 
requirements and the university say providing high end data analytics…. The 
university has strong industrial academic ties… it’s almost like an excellent 
consultancy; good rates, responsive, insightful and easy to contract with”.   
In summary the university was a central actor within an evolving innovation system 
that exhibited pronounced regional innovation system (RIS) characteristics, including: 
an operating Triple Helix model (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000); organisational 
thickness (Trippl et al, 2017); and informal conventions and networks (Cooke et al, 
2004).  
However, the primary causal power of the university and the RIS apropos path 
emergence cannot be evidenced. The same utility innovation manager (G-Dev2, 
January 2016) reflected on the role of the university and localised innovation capacity 
in path emergence:  
“You struggle to make a direct link, it [Strathclyde University] added to the 
jigsaw but was less influential [than the electricity utility firms]. These industrial 
research relationships can be geographically split, technologically split and 
business unit split. It’s not so fundamental that you cluster around it. This was 
about lots of incremental problem solving and feedback loops [for offshore 
wind]. It’s about seeing academia as part of the supply chain, you go where 
the knowledge is…. although it’s handier when it’s in your own city.”  
In short, the presence of the university within the city supported firm diversification by 
promoting technological legitimisation and adaptation of extra-regional technologies 
on which firm deviation from past practice was predicated (Binz et al, 2016). 
However, despite strengths in blue sky research, the university’s primary role in 
testing and validating technology purchased by regionally based electricity utility 
firms reflected a position that was bounded by extra-regional networks and 
knowledge flows (Bathelt et al, 2004; Boschma, 2005; Coe et al, 2008; Truffer and 
Coenen, 2012). It appeared that the university and the RIS in which it was a principal 
actor could not challenge the emerging technological path dependence of the 
broader offshore wind sector (Boschma et al, 2017).     
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5.2.3 Devolved government supports firm-led diversification 
In 2009, the Scottish Government established a national offshore wind team in 
Glasgow. Given its late appearance in this first episode, the team cannot be 
accorded causal primacy regarding the path’s emergence. However, its presence in 
Glasgow alongside other government economic development organisations40 merits 
attention. This concentration of devolved government functions promoted co-
ordination and reduction of uncertainty amongst the city’s electricity utility firms which 
in turn further promoted their diversification. However, as will be demonstrated, the 
Scottish Government was focused on the creation of a new national industry rather 
than a regional one, thus inhibiting common conceptualisation and recognition of the 
emergence of the regional industrial path and its related assets.  
The national offshore wind team was a product of the new SNP Government’s41 
devolved policies regarding climate change (e.g. the Climate Change Scotland Act, 
2009) and pursuit of related economic opportunities (e.g. the Government Economic 
Strategy, 2007). The government’s intent was also driven from the top by the First 
Minister, Alex Salmond, a former energy economist, who was personally committed 
to reorienting the Scottish economy around renewable energy. A manager in an RDA 
(G-RDA2, December 2015) recalled:  
“It was the first time I had seen such shared vision between Scottish 
Government and SE and SDI. The energy teams [in SE and SDI] flipped from 
oil and gas to offshore wind. This was driven by politics and ambition and a 
desire to make things happen…. Alex Salmond stayed close to the agencies 
on this one.”  
Such action was also incentivised by the broader, benign UK institutional 
environment in which it was embedded, including the UK wide consumer levy that 
subsidised offshore wind projects. Additionally, there was a willingness by state 
actors on both sides of the border to embrace institutional entrepreneurship. A former 
inward investment manager (G-FDI, December, 2015) recalled that the Scottish 
Territorial Waters Leasing Round was “just cooked-up and launched” by the Scottish 
Government and The Crown Estate in 2009 to encourage Scottish projects and 
                                               
40 Scottish Enterprise (SE), the economic development agency of Lowland Scotland, and Scottish Development 
International (SDI), the national inward investment and trade development body  
41 Elected in 2007 
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incentivise transplantation of firms and technologies. Furthermore, a manager within 
an electricity utility firm (G-Dev2, January 2016) also identified Scottish Government 
behaviours that incentivised firm deviation from the past, experimentation in the 
present and future-oriented strategizing (Steen, 2016): 
“For anybody who has an offshore wind project in Scottish Waters, I have no 
doubt that they feel reasonably confident that they can go to the [Scottish] 
Minister with anything to try and accelerate to a solution one way or another. 
The industry is a relatively small network, you can go to the Minister and 
resolve things. It’s tangible in terms of project confidence, project 
development, you know you can influence things. I have no doubt that 
institutional moves that Scotland has made in the past made Scotland an 
attractive place to do stuff, not because of numbers written down on a sheet 
somewhere but because at the working level there is an addressability of 
issues you simply do not have with DECC…. a lot of them [policy makers in 
DECC] don’t even know each other.”  
However, although the formation of the Scottish Government’s offshore wind team 
evidently augmented Glasgow’s institutional environment (see Fig 5.5), the devolved 
government’s positioning of offshore wind as a national and not a regional 
opportunity did not promote regional level strategizing or co-ordination. In effect, 
there was a reluctance to recognise and promote Glasgow’s unique assets in 
isolation from the national economy and Aberdeen, Scotland’s presumed energy 
capital. A former Scottish Government Minister (G-SGov2, author’s interview, 
January 2016) recalled that the scale of Glasgow’s capability and opportunity was 
only recognised in Ministerial circles as the government prepared in 2009 for a visit 
by the Chinese Vice-Premier: 
“I think it was when the Chinese came and visited us and there was a desire to 
do a kind of retrospective asset register to identify all we had in regard to key 
players, assets on the ground, capabilities…. although before that Alex 
Salmond had the twinkle in his eye and knew what was possible, understood 
policy and its direction [for offshore wind]. You had evolution going on in a 
range of entities when you started pulling it together, the companies, 
universities, assets. We did recognise something emerging in Glasgow but 
what complicates it further is Scotland is a small country…. Aberdeen and 
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Dundee were also coming together and promoting their assets. What was 
deeply bothersome was the fact that this could be a competing axis when it 
should be conjoining with Glasgow.”   
This perspective was confirmed a by a former inward investment manager (G-FDI, 
December 2015) who noted that the Scottish Government “had no view in making 
Glasgow a capital [for offshore wind] like Aberdeen [for oil and gas]”.  Strikingly, 
however, this absence of strategic co-ordination and intent by the Scottish 
Government to engender a distinct regional path was also mirrored at the city level. 
The head of a business representative body (G-Rep1, January 2016) recounted: 
“Glasgow was slow to understand the economic value to the city of the utilities”. This 
disposition was underscored by the near absence of offshore wind in the strategies of 
local economic development actors and the absence of a co-ordinating regional 
forum for the industry.  
To summarise, although devolved government only appears as a key actor late in 
this episode, the utilisation of its devolved powers and its conventions complemented 
institutional change at the UK level, further encouraging firm deviation and 
experimentation within the region. However, the framing of Glasgow’s assets within a 
national (Scottish) policy agenda and narrative led to path emergence being largely 
veiled. This led to minimal strategic co-ordination and awareness amongst multi-
scalar policy makers regarding the embryonic regional path’s potential. Thus, 
targeted state polices, incentives and initiatives to encourage the path creating 
causal interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms at the regional level are largely 
indiscernible in this episode.  
5.3 Episode 2: Path Development, 2009-2013 
This episode of path development reflects a phase of more pronounced path creating 
interplay between actors, assets and mechanisms. It is a period characterised by 
upbeat projections for the offshore wind path in Glasgow and the associated 
activation of a wider set of path actors related to both project deployment and 
manufacturing functions, including inward investors (see figs 5.2 and 5.3). Although 
firm-led agency remained central to path creation, university and devolved 
government actors also played notable roles in attempting to drive the path’s 
development, particularly through the creation of regional innovation infrastructure 
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that augmented the RIS. Also, significantly, oil and gas firms were sufficiently 
incentivised to break with their past and connect the path with novel networks and 
knowledge. During this episode of path development, a regional path narrative 
emerged that was recognised both nationally and internationally. Although the level 
of job creation remained relatively modest, the approximate 300 direct path jobs42 
were well-paid and knowledge-intensive, many vested with high levels of authority.   
There are three key foci of enquiry for the path’s development during this episode. 
Firstly, there will be consideration of the increasing mindful deviation of Glasgow’s 
power generation and distribution firms which was allied to benign extra-regional 
institutional developments, including the release of multiple Scottish offshore wind 
development sites by The Crown Estate in 2009. The second foci is the creation of 
the International Technology and Renewables Energy Zone (ITREZ) in 2011 by 
higher education and devolved government actors to “create a global research and 
development hub [for] the offshore renewable sector” (Board Approval Paper, 
Scottish Enterprise, December 2011). Finally, there is exploration of the 
incentivisation and diversification of oil and gas firms from carbon-based path 
dependence into Glasgow’s offshore wind path during this episode.  
 
Figure 5.2: Key path actors in Glasgow city centre 2009-13 
                                               
42 Based on figures provided by interviewees 
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Figure 5.3: Key path actors in wider region 2009-13  
5.3.1 Utility firms accelerate diversification    
In this episode, Glasgow based electricity utility firms expanded their offshore wind 
teams in line with their growing national and international ambitions and sought co-
location of parts of their manufacturing supply chain to the region. This enhanced 
strategization and experimentation by these path actors was accompanied by the 
operationalisation of a range of path creating mechanisms, including transplantation, 
which suggested a step change in regional asset valorisation was at hand. Such 
marked firm deviation from past practice at the regional level was linked to 
developments pertaining to the nation state’s institutional environment for the broader 
offshore wind sector.  
In 2009 institutional developments, including the EU’s binding targets for greenhouse 
gas reduction, Westminster’s Low Carbon Transition Plan and Holyrood’s Climate 
Change Act, provided Glasgow’s power firms with confidence on the multi-scalar 
direction of energy transition. These broad benign policies were also complemented 
by institutional developments more specific to the firms’ offshore wind ambitions and 
expectations. Firstly, in April 2009, the UK Government announced a doubling of the 
subsidy for offshore wind farms compared with onshore. Secondly, in early 2009, The 
Crown Estate announced ten exclusivity agreements for offshore wind development 
sites in Scottish Waters. Thirdly, in summer 2009, the Scottish Government created a 
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marine planning agency, Marine Scotland, to expedite offshore wind planning 
applications.  An offshore wind team manager in Glasgow (G-Dev3, August 2016) 
recounted of the significance of such state incentivisation for Glasgow’s path 
development:  
“It was a case of subsidy combining with co-ordinated leasing and streamlined 
planning; and then BOOM…. People came flocking. If Scotland had been 
independent, all the indices would have shown it to be the best place in the 
world to locate [for offshore wind] …. Glasgow was like a boom town”43.   
For Scottish Power, gaining exclusivity from The Crown Estate in 2009 for the Argyll 
Array site off the Scottish west coast represented a key trigger for a step change in 
the firm’s level of experimentation. The site, which could accommodate 300 turbines 
and had a development cost of £5.4billion, represented the largest and most 
ambitious planned offshore wind project in the world. In response, Iberdrola, Scottish 
Power’s parent company was incentivised to further valorise the Glasgow assets of 
its Scottish subsidiary. In recognition of its unique skills and knowledge, which were 
embedded in a wider regional capability, Scottish Power’s Glasgow HQ became 
Iberdrola’s head office for its global offshore renewables business. Rapidly, the 
offshore team in Glasgow grew to over 60 staff, with new team members mostly 
recruited from the regional labour market44. Concurrently, Iberdrola, encouraged by 
wider EU energy transition policies, including the EC’s Strategic Energy Plan for 
Wind (2010), progressed projects in the German Baltic Sea and French Atlantic. 
These projects and the related international partners provided Scottish Power with 
access to new international markets, funding and knowledge that could further 
valorise regional labour and research assets (Bathelt et al, 2004; Coe et al, 2008; 
Binz et al, 2016).  
Significantly, Iberdrola also saw the opportunity with Gamesa, a Spanish OEM of 
which it was a partial owner, to transplant new turbine technologies to the region, 
which could then be tested and legitimised in the UK’s expanding state subsidised 
market. It was a proposal that was welcomed by the Scottish Government in the form 
of a Memorandum of Understanding and support from its inward investment agency, 
SDI. With the opening of Gamesa’s turbine design office in the region in 2011, a 
                                               
43 Revealing the importance of Glasgow and Scotland to the UK’s overall ambitions in terms of offshore wind 
44 Based on author’s interviews 
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director in a regional innovation centre (G-RHE2, author’s interview, December 2015) 
recalled: “Scotland and the UK became a massive test site for Iberdrola’s global 
ambitions…. Glasgow became its offshore centre”. 
In 2009, Scottish Power’s rival, SSE also pursued more pronounced diversification 
and experimentation, incentivised by greater certainty of reward. Having secured 
development rights for a number of UK offshore wind sites, including the 690MW 
Islay Array and the 670MW Beatrice Array off the Scottish coast, the firm embarked 
on a programme of investment in Glasgow’s assets in order to develop these sites. In 
doing so, SSE also linked these regional assets to extra-regional networks, 
knowledge and funding (Bathelt, 2004; Coe, 2008; Binz et al, 2016) via a range of 
mechanisms. For example:  
 In October 2009, only eight months after the Scottish Territorial Waters 
Leasing Round and six months after the increase in state subsidy, the firm 
announced that it was creating a £20million Centre of Engineering Excellence 
for Renewable Energy (CEERE) in Glasgow to harness the region’s unique 
skills and research assets for the design and delivery of its renewable projects 
(a move that was projected to augment its 70 staff in Glasgow by 300).  
 In 2010, SSE agreed a strategic alliance with Mitsubishi Power Systems 
(facilitated by SDI) to jointly fund and design offshore wind projects which 
would utilise the region’s skills and research assets. In particular, Mitsubishi’s 
development of a hydraulic drive train was seen as a disruptive alternative to 
the dominant gear-driven turbines of Siemens and Vestas. Subsequently in 
2011, SSE opened its offshore wind turbine test centre at Hunterston near 
Glasgow, with SE support, to test Mitsubishi’s prototype turbine. 
 In the same year, SSE purchased along with a Hong Kong private equity firm 
(Marsh Global Holdings) an onshore wind tower manufacturer in Kintyre (a 
former Vestas inward investment with circa 100 employees), with support from 
Highland and Islands Enterprise and local government, in order to facilitate 
diversification into offshore wind towers. 
 In 2012, SSE established offshore wind procurement alliances with supply 
chain firms such as Atkins, Bifab, Mitsubishi, Siemens, Technip and the Wood 
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Group by which to “share development costs and create product and process 
innovation space” (G-Con2, July 2016). 
Finally, in 2010, a new entrant Mainstream Renewable Power, an Irish firm, having 
gained exclusivity for the Neart na Gaoithe wind farm off Scotland’s east coast in 
2009, established a project office in Glasgow. A manager in the firm (G-Dev3, August 
2016) observed that executives selected Glasgow as the location for their inward 
investment based on the region’s skills, research and training assets and “networked 
players”. 
In summary, mindful deviation by project developers from past practice in this period 
indicates significant temporal alignment with and contingency on extra-regional 
institutional developments. Moreover, while corporate acquisition was the primary 
path creating mechanism associated with firm diversification in the episode of path 
emergence, a more diverse range of branching and transplantation mechanisms 
which valorised regional assets, linking them to international networks, is evident in 
this period of path development.  
 
5.3.2 University supports firm-led diversification and transplantation    
“Why the rush to a post-industrial city on the other side from the renewable 
action on the [UK] east coast? Scottish Power and SSE have helped, by 
cultivating skills in the sector and drawing in contractors, such as Gamesa. 
The biggest asset, however, is the University of Strathclyde. The university's 
electrical-engineering department is probably Britain's best.”  
The above quote from The Economist (2011) entitled “Green Rush: The Renewable 
Energy Industry is Heading to Glasgow” provides a degree of insight to the 
increasing significance of institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) and the 
region’s research assets, especially the University of Strathclyde, in regard to the 
path’s creation. Accordingly, it is appropriate to explore the role of the regional 
innovation system in influencing the causal interplay of actors, assets and 
mechanisms and the qualitative nature of the path during this episode. 
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In 2011, the University of Strathclyde, under the leadership of its Principal, Professor 
Sir Jim McDonald,45 and Scottish Enterprise announced a £100m public investment 
to stimulate a research driven offshore wind cluster46 predicated on regional firm 
diversification and OEM related inward investment. Both public actors anticipated 
that the International Technology and Renewables Energy Zone (ITREZ) would 
“create a global research and development hub [for] the development of offshore 
renewable sectors, stimulating co-location, investment and job creation” (Board 
Approval Paper, Scottish Enterprise, December 2011). ITREZ was to be the physical 
embodiment of the offshore wind RIS: an innovation quarter, adjacent to the 
University of Strathclyde, which would enable existing and new entrant firms to 
deviate and experiment (Martin, 2010) by utilising the region’s research assets.  
In 2012, ITREZ signed joint research agreements with a number of international 
supply chain actors, including Gamesa and Technip, and also Scottish Power and 
SSE in order to exploit the region’s research capability, both close to market and blue 
sky. However, a former ITREZ manager recounted (G-RHE2, December 2015) that 
the initiative was fundamentally dependent “on a large international OEM, probably a 
new entrant to offshore wind, locating nearby” to link the RIS and local research 
capacity to extra-regional knowledge flows, funding and markets, thereby facilitating 
the “development of alternative technologies”. Therefore, in some respects, ITREZ 
could be characterised as an attempt by public and private actors to create 
something approaching a niche (Geels, 2004): a protected, shielded and empowered 
space (Smith and Raven, 2012) in which the technological path dependence of the 
wider sector could be countered (Markard and Truffer, 2012; Boschma et al, 2017).  
However, changing extra-regional institutional dynamics were to constrain the path 
creating powers of ITREZ and the RIS in which it was set. Critically, the UK Coalition 
Government’s austerity programme from 2010 onwards ensured that the cost 
reduction became central to UK Government offshore wind policy, further displacing 
a seemingly secondary regard for industrial development. This increased emphasis 
on cost reduction incentivised developers and their investors to seek projects in lower 
                                               
45 Professor Sir Jim McDonald, (appointed Principal in 2009) is a central actor in building relationships between 
the university and industry and government. He was instrumental in the creation of ITREZ. He is an electrical 
engineer, who has worked in academia and industry (including Scottish Power) and was energy advisor to the 
First Minister, Alex Salmond. In 2014, the university awarded the Chair and Chief Executive of Iberdrola, Jose 
Ignacio Sanchez Galan, an honorary professorship, soon after launching the Iberdrola Energy MBA 
46 SE marketing material and website 
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risk shallow waters near large urban centres. Therefore, during this episode, the 
offshore wind projects that were advanced were in English coastal waters that readily 
favoured the deployment of technology evolved from a dominant terrestrial 
antecedent. The main beneficiary of this technological preference was Siemens, 
which in 2011 won 100% of UK offshore wind turbine orders. Critically for ITREZ, 
Siemens already had its own mature research networks and in-house research 
capability and infrastructure that had evolved from its terrestrial technologies.  
Even so, Glasgow path actors pursued and developed relationships with OEMs that 
could utilise ITREZ. For example, as noted, the Spanish OEM, Gamesa, which was 
part owned by Iberdrola, opened a turbine design office in the region in 2011 and 
signed a joint research agreement with ITREZ to develop new turbine technologies. 
Whilst in the same year, Doosan Babcock, a South Korean engineering firm with a 
pre-existing facility in the region signalled in a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the Scottish Government that it would manufacture turbines in the region. However, 
ongoing UK state emphasis on cost reduction, as reflected in the UK’s Offshore Wind 
Cost Reduction Task Force (2011) and Programme Board (2012), consolidated the 
technological dominance of an effective duopoly (Siemens and Vestas) and 
prompted Gamesa and Doosan Babcock to abandon their transplantation plans in 
2012. In short, uncertainties about the development of the offshore wind market and 
rapid technological path dependence was dis-incentivising the agency of non-
incumbent offshore wind OEMs required for the utilisation of ITREZ.  
However, it was not only extra-regional policy and regulation which constrained 
valorisation of regional research assets, diverging informal government conventions 
also played a part. In 2010 the UK Government established the Offshore Wind 
Developers Forum, a partnership described by one electricity utility firm manager (G-
Con1, December 2015) as focused on “developing a holistic UK support for project 
development but not the supply chain…. [the forum was] mistaking a utilities cost 
reduction strategy with an industrial one”. In contrast, in the same year, Scottish 
Enterprise commissioned and publicised research that framed offshore wind as 
primarily an industrial opportunity47. Such diverging perspectives informed the actions 
of both governments. For example, it was not until 2013 that the UK Government 
                                               
47 The study estimated that offshore wind would contribute an additional GVA of £7bn and 28,000 jobs to Scottish 
economy within a decade 
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published an offshore wind industrial strategy, three years after the Scottish 
Government launched its industrial development route map. Therefore, the 
institutional complementarity (Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016) between London and 
Edinburgh that had seemed evident in the initial period of path emergence was less 
pronounced in this period. An RDA manager (G-RDA1, December 2015) noted of the 
period: “There were no real intensive dialogue or strategic touch points between 
them [the two governments]”.   
In summary, the path creating agency of university and devolved government actors 
was circumscribed by the extra-regional political-economic framework in which it was 
set. The failure to notably enhance the power of the RIS via the £100m public 
investment in ITREZ meant that the region did not become “a centre for generating 
patents…. or the radical stuff…. the big firms owned the technology” (G-Rep1, 
January 2016). In effect, extra-regional forces circumscribed the power of the RIS to 
activate actor experimentation and deviation from past practice or mediate the scale 
and character of the evolving regional path.    
5.3.3 Oil and gas firms pursue diversification and transplantation  
In this episode of path development, the mindful deviation of extra-regional oil and 
gas firms into the Glasgow path is notable. In particular, reference illuminates the 
conditional and open nature of path creation. Moreover, such diversification and 
transplantation is all the more noteworthy given the limited historic interface between 
Scotland’s two mature energy industries: oil and gas centred in Aberdeen; and 
electrical power generation and distribution centred in Glasgow.  
The entry of oil and gas firms into the path was predicated on “the pull” of the 
growing scale of offshore wind market and related supply chain and “the push” of a 
sharp fall in the oil price in 2009 (cited by former head of SDI Energy Team, author’s 
interview, G-FDI, December, 2015). These dynamics heightened expectations of 
reward (Steen, 2016) amongst the oil and gas sector and encouraged 
experimentation by actors that had previously “seen the new low risk, low cost and 
heavily regulated [offshore wind] industry as kindergarten stuff” (G-FDI, December, 
2015). Consequently, in 2010, the Wood Group, a global oil and gas firm based in 
Aberdeen, pursued diversification by acquiring a majority stake in the Glasgow based 
renewables consultancy Sgurr Energy (the consultancy had been established by 
former Scottish Power managers). Soon after, Xodus, another Aberdeen based firm 
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with significant global networks, transplanted its embryonic offshore wind expertise to 
the city in order to capitalise on the region’s skills, knowledge and networks. Such 
intercity investments were also augmented by international investments, including 
DNV, a Norwegian oil and marine services firm, which according to its press 
statements was also drawn by regional assets that were distinct at the international 
level. 
Thus, this episode of path creation demonstrates that the dynamic institutional 
environment was generating expectations of sufficient scale to incentivise oil and gas 
firms to deviate from their deep-rooted carbon-based path dependence and diversify 
towards low carbon power generation. Although not significant in scale, such firm-led 
diversification and transplantation gave Glasgow’s path actors access to the skills, 
knowledge, technology and networks (Binz et al, 2015) of the established and 
internationalised offshore oil and gas sector.   
5.4 Episode 3: Path Realisation, 2013-2015 
During this third and final episode, the industrial path that was realised still exhibited 
growth characteristics but these were more constrained than had been anticipated 
during the previous episode. By the end of 2015 approximately 350 direct offshore 
wind jobs48 were in the region. However, this was not of the volume foreseen and 
many were dependent on public funding. Moreover, in this episode, the strategic 
autonomy of local actors, such as Scottish Power and the University of Strathclyde, 
which had been evident in previous episodes was reduced. In this period of path 
realisation, the role of electricity utility firms in regional asset valorisation was muted, 
whilst the direct role of the UK state became significant, with the establishment of 
Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult (ORE Catapult). This high-profile decision to 
locate the UK funded innovation body and the related 100 jobs in Glasgow somewhat 
masked the changing nature of the path’s evolution in terms of the attenuation of 
firm-led agency and the implications that this would have on the path creating 
interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms and subsequent path outcomes.  
A common view amongst interviewees was that the path that had been realised was 
“stuttering its way forward” (G-RDA1, December 2015). Just as many interviewees 
had said that the path had emerged by institutionally inspired happenstance, a similar 
                                               
48 Based on figures provided by interviewees 
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sentiment regarding path evolution in this episode was also evident. Tellingly, a 
manager within a regional development agency (G-RDA3) revealed: “We had 
anticipated new turbines and supply chains due to the seeming growth in the market 
but nobody considered the subsidy regime drying up…. I don’t think it was group 
think, we just didn’t see it coming”. To interpret, the opportunity to create a new 
regional industrial path of size and quality was closing and its closure was veiled from 
economic development policy makers, suggesting a lack of institutional prescience 
one would associate with policy makers acting as institutional entrepreneurs 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009) and system builders (Geels, 2004; Boschma 
et al, 2017).  
There are two key foci for understanding the path’s realisation during this period. 
Firstly, there is consideration of the rapid attenuation of firm-led agency, particularly 
relating to Scottish Power and SSE. Whilst the second relates to the location of the 
UK state’s Technology and Innovation Centre (ORE Catapult) in the region and its 
effect on the nature of regional path creation.  
 
Figure 5.4: Key path actors Glasgow city centre 2013-15 
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5.4.1 Circumscribed firm-led diversification and transplantation   
This analytical focus considers the attenuation of firm-led agency and its effect on the 
size and character of the regional industrial path. In doing so, it will explore how this 
outcome was contingent on UK state policy and regulatory changes that made many 
projects in Scottish waters commercially unviable. Although Scottish Government 
subsidies incentivised firms to adopt new technologies that could more economically 
exploit Scotland’s offshore wind resources these only partially mitigated the overall 
impact of UK state changes on the Glasgow path. Moreover, the close temporal co-
relation between alterations to the nation state’s “rules” (North, 1990) and firm 
attenuation in the regional path, reveals the relative causal power of the two scales of 
government.   
In 2013, the UK Energy Act, introduced a new subsidy regime for offshore wind 
projects, Contracts for Difference (CfD). Award of subsidy to project developers was 
now based on an auction system which supported the lowest cost bids, thereby 
driving cost reduction via project developer competition. The system privileged 
projects in shallow and sheltered waters and their associated prevailing technologies. 
To smooth transition to the new CfD subsidy regime that was scheduled to make its 
first call for bids in 2014, the UK Government introduced a temporary subsidy regime, 
the Final Investment Decision Enabling for Renewables (FIDER). Concurrently, in 
2013, the devolved Scottish Government introduced enhanced subsidies (Scottish 
Renewable Obligation Contracts) for supporting innovative projects that 
demonstrated technologies more suited to Scotland’s deeper and dynamic waters, 
such as floating wind. However, despite such institutional entrepreneurship, the 
Scottish subsidy could only incentivise projects of a small scale, exposing the 
devolved government as a market adaptor, not a market maker. Moreover, through 
its Energy Act (2013), the UK Government consolidated control over the institutional 
levers of energy policy by scheduling the withdrawal of Scotland’s subsidy powers for 
2017. The sovereign UK state was exercising its exclusive right to determine 
devolved powers. 
The effect of these institutional dynamics in shaping the expectations of electricity 
utility firms (Steen, 2016) was significant and tellingly rapid. Increasing institutional 
uncertainty disincentivised these firms from mindful deviation (Garud and Karnoe, 
2003) from past practice and future facing strategizing and experimentation. In the 
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same month that new UK Energy Act received Royal Assent (December, 2013) 
Scottish Power withdrew from the globally significant 1.8GW Argyll Array, meaning 
the firm would have no offshore wind projects in Scottish waters. The firm’s 
geographic project focus was now in English, German and French waters. Illustrating 
the impact of the changing institutional environment, a director within Scottish Power 
(BBC interview, December 2013) observed of the firm’s abandonment of the project:  
"We believe it is possible to develop the Argyll Array site, it has the some of 
the best wind conditions of any offshore zone in the UK. However, it is our 
view that the Argyll Array project is not financially viable in the short term. As 
cost reductions continue to filter through the offshore wind industry, and as 
construction techniques and turbine technology continues to improve, we 
believe that the Argyll Array could become a viable project in the long term. 
[However] the rate of progress in development of [deep water] foundation and 
installation technology has been slower than anticipated. The current outlook 
for offshore wind deployment in the UK suggests this will not significantly 
improve in the short term.”  
The implication of the decision was not lost on Scottish Power management in 
Glasgow. An innovation manager in an electricity utility firm (G-Dev2) recalled: “A 
huge nearby radical anchor project would have been a focus for local expertise and 
innovation…. But why should companies bear massive financial uncertainty between 
auctions… why risk radical innovation”. In addition, the subsequent geographic 
concentration of the sector south of the border had consequences for the place of the 
Glasgow office within the Iberdrola hierarchy. Although Glasgow remained formally 
the corporate lead office for offshore wind activities and the related team remained 
stable in employee numbers (c. 65 staff), the centre of power moved to London, 
whilst project functions were increasingly dispersed across the EU, close to projects. 
By 2015, London accounted for 50% of all Iberdrola offshore staff and was the 
location of the Director of Offshore Renewables49. A director in an electricity utility 
firm (S-Dev2, February 2016) highlighted that “London’s now the centre of the 
offshore [wind] world due to the consenting bodies, the [UK] government, consultees, 
the contractors, and financiers being in one place….and government industry fora 
                                               
49 A graduate of the University of Strathclyde 
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being here, rotating meetings round respective stakeholder offices…. [Also] London 
is well placed for connectivity, saving a lot of [international] travel time compared with 
Glasgow”. In short, the impact of regulatory change was combining with the 
centralised nature of the UK state to diminish the power of the Glasgow office in the 
Iberdrola hierarchy and, in turn, its autonomy and authority to determine the future of 
the regional path and related utilisation of regional assets.   
Only four months after Scottish Power’s Argyll Array decision, SSE announced it was 
abandoning plans for its largest Scottish project, the Islay Array (690MW), and that it 
would be minimising corporate exposure in other UK projects. However, unlike 
Scottish Power, SSE retained a major project in Scottish waters, the Beatrice project 
(670MW). A director in a utility firm (S-Dev1, February 2016) observed that the 
project only survived because it had confirmed subsidy under the temporary FIDER 
arrangements. Tellingly, the director also revealed that the broader uncertainty of the 
regulatory environment made SSE rethink its approach to jointly developing non-
incumbent alternate technologies and to favour the purchase of Siemens technology:  
“Assurity, cost and durability… and existing long term known [terrestrial] 
relations with Siemens were attractive. It’s now about incremental innovation 
that leads to cost savings of existing suppliers…. operational efficiency, 
predicting wind speeds, access and maintenance…. these are priorities.”  
Therefore, SSE abandoned the innovative supply chain experimentation evident in 
the previous episode and purchased incumbent “off the shelf” technologies. Thereby, 
leading to reduced valorisation of regional knowledge, research and skills. For 
example, SSE quietly retreated from plans to create a centre of renewable energy 
engineering expertise in the city that was projected to create 300 jobs. Another 
director in the same firm (G-Dev1, January 2016) ruminating on the brittle 
dependence of corporate forward planning on UK state policy noted: “SSE has 
developed a unique world class capability in Glasgow and now [UK] government 
policy has changed….the UK Government has a history of losing focus on industry 
development”.  
Moreover, the correlation between the regulatory environment and local corporate 
strategy had consequences for the future of ITREZ and the RIS in which it was 
embedded. A senior executive in a university (G-RHE1, author’s interview, February 
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2016) reflected on the institutionally contingent changing focus of ITREZ and the 
University of Strathclyde: 
“[ITREZ and the university now] promote other low carbon technologies…. 
nuclear, gas, hydrogen, repowering and efficient electricity distribution, to 
migrate our talent and research capability to innovation focal points in line with 
movements in government policy….and income potential…. to meet the 
commercial needs of the big corporates and their order books.”  
Conspicuously, the attenuation of firm-led path agency was heightened by policy 
misalignment within and between government levels (Barca et al, 2012; Martin and 
Sunley, 2015). For example, the UK Government’s CfD auction process of 2014 
incentivised a culture of closed industrial price competition, promoting lower risk 
incumbent technologies; whilst ORE Catapult, launched almost simultaneously by the 
UK Government, sought to encourage collaborative innovation within the industry. In 
regard to the UK / Scottish policy nexus, a manager within a regional development 
agency (G-RDA2, December, 2015) recounted that the UK state’s introduction of CfD 
was “the red light that halted [Scottish] plans…. CfD is slamming the door in 
Scotland’s face…. The industry needed a measured approach to its development, 
not classic stop start”. Moreover, Scottish civil servants observed that UK industry 
government fora increasingly seemed focused on English waters, a bias they felt was 
amplified in the run up to the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014. One 
remarked (G-SGov1, Dec 2015) that the UK’s Offshore Wind Programme Board was 
“driven by the UK Government with a Saint George’s flag”. 
However, notably in this episode regional consultancy firms recognising the 
diminished expectations of the path’s two anchor firms, Scottish Power and SSE, 
sought out new market opportunities in English and international markets with 
support from SE and SDI. Also noteworthy was the mindful deviation of three 
Glasgow-based consultancies to provide advice and support to floating wind projects 
that were part funded by the Scottish Government’s enhanced subsidy; signalling the 
potential for a national level technological niche in which Glasgow path actors could 
play a part.  
Finally, a holistic view of state economic development policies relating to the region 
reveals an absence of coordination between energy, industrial and regional policies. 
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Illustrative of this strategic deficiency was agreement of a £1.1 billion City Deal in 
2014, the same year that changes to UK energy policy had an adverse effect on the 
regional offshore wind path. All three levels of government (UK, devolved and local) 
agreed a City Deal comprising supply side investments with limited attention given to 
regional industrial development, despite the offshore wind path potentially offering 
the increased GVA, productivity and quality jobs sought by the City Deal partners.  
To summarise, given diminished expectations amongst the region’s electricity utility 
firms induced by UK regulatory and policy changes, the interplay of firms, assets and 
mechanisms was muted in this episode. Although, there is evidence of ongoing 
experimentation amongst auxiliary firm actors, this was not on a scale that could 
compensate for the attenuation of the two critical firm actors of the path, Scottish 
Power and SSE. Moreover, the changing disposition of these dominant local actors in 
terms of technological selection and investment forced ITREZ and the University of 
Strathclyde to move away from a primary focus on offshore wind and further reduced 
the causal influence of local knowledge and research capacity on path creation.   
5.4.2  UK state flagship investment augments path 
The final analytical focus relates to how direct nation state investment in the regional 
path shaped the nature of the path’s realisation. Specifically, it explores how the UK’s 
new Catapult technology and innovation centre engaged with both regional and 
extra-regional actors, networks and knowledge flows. This investigative lens also 
gives insight in to the direct role of the nation state in valorising regional skills and 
research assets. Furthermore, this analytical focus illuminates the changing 
orientation of the path’s ownership, from private towards public, and the relative 
importance of public and private investment in the path’s evolution.      
The UK Government’s £50million investment to create the Offshore Renewable 
Energy Catapult (OREC) in Glasgow and the related recruitment of c. 100 staff over 
the course of 2013 and 2014 represented a significant endorsement by the nation 
state of Glasgow’s skills and labour market assets. A UK civil servant (S-R3, author’s 
interview, January 2016) recounted that the selection of Glasgow was based on a 
number of regional attributes:  
“[It] was an open bid process with no spatial prioritisation but there was a need 
for a pool of potential staff and there was a big vision for ITREZ and a 
127 
 
renewable energy cluster imagined…. and the Catapult could be part of a 
functioning [Glasgow] network.” 
Notably, devolved government played a critical role in securing this nation state 
“inward investment”. A regional development manager (G-RDA1, December 2015) 
recalled that the Scottish Government “aggressively lobbied the UK Government” in 
order to “locate a new major player in Glasgow’s industrial community” (see figure 
5.5).  
In 2014, OREC entered its new HQ located in the ITREZ and, in the same year, took 
ownership of significant offshore wind test and demonstration infrastructure at Blyth 
in North East England (formerly NAREC50).  Interviewees recalled a sense of 
heightened expectation regarding how the TIC would support their activities and 
ambitions. However, the operation of OREC was prescribed by the institutional 
priorities of the UK state and not the regional industrial community. OREC was 
tasked with engendering innovation in order to reduce the cost of offshore wind via 
collaboration between industry, academia and government. It was not about 
challenging the technological path dependence of the sector to create new industrial 
development opportunities, but rather it focused on reducing the cost of largely 
incumbent technologies through innovation. This goal was reflected in the 
management and governance structure of the new organisation. OREC’s Chief 
Executive had been Chair of the UK’s Cost Reduction Task Force and its Industry 
Advisory Group was largely comprised of incumbent project developers and related 
suppliers. Significantly, the need for OREC to source a third of its funding51 from the 
private sector incentivised the development of relations with established industrial 
actors who would have better access to funding than new entrants.   
In its first two years of operation, OREC did not utilise the region’s research assets to 
the anticipated degree or readily integrate with the RIS. A university technology 
manager (G-RHE2, December 2015) reflected that “Catapult is poorly networked in 
Glasgow…. it was like space ship landing…. remaining relatively unintegrated into 
Glasgow”. This view was further evidenced by a director in an electricity utility firm (S-
Dev1, February 2016) who suggested confusion regarding the respective roles of 
ITREZ, a product of Scottish Government policy, and the UK Government’s ORE 
                                               
50 National Renewable Energy Centre 
51 The other two thirds were to be sourced from UK Government funding and other research funds e.g. EU 
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Catapult. Moreover, the same interviewee indicated a lack of co-ordination and joined 
up government strategy in this regard: “There has to be more awareness of 
Glasgow’s offer and conscious decision making by government and others…. we 
need to join up a bit better.” 
However, it can be contended that ORE Catapult and ITREZ were not competing 
initiatives but rather differing ones. ITREZ was largely premised on diffusing and 
applying the region’s knowledge and commercialising the university’s research, both 
radical and incremental; whilst OREC pursued a UK cost cutting agenda via the 
application of new knowledge with no spatial preference for its sourcing. Key OREC 
initiatives and services were not dependent on the regional innovation system e.g. 
analysing and sharing technical performance data of national and international 
developers and providing test and demonstration services to OEMs at Blyth. For 
OREC, the path in which it acted was primarily that of the wider sector and not the 
regional one. The consequences of this seeming lack of alignment were illuminated 
by an energy advisor to the Welsh Government (S-R1, December, 2015): 
“Many feel that OREC is not so well networked in Glasgow…. and its 
university connections are stronger with Newcastle University and Durham 
because of the location of its test infrastructure [in Blyth, North East England]. 
Strathclyde [University] thought OREC would commission research and top-up 
its EPSRC funding but they’ve not been shown the money. There was just not 
the demand for radical research. If there is a regional innovation system 
operating, OREC is not really a part of it. It connects with the local economy 
through recruitment and its Board…. Blyth and the need to get income to 
cover the costs of its big test infrastructure - that’s good for its thirds model - 
has shaped its strategic direction and partnerships.”   
In summary, ORE Catapult was a much anticipated UK state investment in 
Glasgow’s offshore wind industrial community that promoted the profile of the 
regional path both nationally and internationally. Moreover, such state transplantation 
further valorised the region’s skills and labour market assets. However, it did not 
have the impact on the valorisation of the region’s research assets or strengthening 
its RIS that was anticipated, primarily due to its institutionally derived emphasis on 
sectoral cost cutting privileging established technologies and extra-regional relations. 
Moreover, it was a predisposition that did not readily engender regional firm 
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diversification or inward investment and therefore its presence did not have the 
anticipated effect on private sector job creation. The seeming dislocation between 
OREC and the regional economy is evidence that geographic proximity does not 
ensure ready assimilation of a new actor in to a pre-existing regional innovation 
system, other proximities, including institutional ones, are requisite (Boschma, 2005).  
5.5 Character of the Path and Effect on Regional Development 
By the end of the final episode approximately 350 high skill, knowledge intensive jobs 
were associated with the Glasgow path, the largest concentration of such offshore 
wind jobs in the UK outside London. In the industry’s international spatial division of 
labour, the regional path represented a geographic concentration of specialised skills 
and knowledge relating to project development and delivery, research and support 
services. However, given that the path’s fortunes had been regulated by a changing 
and uncertain nation state policy and regulatory environment there was a sense of 
both unfulfilled potential, especially in regard to private sector investment and job 
creation, and caution about its prospects.    
Despite the agency of multiple path actors, the ambition of harnessing energy 
transition to create a regional cluster of integrated deployment and manufacturing 
functions went unachieved, as did the aim of creating a regional industrial community 
exhibiting characteristics of a technological niche i.e. one that could counter 
technological path dependence of dominant players. The observations that Glasgow 
is “a low carbon capability that responds to government and market signals” (G-
Rep1, January 2016) expose the causal significance of extra-regional institutional 
forces in determining the scale and nature of path creating agency.  Therefore, 
despite evident exceptional regional assets that could have allowed it to become an 
international “global hub”52, Glasgow became an ancillary knowledge node within an 
increasingly technologically path dependent sector.  
Moreover, by the end 2015, the power of key local path actors, such as Scottish 
Power, SSE and the University of Strathclyde, which had been influential in the 
earlier episodes of path creation had been constrained by extra-regional “rules” 
(North, 1990; Geels, 2004). Despite institutional thickness apparently remaining a 
notable feature of Glasgow’s offshore wind community (see fig 5.5), the community 
                                               
52 Scottish Enterprise Board Approval Paper for ITREZ, December 2011 
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was not vested with sufficient power to influence and mediate extra-regional 
institutional forces, especially at the level of the nation state, to create a regional path 
of greater scale and function.  Therefore, although Glasgow was more than just a 
receptacle for economic activity (Scott, 1998; Pike et al, 2007; Hudson, 2007) or a 
passive arena reshaped by national and international capital flows (MacKinnon, 
2014), the region did not possess sufficient power, even when working in partnership 
with devolved government, to create a globally significant agglomeration of offshore 
wind firms that could challenge place and technological path dependence (Boschma, 
2017 et al).  
Despite the significant nation state investment in relation to ORE Catapult, this direct 
intervention by the UK Government did not outweigh the economic impact of the 
attenuation of private sector investment. This attenuation denied the regional 
economy the additional private sector, competitive, knowledge intensive jobs and 
firms that the Glasgow Economic Forum had identified a pressing need for in 2006. 
Moreover, it is telling that the most significant concentration of offshore wind 
employment in the city by the end of this account related to ORE Catapult. It was an 
outcome that further emphasised the regional economy’s public sector path 
dependence, reflecting Glasgow’s moniker of “Public Sector City” (Tomlinson, 2018). 
This seeming missed opportunity for the region’s development caused by changes in 
state energy policy revealingly mimics previously squandered opportunities in recent 
decades. In the 1980s skilled jobs relating to the design and manufacture of wind 
turbines and the location of the British National Oil Corporation’s HQ were lost as a 
consequence of UK state energy policy. Finally, this lack of sensitivity regarding the 
interplay of multi-scalar state institutions is also redolent of an enduring deficit of 
coherent inter-scalar government policy in regard to the region’s development. 
5.6 Summary     
The creation of the Glasgow offshore wind path was the product of the novel 
knowledge of energy transition fusing with unique regional assets. The degree of 
fusion was contingent on the interplay of mutable aggregations of actors, 
mechanisms and regional assets, which was pointedly mediated by the multi-scalar 
institutional environment. These shifting aggregations and their interplay, occurring in 
unique temporal and spatial contexts, led to three discernible episodes of path 
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creation over a decade – path emergence, development and realisation (fig 5.5). At 
the outset, path emergence was primarily shaped by UK Government policies and 
regulation which were engendering the development of the wider offshore wind 
sector. The path was framed within the context of this largely extra-regional 
development process, leading to limited path awareness at the regional level. 
Subsequently, the alignment of benign policies and regulation at both the UK 
Government and Scottish Government levels incentivised increased and distributed 
firm agency and enhanced interaction of mechanisms and assets. Moreover, the role 
of regional institutional thickness in both encouraging common purpose and private 
and public agency became more pronounced, as demonstrated by the creation of 
ITREZ. However, key changes in the UK institutional framework relating to subsidy 
led to rapid dis-incentivisation of firm agency and common purpose, despite the 
continuation of benign devolved policies and regulation. Furthermore, the negative 
consequences of this outcome were only partially mitigated by the transplantation of 
a major UK Government flagship investment, ORE Catapult.       
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 5.5: Glasgow’s timeline of episodes of path creation 
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 Size of spheres represent author’s estimate of relative importance of regional path actors 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 5.6: Career dynamics as an expression of institutional thickness 2006-15 
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Chapter 6: Humberside Case Study - From Imagined “Super 
Cluster” to Dispersed Supply Chain Nodes 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines three episodes of regional industrial path creation pertaining 
to offshore wind on Humberside from 2006 to end 2015. By exploring these changing 
episodes of path creation, the shifting causal interplay of path actors and 
mechanisms in utilising regional assets can be deconstructed and institutional 
influences revealed. As before, the case study facilitates exploration of the related 
conditionality of the resulting path’s scale and character. By following the path, the 
“deep-seated [and] wider relations, positions and contexts of actors in inter-related 
structures unfolding over space and time” (Pike et al, 2016b, p 132) are exposed, 
providing insight on the interplay of exogenous and endogenous forces. 
For each of the three episodes, a short description of the path’s evolution and 
identification of related key foci of enquiry set the scene within which the mindful 
deviation of path actors (Garud and Karnoe, 2003) are examined within a multi-scalar 
institutional environment. As before, there is consideration of how these mobilised 
actors utilised path creating mechanisms to convey the exogenous stimulus of 
energy transition to reconfigure and valorise regional assets in relation to each of 
these foci (MacKinnon et al, 2018). The chapter concludes with a description of the 
scale and character of the resulting path and its effect on regional development and 
regional path dependence.  
There are three temporal episodes that will drive the case study’s investigation of 
path creation. During the first period, 2006 to 2011, a nascent offshore wind path 
emerged, and by the end of the episode c. 100 O&M jobs were located in Grimsby 
and a significant Siemens’ inward investment, the UK’s first turbine manufacturing 
facility, was anticipated for Hull.  In the second episode, 2011 to 2014, the anticipated 
pace of path development slowed, although a pan-Humber marketing brand and 
Enterprise Zone were created. By the end of 2013 there were approximately 200 jobs 
and increasing transplantation activity related to O&M in Grimsby but the scale and 
quality of such path activity was circumscribed. On the estuary’s northern bank, a 
hiatus relating to the Siemens investment meant few jobs had materialised. In the 
phase of path realisation, between 2014 and end 2015, path resurgence was evident. 
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Siemens’ commenced construction of its facility, albeit it on a reduced scale, that 
would create 1,000 jobs. There were also significant announcements regarding O&M 
investment and related job creation in Grimsby. Although the path’s scale and quality 
was less than previously anticipated, the realised regional offshore wind path 
represented a notable component of the industry’s UK and international division of 
labour. 
6.2 Episode 1: Path Emergence, 2006 -2011 
During this first episode, an embryonic regional offshore wind path emerged on 
Humberside focused on three principal sites located at Grimsby, Hull and beside 
Immingham (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). By the end of this episode of emergence, the 
south bank was synonymous with project deployment, especially O&M at Grimsby, 
and the north bank with the proposed Siemens’s turbine manufacturing facility. The 
process of path emergence was primarily dependent on the interplay of firm-led 
transplantation with the Humber’s nearby offshore wind resources, excess port 
infrastructure and inexpensive maritime and industrial processing skills. 
During this initial episode, the path was increasingly recognised as a significant 
regional opportunity and strategic social agency played a noteworthy role in 
facilitating the initial causal interplay of assets, actors and mechanisms. A regional 
industrial representative (H-Rep 2, author’s interview, March 2016) recalled:  
“Round 3 [launched by the Crown Estate in 2008] changed perceptions. 
Offshore wind had previously had something of a sandals perception [amongst 
local actors] but the scale of offshore wind meant it could touch everyone in 
the local industrial base; painters, fabricators, lawyers, Tata [the steel works at 
Scunthorpe]. The Humber had missed out on oil and gas and didn’t want to 
miss out this time… this was the religious phase….. it could be a second 
industrial revolution for Humberside”. 
Government actors also increasingly saw the opportunity for a new development path 
for the region.  A former UK Government regional official (H-UkGov1, author’s 
interview, March 2016) recounted the creation of a regional vision in which 
“decarbonisation provided a meta-narrative for the Northern Powerhouse on 
Humberside…. providing a rallying call for industrial intervention that was almost 
evangelic”.  
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There are three key foci of enquiry for the path’s emergence. Firstly, the 
transplantation of an O&M function to Grimsby in 2008 represented a notable early 
instance of path emergence. By the end of the episode, c.100 jobs53 were located in 
the port town, representing the earliest significant concentration of regional path 
related employment. A second notable occurrence was the purchase by Able UK, a 
disruptive new entrant to the regional economy, in 2008 of a large green field site 
with waterfront access on the Humber’s south bank and the site’s subsequent 
promotion to offshore wind inward investors, especially turbine manufacturers. 
Finally, the announcement in 2011 of a Memorandum of Understanding between 
Siemens and ABP to create a £310 million turbine manufacturing facility, centred on 
Hull’s Alexandra Dock, represented the third and final notable act of path emergence.    
 
Figure 6.1: Principal path creation locations and regional actors on Humberside 2006-11 
                                               
53 Based on figures provided by interviewees 
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Figure 6.2: Images of principal Humber locations of path creation 
6.2.1 Utility firm’s transplantation initiates path 
This analytical focus relates to the transplantation of an O&M base at Grimsby Fish 
Dock in 2008 by the electricity utility firm Centrica, representing the first notable 
instance of regional path creation. As will be demonstrated, this new investment on 
Humberside was dependent on changes in the broader UK institutional context that 
encouraged the terrestrial onshore wind developer to mindfully deviate into offshore 
wind54. However, the selection of the location was influenced by geographical assets 
and the strategic social agency of local actors, namely Grimsby Fish Dock 
Enterprises and North East Lincolnshire Council.  
In 2006, the Humber estuary was in proximity to six designated offshore wind sites 
consented to project developers by the UK state, totalling c. 2.3GW (fig 6.3). These 
assets represented the largest global concentration of readily exploitable offshore 
wind resource, in terms of wind and maritime conditions and proximity to the national 
grid and urban markets. Reflecting on these spatial advantages, a former UK 
Government regional official (H-UKGov1, author’s interview, March 16) cited the 
                                               
54 For example, Energy White Paper, 2003; Energy Review, 2006; Energy White Paper, 2007; Climate Change 
Act, 2008 
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“inescapability of geography” in influencing selection of the region for offshore wind 
investments.  
However, the mindful deviation of Centrica, one of the UK’s “Big Six”, from its 
terrestrial business model was contingent on state leasing, consenting and subsidy 
making asset exploitation commercially attractive. Moreover, institutional 
entrepreneurship (Di Maggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009) by state actors had 
ensured strategic co-ordination of these “rules” (North, 1990; Geels, 2004), as 
demonstrated by the Crown Estate’s Third Leasing Round being launched in the 
same year as DECC announced enhanced subsidy for offshore wind projects. 
Consequently, this interplay of nation state institutions and the profit rationale of 
Centrica, privileged and encouraged the economic exploitation of near to shore, 
shallow water sites, such as those close to the Humber.  
 
Source: The Crown Estate, 2009 
Figure 6.3: Humber estuary’s proximity to designated offshore wind sites   
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Given this expectation of commercial reward (Steen, 2016), Centrica commenced 
construction of the relatively small Round 1 Lynn and Inner Dowsing offshore wind 
farm in 2006, adjacent to the Humber estuary. Significantly for the initial economic 
impact of the emergent regional path, the construction process was undertaken from 
Esbjerg, given the Danish port’s developing capability for installing offshore projects 
in the North Sea basin. Concurrently, Centrica and its O&M partner, RES, sought to 
find a UK location for the transplantation of its O&M function in order to service the 
wind farm once operational in 2008. A former O&M manager (H-O&M2, May 2016) 
recalled:  
“Grimsby had acceptable steaming [90 minutes] to Lynn and Inner… and the 
motorway, rail link and broadband to the portside.... The big support vessels 
came from Esbjerg…. [Grimsby’s] port’s repair systems and slipways were not 
that important.… In 2008, I responded to a job advert [for an O&M Manager] 
that my wife showed me in the local paper that was like a personal ad…. at 
that time nobody in Grimsby had heard of offshore wind”.  
Given the industry’s initial modest growth profile, Associated British Ports (ABP), 
Humberside’s monopoly port operator, was insufficiently incentivised to deviate from 
past practice. A former O&M manager (H-O&M2, May 2016) recalled that ABP was 
dismissive of the needs of project developers and associated income when 
approached in 2006:  
“At that time ABP had no idea what offshore wind was going to be.... for ABP it 
was a new technology…. [Centrica and RES] set up a high level meeting with 
ABP.  It [ABP] worked by charging per tonne of coal or iron ore. These [O&M] 
vessels are small, carrying twelve people, in the main aluminium and 
fibreglass. ABP told them to p*ss off and go talk to Roger Smith [the manager 
at Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises] at the fish quay”.   
It was left to the smaller private actor, Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises (GFDE), which 
was seeking additional income to mitigate the reducing revenues from the declining 
fishing industry, to facilitate fusion of the novel new technology of offshore wind with 
regional assets. A director with a local authority (H-LA3, author’s interview, May 
2016) revealed:  
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“The first O&M enquiry was through GFDE. Centrica had already approached 
ABP but they didn’t see opportunity and so they [GFDE] hosted them at their 
office at the fish dock. It’s been individuals that have made this happen…. 
getting the enquiry in was the private sector. The RDA would not have 
influenced it or helped the renewables industry in Grimsby. It’s been 
individuals, the Kurt Christensens of this world55.  
However, the valorisation of the old fish dock was not solely the product of firm 
agency but also that of the local Council. A quote by a local authority director (H-LA3, 
May 2016) reveals the importance of local government in utilising its powers to 
reduce physical barriers to transplantation:  
“It was an opportunity to transform the port estate. It was rundown, 
dilapidated, there were demolitions. The twenty five year service contracts [for 
the wind farms] meant we could start thinking long-term…. We recognised that 
the lock gates were not fit for purpose, they needed upgraded to allow more 
O&M vessels to use the quay. It was a direct intervention [of £500,000] by the 
Council to show commitment to the industry. It wasn’t funded by the EU but by 
the Council…. we had to do a lot of work around State Aids to ensure it would 
help multiple companies”.  
By the end of this episode, Grimsby’s port assets were being transformed by offshore 
wind investment, a process enabled by the firm-led transplantation of Centrica and 
diversification by GFDE. Moreover, activation of such firm agency was largely 
contingent on changes to the wider UK institutional environment, facilitated by state 
institutional entrepreneurs, primarily the Crown Estate and DECC. However, a local 
state actor, North East Lincolnshire Council, played an auxiliary but notable role in 
priming the reconfiguration of local legacy assets for firm-led utilisation.           
6.2.2 Disruptor’s diversification promotes transplantation  
Another notable analytical focus in relation to the path’s emergence was the 
purchase in 2008 of a large green field site adjacent to Immingham by Able UK, a 
Middlesbrough firm that specialised in ship decommissioning. Able UK’s intention 
was to develop the Able Marine Energy Park (AMEP) on the site to accommodate 
offshore wind manufacturing, deployment and O&M functions. In doing, so the new 
                                               
55 Owner of a local fishing firm who diversified in to offshore wind services, creating the firm Wind Power Support 
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regional entrant aimed to challenge the monopoly position of ABP. However, the 
formal and informal institutional environment in which these ambitions were set 
represented a barrier to their realisation.  
The potential of the large 200ha site, which had been originally earmarked for a coal 
fired power station but had become available due to changing energy policy, was 
summarised by a firm director (H-PO2, author’s interview, June 2016):  
“In a nutshell, we have the best product. It would be a bespoke facility, tailor 
made to meet the exacting standards of the industry. It ticks all the boxes. 
We’ve had the privileged position of talking in detail to virtually everyone who 
moves in the sector. We know how long the quay should be, what loading 
requirements should be, the characteristics of land and slope and 
requirements for cranes.” 
Able UK’s diversification was contingent on the plans of OEMs to transplant their 
offshore wind turbine technologies to the east coast of England. Given the seeming 
scale of the nearby offshore wind market (estimated at 7GW within a national market 
of 35GW by 2020), GE, Siemens and Vestas undertook numerous regional site visits 
and appraisals between 2008 and 2009. Such OEM strategizing was encouraged by 
regional state actors.  A former regional development manager (S-OEM, author’s 
interview, August 2016) recalled: 
“There was a massive groundswell right across the value chain. You were 
regularly at the airport meeting up with visiting companies. You turned in to a 
tour guide showing off the best sites.”  
Moreover, Yorkshire Forward56 promoted the AMEP site for co-location. A former 
senior UK state official (H-UKGov1, March, 2016) revealed:  
“Yorkshire Forward [was] catalyzed by the Crown Estate maps showing the 
scale of sites just offshore…. [and] pushed the massive opportunity for co-
location and clustering that the site offered investors and their supply chain. It 
had the potential to be a game changer for the Humber and the North…. all 
the other sites were un-clusterable [due to size constraints]”.  
                                               
56 A Regional Development Agency (RDA) 
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However, although state actors promoted the site for inward investment relating to 
manufacture and installation, these actors did not possess the resources or powers 
to address the related physical barriers to transplantation. A local economic 
development manager (H-RDA, March 2016) reflected:  
“The problem with Able is the quay is not there. Who is going to punch through 
and invest the £450million for the quayside and the basic site infrastructure? 
There’s a need for a big investor that wants to operate from the site and make 
the huge investment”.  
Moreover, the rapid evolution of the industry engendered by the institutionally driven 
priority of cost reduction led to a swift consolidation in the value chain and 
technological path dependence (Boschma et al, 2017). In particular, Siemens 
successful rapid scaling up of its turbine models provided the OEM with a dominant 
market position by 2011. Responding to such sectoral dynamics, GE in 2011 
withdrew from alternate gearless turbine technologies and dropped its transplantation 
plans. Subsequently, in 2012, Vestas abandoned plans for its new larger scale 
turbines and their manufacture in the UK, choosing to consolidate turbine 
manufacturing in Denmark. The implications of these OEM dynamics for the AMEP 
site was evidenced by a director (H-PO2, June 2016):  
“In 2010 we started the quay design and planning consultation and we shook 
hands with GE, they were coming here. But the gearless technology for their 
turbines did not work and hit the dust… Vestas also never took forward their 
plans as their plans for new products changed… but Siemens were pending, 
all the guys at Brande (Siemens’ Danish HQ) were so excited”.  
However, as will be consequently evidenced, Siemens was also concerned about the 
related cost barriers to developing the AMEP site. 
Nor did all state actors favour the AMEP site for transplantation. Whitehall’s culture 
promoted caution towards prioritising potential inward investment locations. Although 
a UK inward investment manager (H-UKGov2, February 2016) described the AMEP 
site as “the dream ticket given its scale…. a blank canvas that would allow 
clustering…. it was our Bremerhaven option57”, a senior colleague on the same day, 
in the same London office, (S-UKGov2, author’s interview, February, 2016) offered 
                                               
57 North Sea German Port with an offshore wind supply chain cluster 
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an insight into normative convention that stymied co-location: “Government never 
fully understands business so often leaves it to the market. We move around a lot 
and it takes time to develop such knowledge to make that call, therefore, there is 
often no [spatial] preference.” In effect, despite government leasing, consenting and 
subsidising the industry, it remained cautious about influencing or directing the 
locational decision making of the supply chain. Strikingly, at the regional level, 
competition between local authorities also undermined strategic co-ordination that 
may have channelled investors to locations that optimised regional economic impact. 
A local industry representative in Grimsby (H-O&M2, May 2016) observed:  
“People ignore what is happening round the corner. We’ve got Scunthorpe 
steel works nearby (twenty miles from AMEP) but we don’t give a sh*t, in part 
because of the rivalry between Hull and Grimsby, that is as much cultural as 
economic. There’s an aspiration of an integrated offer but it’s an aspiration”.    
The aforementioned rapid technological consolidation also circumscribed the agency 
of government. Although significant UK state resources were deployed in the form of 
R&D support to facilitate the development of new turbine technologies to encourage 
transplantation of the related manufacturing activities, a UK civil servant (S-R3, 
January 2016), revealed:  
“In all the conversations [with foreign investors] innovation never played a 
major factor. It was enlightening for government that NAREC58, the UK’s 
technological crown jewels, was not the case for most OEMs…. nor did R&D 
support push anyone over the line”.  
Although, the UK state was attempting to influence the emergence of alternate 
technologies in order that more OEMs located their manufacturing and supply chains 
in the UK, which would have been to the benefit of AMEP, the adopted means to 
achieve this outcome were ineffectual. A manager within a technological innovation 
centre (G-RHE3, author’s interview, December 2015) reflected: “What’s even a few 
million pounds of government support in an industry that thinks in billions of pounds? 
Confidence in market and line of sight of subsidy encourages new technologies”.  
                                               
58 National Renewable Energy Centre, a significant UK state and EC investment in open access test 
infrastructure for offshore wind firms, based in Blyth in North East England 
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By the end of this episode, the 200ha AMEP site remained undeveloped. The 
absence of public funders and the decreasing number of OEMs to invest in the site, 
especially in relation to the quayside, ensured that the site remained undeveloped 
and a major barrier to transplantation was still in place at the end of this episode. 
Furthermore, although many state actors recognised the opportunity for clustering, 
their ambitions were negated by the laissez faire approach of the UK state and the 
vested interests of local development actors.   
6.2.3 OEM anchor transplantation announced   
The final analytical focus of path emergence on Humberside relates to Siemens’ 
announcement in March 2011 that Alexandra Dock in Hull would be the primary 
location for its £160m turbine manufacturing investment which would create 1,000 
jobs. Such mindful deviation by Siemens was predicated on expectations of reward 
generated by the favourable UK institutional context. In tandem, ABP, the monopoly 
port owner, committed to investing £150m in the reconfiguration of the derelict dock 
to facilitate the inward investment. Notably, the strategic agency and planning powers 
of national and local government were key to incentivising Siemens’ selection of the 
site.    
Siemens’ decision to locate its investment on the relatively constrained 59ha dock 
site was according to an OEM manager (S-OEM1) based on “access to large 
offshore wind farms, availability of land, river access and logistics.” Going on, the 
executive stressed the importance of geography over other factors: “It was the site 
that was important. Site and location…. [although] a stable regulatory regime is also 
very important”. Tellingly, the interviewee recalled: “Siemens was going to the south 
bank [to AMEP] but the related capex59 of £400 million for its development was such 
a massive cost that Siemens went away and rethought”. 
However, the role of government planning powers and procedures in influencing 
Siemens’ specific regional investment location is also worthy of note. Significantly, 
Alexandra Dock was not only perceived as a lower cost option compared with AMEP 
but also one with more planning certainty. An OEM manager (S-OEM1) noted that 
ABP’s possession of a consented change of use for Alexandra Dock to a container 
facility, approved by UK’s Department of Transport in 2005 and a pre-existing 
                                               
59 Capital expenditure 
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Harbour Revision Order for the related harbour works, approved by the UK 
Government in 2006 (effectively an Act of Parliament), were recognised as 
advantageous for the speedy reconfiguration of the site. 
As regards ABP’s involvement, a manager in a port operator (H-PO1) revealed that 
the firm’s diversification was also incentivised by both broader energy policy and 
possession of an approved change of use and consent for harbour works at 
Alexandra Docks:  
“(ABP) asked how long the coal industry will last. The size and location of 
Round 3 announcement [2008] was a wake-up call for ABP. [ABP] had a 
consented facility [Alexandra Dock]…. and started working closely with 
Yorkshire Forward and the Council…. [ABP] was acutely aware that Siemens 
was the market leader.”  
The site, although not rivalling the potential development scope of AMEP, was 
positioned as one that facilitated transplantation by providing an existing asset which 
was regulatory primed for reconfiguration at a lower cost (with a potential auxiliary 
site at Paull in nearby East Riding). In order to consolidate this locational advantage, 
a partnership between Hull City Council and ABP was formed in 2009, Green Port 
Hull. A director at a local council recounted (H-LA1): 
“We saw our advantage, we had an HRO [for Alexandra Dock], the flexibility to 
change use; we had a product that nowhere else in the UK could match. We 
[Hull City Council and ABP] went straight to Siemens [bypassing Yorkshire 
Forward], their initial response was there’s not enough land, so we came back 
with the Paull site and the link road…. Site and planning considerations were 
drivers between Siemens and ABP…. and then we sold the other benefits of 
locating in the city - labour force, supportive organisations, 
transport….Yorkshire Forward was hell-bent on this [inward investment] going 
to the south bank to get a few firms on a big site …We pushed for this 
ourselves”. 
Soon after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Siemens, ABP 
submitted to Hull City Council planning applications for a facility at Alexandra Dock 
for the manufacture, assembly, testing and shipment of offshore wind turbines. Within 
months outline planning consent for the proposed development was granted by the 
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Council via a Local Development Order (LDO), a streamlined planning process to 
expedite the project. 
Finally, it is worth observing that intra-Humber institutional competition made each 
local authority promote its own assets in isolation and there was limited joined up 
thinking on how Siemens’ investment could catalyse other regional opportunities. 
Significantly, in 2010 it was announced that Yorkshire Forward would be abolished, 
thereby leaving only local authorities with “limited capacity, incentive or inclination for 
co-ordination” (cited by H-UKGov1, March 2016) and a less powerful Local 
Enterprise Partnership (LEP) to mediate the path’s regional emergence. Such 
decreasing institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) would adversely influence 
agglomeration in the coming episode.  Even so, at the end of this initial episode, 
Siemens proposed inward investment pointedly contributed to the emergence of a 
regional path narrative that was significant at the UK level.  
6.3 Episode 2: Path Development, 2011 - 2014 
In this second episode, the anticipated pace of path creation slowed and foreseen 
levels of private sector economic activity were unrealised in response to a changing 
institutional environment that constrained transplantation. Although by the end of 
2013 there were nearly 200 O&M jobs60 in Grimsby, the scale and quality of path 
creation was circumscribed, and on the opposite bank, a hiatus relating to the 
Siemens investment meant Alexandra Dock remained undeveloped (see fig 6.4). 
Additionally, a planning challenge by ABP ensured AMEP remained unutilised. Even 
so, such cross estuary competition was partially mitigated by a new pan-Humber 
renewables brand and the creation of a regional regulatory forum for the estuary, as 
part of a Humber City Deal. Moreover, the UK’s largest Enterprise Zone was 
established in 2011 to create “a world class offshore wind hub”61 (supported by 
Regional Growth Fund and Growth Deal monies).  
                                               
60 Based on figures provided by interviewees. 
61 DCLG, HM Government, 2011 
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Figure 6.4: Principal regional actors on Humberside 2011-14 
During this episode, the above mentioned attenuation of firm-led agency was 
primarily caused by changes to the UK’s policy and regulatory environment. A senior 
academic at Hull University with significant energy industry experience (H-RH1, 
author’s interview, March 2016) observed: “The industry needs government subsidy 
but if you don’t have long term stability in mandates and there’s increasing 
uncertainty on policy, investors drop in and out and it’s bad for innovation and the 
culture of risk…. and longer term investment cycles and planning”. Growing 
uncertainty amongst firms created by changes to the broader state institutional 
environment, circumscribed their experimentation and strategizing, whilst promoting 
competition and caution. A local O&M service provider (H-O&M1, author’s interview, 
March 2016) recounted: “It was all about commercial competition leading to friction 
and uncertainty rather than common good for the local economy. It felt as if things 
were in limbo”. 
The three key foci of enquiry for this episode of path development are: Siemens’ 
delay in progressing transplantation in Hull; regulatory obstacles blocking valorisation 
of the AMEP site through transplantation; and ongoing but circumscribed 
development of transplanted O&M functions in Grimsby.  
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6.3.1 OEM postpones anchor transplantation 
A three year hiatus following the announcement of Siemens and ABP’s MoU is a key 
analytical focus for understanding path’s development dynamics on Humberside. 
During this period, UK policy and regulatory changes led to the OEM reconsidering 
its transplantation plans for Humberside and placing them in the context of its wider 
European offshore wind supply chain. In turn, ABP and Hull City Council’s 
engagement with the OEM became irregular and uncertain and local actors had 
limited leverage on wider policy and regulatory developments that were influencing 
industrial dynamics at the regional level.  
Within six months of Siemens’ investment announcement in 2011, the UK 
Government signalled a fundamental review of the costs of offshore wind by 
establishing the Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Task Force. A Treasury official 
recalled (S-Uk Gov3, author’s interview, February 2016): “There was a sense that 
things were spinning out of control and [subsidy] commitments were going to splurge 
over…. The Treasury became more involved”. Subsequently, in 2012 the UK 
Government announced that a new Energy Act would be introduced which would 
curtail subsidies for offshore wind projects. A manager in a port operator recounted 
(H-PO1, March 2016): “Siemens were seeing where CfD62 was going…. Siemens 
wanted to make sure that they were comfortable and that an industry was going to 
emerge, that they had a market and an industry to serve”. Additionally, a director 
within a local authority (H-LA1, July 2016) noted that an absence of long term 
regulatory clarity invoked concerns in Siemens about the related costs of developing 
the combined Alexandra Dock and Paul sites: “They [Siemens] needed assurance on 
the policy horizon to model their investment returns”.  
A UK inward investment official (H-UKGov2, February 2016) recounted that not only 
Siemens but other OEMs, such as Vestas, began to “pursue a pan-European 
industrial play…. OEMs that had considered building supply chains in each market 
[recognised it] couldn’t be cost effective given the resulting scale of the industry”. 
Specifically in regard to Siemens, another UK civil servant recalled “getting Siemens 
to Hull went round in circles for years.... going from a position of let’s get Siemens 
and other OEMs and their supply chains to let’s get Siemens as that’s all there is. 
The Cost Reduction Task Force and the other changes sent the signal that cost 
                                               
62 Contracts for Difference, the proposed new auction based subsidy system 
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reduction was the imperative, not economic benefit”. In short, nation state energy 
policy was having a detrimental impact on the ambitions of nation state industrial 
policy and regional policy (as reflected in the creation of the Humber’s “Renewable 
Energy Super Cluster Enterprise Zone” in 2011).   
Moreover, the emergence of a European supply chain combined with the need to 
rapidly scale up turbine sizes to make them more efficient made finalisation of 
Siemens’ plans for Hull problematic. A manager in a port operator (H-PO1, March 
2016) observed:  
“[It was] hard to know what Siemens wanted because technology and scale 
were happening so fast and [there were] different views within Siemens on 
design and purpose of the plant…. it was hard to get a design freeze for 
planning. Everything was moving quickly in terms of the technology and the 
supply chain given the push for larger machines to lower costs”.  
Recalling the OEM’s hesitation in this episode, a director of a local authority (H-LA1, 
author’s interview, July 2016) reflected:  
“After the memorandum of understanding was signed, Siemens went in to 
review mode…. they locked us out for six months and went in to radio 
silence…. We worked through the BIS regional office to emphasise to 
Whitehall how important clarity on [national] policy was”.  
Although the Council had a key role in the “nitty-gritty” of delivering the project on the 
ground, especially in regard to planning (cited by H-LA1, July 2016), the latitude of 
local government to influence the wider policy environment was seemingly limited. 
However, co-ordinating energy, industry and regional policies within and across 
Whitehall was also problematic. A Treasury official (S-UK Gov3, February 2016) cited 
ingrained impediments to achieving aligned policies:  
“One of the things you’ll see if you talk to a lot of people in Whitehall, if there is 
a [policy] problem there will be eleven different groups to solve it and nine 
different ways…. [For example, in terms of national infrastructure] there’s a 
construction team in BIS, there’s a Government construction strategy run out 
of Cabinet Office and there’s the work of Infrastructure UK [The Treasury]. But 
there is no reason why this shouldn’t join up and be co-ordinated but BIS has 
a different agenda from Cabinet office and to us [The Treasury].”     
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In summary, attenuation of Siemens’ transplantation activity on the Humber’s north 
bank demonstrates the causal power of extra-regional institutions in mediating the 
activation and deactivation of path creating agency and related mechanisms to 
valorise assets at the local level. Moreover, it would appear that local actors had 
limited influence on shaping such institutional change, whilst national state actors 
were not fully sighted on or cognisant of the spatial consequences of interacting 
policies.   
6.3.2 Utility firms accelerate transplantation 
This final analytical focus pertaining to the regional path’s realisation relates to the 
increasing levels of investment by offshore wind project developers. By end of this 
episode four offshore wind projects close to Humberside were generating electricity - 
Lincs, Lynn and Inner Dowsing, Humber Gateway and Westermost Rough. 
Additionally, the Racebank and Triton Knoll projects were progressing towards 
construction and the massive 5GW Hornsea Zone was leased. Despite an 
increasingly uncertain UK policy and regulatory environment, this internationally 
significant project pipeline generated sufficient expectation of reward amongst project 
developers to incentivise further investment in Grimsby’s port assets.  
In 2014, Dong invested £11.5million to reconfigure shore side and marine facilities at 
Grimsby’s Royal Dock to support the construction of Westermost Rough wind farm 
and accommodate the operation of three O&M vessels from the facility. In 2015, the 
Danish energy company also announced that it would construct the Race Bank 
windfarm from the Grimsby Fish Dock and that the port would be used as the O&M 
base for the 5GW Hornsea development as part of a projected £6 billion investment 
in the region’s industry. In addition, E.ON’s O&M base for its Humber Gateway 
project, deploying MHI Vestas turbines, was established at the Fish Dock in 2014, 
accommodating four O&M vessels. By the end of 2015, such activities supported 
approximately four hundred local jobs and circa 30 vessels which made 4,000 O&M 
trips per year63. 
These investments and the related transplanted technologies also facilitated the 
successful diversification of regional firms. For example, in 2014, Humber based Rix 
Sea Shuttle had its fleet of new support vessels fully utilised for O&M and 
                                               
63 Based on author interviews 
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construction activities. In the same year, a Grimsby firm, Anglia Engineering 
Solutions, won a multi-million-pound contract to supply fabricated and machined 
components for offshore wind cabling. To support such diversification, the Grimsby 
Renewables Partnership, a local business forum with one hundred members, was 
officially launched in 2015 to encourage local sourcing. 
By the end of the episode, a director of the local Council observed of the 
transformation of Grimsby port and the role of local state agency in its ongoing 
reconfiguration:  
“We had an absolutely transformed port estate, no longer run down and 
dependent on storage, vehicles and timber….(with) a very different offer for 
developers and [inward] investors…. with food companies that no longer 
needing quayside being helped to move to other sites to allow O&M. [The 
Council is] getting Growth Deal monies for managed workspace for local firms. 
ABP have now taken over contracting and contracts from Grimsby Fish Dock 
Enterprises and they’ve done a draft port masterplan…. that they haven’t 
shared with us but they are coming to talk to us”.  
The above quote alludes to both the causal path creating interplay of actors, assets 
and mechanisms but also highlights the ongoing power of a monopoly asset owner, 
ABP, in determining this process. 
6.3.3 Disruptor’s diversification stalls 
In this episode, the absence of private investment at AMEP is a notable analytical 
focus for understanding the dynamics of path development on Humberside. Although 
the site represented the only regional location that could accommodate multiple 
inward investors, extra-regional policy and regulatory dynamics were mitigating its 
necessity. The fortunes of AMEP in this episode are also worthy of consideration as 
they illuminate how regional rivalry unchecked by inadequate regional institutional 
capacity and power constrained regional industrial path evolution.         
The causes of path attenuation and related site investment at AMEP were offered by 
a director of Able UK (H-PO2, June 2016):  
“The developers were scared by the bidding pressures for subsidy and the 
need for cost cutting to get it…. and supply chain firms from Europe did not 
want to set up in the UK and take the risk, and there were few British 
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companies that wanted to partner them. The cost of energy, the CfD, is based 
on a project by project basis, so there is no incentive for Vestas to have a 
nacelle plant, which is really what our site is about and there is no reason for 
Dong to make a major ten year commitment. The problem is that CfD makes 
developers and supply chain think on a project by project basis. Bottom line is 
each project has its own mobilisation costs, set up costs.... discrete costs. 
They’re not part of a framework. Not even Siemens has been given a proper 
framework contract that gives certainty and transparency. Everything is 
bespoke and in isolation. What’s the return for the UK?”   
This changing institutional environment and related market uncertainty caused 
Siemens, the only OEM to have committed to transplantation, to hesitate over its 
preferred Alexandra Dock location; thereby keeping other locational options in play. A 
local development manager (H-RDA, March 2016) mused: “At that time Siemens 
could have gone south of the river if they felt it best suited their corporate interests. It 
was only an MoU with Siemens and ABP”. It was a possibility that fostered significant 
friction between the incumbent actor, ABP, and, the new entrant, Able UK. In 2011 
Able UK submitted a planning application for the development of the AMEP site and 
in 2012 the Infrastructure Planning Commission (the UK Government body for 
reviewing projects of national significance) announced that it would consider the 
proposal. In 2013, concerns regarding the environmental impact on bird habitat were 
raised by Natural England and the RSPB. In turn, Able UK responded with a 
proposed £30 million habitat mitigation scheme, thereby placing additional costs on 
valorising the green field site. However, just as resolution seemed achievable, ABP 
objected on the grounds that the project conflicted with its plans for a deep water jetty 
on the south bank. It was the start of an acrimonious legal process that would not be 
resolved until a Special Parliamentary Committee rejected ABP’s objection in 
October 2014. Whether by default or design, ABP had kept Siemens committed to 
the north bank by neutralising locational choice on the Humber. Such seeming 
vested interest ensured that AMEP’s potential for creating a cluster like 
“Bremerhaven” was obstructed at a time when a window of locational opportunity 
remained open. The acrimony between ABP and Able UK led to the firms’ 
representatives being ejected from the Humber LEP Board, the successor to the 
RDA. It was a clear example of the limited institutional thickness on Humberside, 
whereby the collective could not arbitrate exclusive interest.  
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In summary, the dynamic UK regulatory context, with its emphasis on cost cutting 
and competition, disincentivised developers and supply chain firms from 
experimentation and long-term investment, leading to an absence of potential 
investors for the AMEP site. This curtailment of firm agency combined with seemingly 
rent seeking behaviour by the region’s key asset owner, ABP, undermined potential 
co-location and clustering opportunities on Humberside; the solitary region in the UK 
to have seemingly secured transplantation of an OEM turbine manufacturing plant. 
Consequently, AMEP – the only site that could accommodate industrial 
agglomeration within the region - remained un-reconfigured in this episode and the 
following.  
6.3.4 Utility firms continue transplantation 
This analytical focus in regard to the path’s development relates to the gradual 
expansion of O&M functions and employment at Grimsby linked to the continuing 
build out of offshore wind projects in the North Sea. These modest and intermittent 
O&M investments were shaped by an interplay of exogenous and endogenous 
institutional factors. However, this analytical lens also reveals how the nature and 
quantum of these functions and jobs were circumscribed by wider sectoral and 
technological dynamics and the dominance of a limited number of firm actors.  
In this episode, the Humber estuary was in geographic proximity to seven designated 
offshore wind sites that were consented to developers by the UK Government, 
totalling over 7GW. Of these seven projects, five had secured support via the non-
competitive ROCs subsidy (Lynn and Inner Dowsing, Lincs, Westermost Rough, 
Humber Gateway and Race Bank) thereby maintaining the activation of developer 
agency. However, although these projects were awarded leases under the Crown 
Estate’s leasing rounds of 2001 and 2003, the long lead in times for planning, design 
and development meant that only two O&M bases had been established by 2013 
(Centrica’s O&M Grimsby bases for its Lynn & Inner Dowsing and Lincs projects).   
Even so, despite an emerging less benign national policy landscape, the future 
remained relatively positive given the pipeline of projects with confirmed subsidy. In 
late 2013 RES, an O&M firm, confirmed construction of a dedicated facility for twenty 
engineers at the Fish Dock and E.ON, another of the UK’s “Big Six”, indicated that it 
would use the port as its east coast O&M base, creating fifty jobs. Both decisions 
were predicated on the completion of the upgrade of Fish Dock lock gates in 2013, 
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enabled through £500,000 of funding by North East Lincolnshire Council. In addition, 
Dong, the Danish publicly owned utility firm, announced an investment of £11 
million64 to reconfigure Grimsby’s Royal Dock for the transplantation of O&M and 
construction functions for Westermost Rough Offshore wind farm. 
Significantly, the character of Grimsby’s O&M function was not only defined by its 
gradual formation but also by its circumscribed quality, a consequence of the 
developers’ procurement choices. Centrica purchased Siemens turbines for both its 
Lynn and Inner Dowsing and Lincs offshore wind projects, as would other developers 
moving towards installation. However, Siemens was not only selling offshore turbines 
but also the ongoing technical support. Consequently, the higher value aspects of the 
O&M process were retained by Siemens. A former O&M manager (H-O&M2, May 
2016) illuminated the inherent shortcoming of this O&M model for creating local high 
value jobs and preventing Grimsby becoming a low value node in the industry’s wider 
division of labour (Bathelt et al, 2004; Coe et al, 2008):  
“90% [of O&M staff] live locally, lots come from Hull and commute. 10% are 
the Danish guys doing specific tasks such as a gearbox that has developed a 
vibration and that has been picked up in the monitoring centre in Denmark and 
then they despatch the very experienced guys. Two very clever guys then 
come over to use some very clever kit to find out what is going on and that the 
local manager may not even know about their despatch. Most of the local 
[O&M] guys undertake the routine servicing and maintenance. The local 
turbine technicians are the car mechanics who do the annual service, next 
technical step up is the person from Siemens, the top guys, the trouble 
shooters who make the money from the company, who can compare problems 
– ‘Oh! We’ve seen this before on the east coast or in Denmark’…. Then the 
problem is you [the developer] have to buy spares from Siemens. You can’t go 
far in your career, unless you’re with Siemens. It’s like a car dealership. 
Siemens do the turbine monitoring and the technically rich stuff. You only 
develop deep technical know-how if you work with Siemens”. 
Although by the end of this episode firm-led investment triggered by a benign 
institutional environment had further valorised Grimsby’s port and adjacent natural 
                                               
64 With a contribution of £1.5million from the UK’s Regional Growth Fund 
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resources, the path’s development was slow and the resulting scale limited, reflecting 
both the time lag in the industry’s project life cycle and uncertainty about the future 
policy and regulatory environment. Moreover, supply chain consolidation and related 
increasing technological path dependence that was a product of the UK state’s 
growing emphasis on cost-cutting circumscribed the scale and quality of the path, 
especially in terms of the O&M function, the main focus for path employment. 
Strikingly these institutionally induced firm dynamics were occurring at a time when 
the government created the UK’s largest Enterprise Zone in the region to promote 
and capture the presumed economic and industrial development opportunities of 
offshore wind.   
6.4 Episode 3: Path Realisation, 2014 - 2015 
During this episode of realisation, there was a revival of path growth. Whilst firm-led 
agency was more constrained than had been previously anticipated, largely as a 
consequence of changes to the extra-regional institutional environment, investment 
and reconfiguration at Hull’s Alexandra Dock and Grimsby’s port occurred on a 
notable scale (see fig. 6.5). This was accompanied by a pragmatic acceptance by 
state economic development actors that UK institutional changes made further 
significant inward investments and large-scale clustering unlikely in the short to 
medium term. The episode is also notable for the UK government becoming the sole 
state interlocutor with Siemens.  
A local economic development manager (H-RDA, March 2016) summarised the 
altered nature of state expectations about path realisation in this period:  
“I’ve been in post four years and my view on what the industry is going to be 
has changed. Is it a cluster or parts of a supply chain? Our interpretation of its 
trajectory has changed rapidly over five years, probably due to initial naivety. 
Siemens is here but the majority of enquiries are about installation and O&M. 
Grimsby has seen investment in O&M and will only grow but now looking at 
£10m projects…. not £400m manufacturing projects.” 
This more modest, albeit positive, path outcome in terms of investment and job 
creation65 was a consequence of changing nation state “rules” and consequent firm 
                                               
65 1,000+  direct jobs related to the path by the end of this episode - based on figures provided by interviewees 
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uncertainty. Recalibrated expectations dis-incentivised supply chain firms to 
transplant their functions to Humberside, whilst incentivising the creation of European 
supply chains built around a few oligopolistic like principal actors, primarily Siemens 
and Vestas. However, in this period, there is also evidence of state actors attempting 
to mediate the path’s development in terms of scale and quality via regulatory means 
and the development of local innovation capacity.  
 
Figure 6.5: Principal regional actors on Humberside 2014-15 
There are two key foci for exploring the realisation of the regional industrial path. 
These are: Siemens progression of its Investment at Alexandra Dock in Hull; and 
increasing investment in Grimsby Port in order to accommodate growing O&M and 
construction activity.  
6.4.1 OEM anchor transplantation rescaled 
A key analytical focus for understanding the path’s realisation relates to Siemens 
decision in 2014 to commence construction of its proposed manufacturing facility at 
Alexandra Dock. Although the investment would still create 1,000 jobs, the facility’s 
functions were notably scaled back to align with the OEM’s wider European supply 
chain plans. Moreover, the power of local state actors to influence such decision 
making was notably limited, whilst the UK Government assumed the role of principal 
state interlocutor with the OEM in this episode. Finally, this analytical focus exposes 
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the challenge of creating a regional cluster and upgrading the quality of the regional 
path, in the face of changing extra-regional sectoral, technological and institutional 
dynamics. 
Siemens’ confirmed investment, announced in March 2014, was to be focused on the 
transplantation of technology for the manufacture of 75m blades for the new Siemens 
7MW turbines, a labour intensive but relatively non-technical production process, and 
deployment and installation functions. This decision was predicated on the OEM’s 
wider European supply chain plans. There was to be no turbine assembly on 
Humberside as previously proposed, rather that investment was to occur on the 
opposite side of the North Sea in Cuxhaven, thereby further entrenching Germany’s 
higher value position in the industry’s international division of labour. In late 2014, 
Siemens’ subsequently revised its plans for Humberside focusing them solely on 
Hull’s Alexandra Dock site, avoiding costly valorisation of the larger Paull site. It was 
a decision that signalled that subsequent opportunities for supply chain co-location 
were deemed limited by Siemens. An OEM manager (S-OEM, August 2016) recalled 
the corporate pragmatism that underpinned this decision:  
 “It’s a European supply chain. Siemens’ is a world-wide business…. the UK is 
not their only business. Yes, local content is important but blades make sense. 
Denmark, UK and Germany represent a nice European foot print for Siemens. 
Factory foot print is good, therefore there’s local content in all [principal] 
markets. Hull will supply Europe and early US projects with blades. It’s our big 
blade facility….. The existing Danish operations is not suited for 75m blades 
and has already had 13 extensions in nine years.”  
Interviewees illuminated the interplay of changing policy and regulation with 
corporate decision making in shaping this outcome. A former senior UK Government 
regional official (H-UkGov1, March 2016) recalled:  
“We got ourselves in to contortions over state aids that could be offered….in 
the end no options emerged that could compensate for CfD uncertainty and 
therefore Siemens de-risked by scaling back plans…. focusing on blades.” 
A related consequence of changing policy and regulation was reinforcement of 
oligopolistic characteristics of the industry and its technological path dependence, 
both at the UK and European levels, which privileged incumbent firms which could 
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deliver required cost reductions premised on economies of scale. Moreover, such 
limited firm and technological diversity reduced the opportunities for the emergence 
of regional clusters. By the end of this episode, Siemens dominated UK turbine 
purchases with its new 7MW turbine model; whilst only a handful of developers led 
the deployment of the offshore wind farm projects, with the state owned Danish firm 
Dong accounting for nearly one third of UK developments. An OEM manager (S-
OEM, August 20016) reflected that:  
“Due to the unintended consequences of electricity market reform [CfD] by 
default we have reinforced incumbents who are big enough to put a problem 
right…. it’s almost impossible to bring something new to the market”.  
This lack of state prescience on the consequences of nation state regulation for 
industrial and regional policy was observed by a Treasury official (S-Uk Gov3, 
February 2016) who contended:  
“We get the market we reward. We accept the status quo but expect radical 
change.  A portfolio approach would have encouraged the emergence of 
offshore wind [manufacturing and operations] hubs around the coast but the 
market operates in a way that militates against such benefits. The CfD 
competitive process drives counter intuitive disbenefits…. the consequences 
of the auction system minimise opportunities for collaboration and shared 
innovation between developers. We’re looking at project specific solutions 
rather than east coast solutions.”  
In further considering the consequences of the state’s changing regulatory framework 
for industrial agglomeration and co-location relating to Siemens’s investment, an 
OEM director (H-OEM, March 2016) observed:  
“I’ve worked with them all [tower manufacturers considering Humberside] 
recently and it requires a £50m investment but you need clarity regarding the 
market to 2020 beyond, you need to be able to take the bigger picture.... to 
make these commitments. This is not something for the faint hearted.”  
However, it can be demonstrated that the absence of clustering was not solely due to 
insufficient state generated expectation of reward and the emergence of a European 
level oligopolistic value chain. A local government interviewee (H-LA1, July 2016) 
also cited secondary local supply side constraints: “Also skills was emerging as a 
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huge issue. Tower manufacturers required skilled fabrication and tractor welding 
skills not available on the necessary scale.” Moreover, the limited number of sites 
that could be reconfigured with minimal cost to accommodate co-location was 
problematic. Given development of the auxiliary Paull site adjacent to Hull entailed a 
minimum £20 million investment and AMEP’s associated enabling costs were even 
higher, there were no low cost co-location options on Humberside. Such entry costs 
deterred supply chain investors. For example, although it had been assumed by 
government actors that CS Towers, a South Korean turbine tower manufacturer 
would locate on Humberside, the firm in 2015 purchased a tower manufacturer on 
the opposite side of the UK on the Kintyre peninsula. In an uncertain market, the 
South Korean company was more willing to locate on the west coast of Scotland and 
incur shipping costs rather than significant infrastructural costs that it might never 
recoup. 
Before going on to explore how state actors attempted to influence path quality, it is 
useful to note the direct role of the UK state in influencing Siemens’ investment 
decision, thereby exposing the relative limited power of regional state actors in this 
episode and an ongoing lack of joined up and stable industrial policy. Regarding 
Siemen’s investment decision, one senior LEP Board member (H-OEM1, March 
2016) recalled: “Cameron [the Prime Minister] was dealing with it by the seat of his 
pants…. on the phone to them a lot….the Government gave a soft landing to 
Siemens”. If a soft landing was provided, the terms of the deal remain undisclosed. 
Even so, the quote exposes how Siemens’ decision was prompted by last minute 
transactional deal making rather long-term institutional frameworks that generated 
stable expectations and confidence (thus accounting for The Financial Times 
observation that Siemens’ decision was surprising given disquiet surrounding UK 
energy policy66).  
To close this focus of enquiry, it is also useful to observe that state actors attempted 
to mediate the path’s size and quality by firstly utilising national regulatory powers 
and then secondly by building local innovation capacity. Thus, in a belated attempt to 
utilise regulatory powers to develop the UK supply chain, the new CfD subsidy 
framework required bidders to also submit a supply chain plan detailing how they 
                                               
66 Financial Times, 24 March, 2014 
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intended to optimise UK content in their projects. A UK civil servant (S-UKGov4, 
February 2016) recalled:  
“The Government [originally] took a decision that it was not worth sacrificing its 
open for business philosophy for a big part of the offshore wind supply chain. 
We made the decision not to emphasise UK content but the wider changes 
[the downturn in the UK’s oil and gas and steel sectors]…. and recognition that 
we were a global leader in offshore wind generation but did not have an 
equitable share of the economic value, changed things.”   
However, an industry representative (S-OEM, August 2016) observed: “Government 
thinks if it shouts louder, [the UK] will get more local content but don’t understand that 
the only thing that effects the supply chain is the [project] pipeline”. Even so, despite 
such sentiment, it was accepted by many Humberside and London interviewees that 
the introduction of a regulatory obligation to increase UK project content was a 
contributing factor in Siemens belated decision to invest in Hull.   
Secondly at the regional level, state and university actors attempted to mediate path 
quality by developing local innovation capacity. At the end of this episode, plans for a 
regional Open Access Innovation Centre (OAIC) were emerging. However, there was 
limited clarity on the role of the facility given limited overlap between a limited local 
research capability and the requirements of Siemens and a sector that exhibited 
increasing levels of technological path dependence (Boschma et al, 2017). A 
manager in Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult (H-RHE3, December 2015) 
observed:  
“How do you apply a strictly offshore local innovation agenda to Siemens, who 
are interested in labour costs, logistics, handling, productivity and automation 
of production in Hull? This is about cost cutting. They [Siemens] have a lot of 
in-house research capability and existing relations”.  
The complexity of linking industrial development with regional innovation capability 
was also recognised by a government funded regional R&D manager (H-RHE2, 
August 2016):  
“There was not a lot out there [in terms of local supply and demand]; the 
interest, ability, vision was just not there locally. We need to engage with 
corporates first, the Siemens’ and Dongs, and understand their needs and 
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then work with the university. However, a big challenge is displacing R&D from 
Denmark to Humberside; there was a feeling of threat to the Danes. They 
didn’t want to lose control”.  
In conclusion, Siemens’ eventual confirmation of its investment in Hull represented a 
significant fillip for the new regional path. However, it was an investment that was 
circumscribed by changing extra-regional institutional and related corporate and 
technological dynamics. Moreover, the transplantation of new but routine technology 
did not represent a catalyst for supply chain co-location and clustering. However, the 
reasons for this are not only due to the institutional environment in which the path 
was embedded but also deficiencies in the regional asset base, relating to 
infrastructure and skills.  Also, attempts by state actors at stimulating path upgrading, 
once the limitations of transplantation-led path creation were exposed, were belated 
and circumscribed.      
6.4.2 Utility firms accelerate transplantation 
This final analytical focus pertaining to the regional path’s realisation relates to the 
increasing levels of investment by offshore wind project developers. By end of this 
episode four offshore wind projects close to Humberside were generating electricity - 
Lincs, Lynn and Inner Dowsing, Humber Gateway and Westermost Rough. 
Additionally, the Racebank and Triton Knoll projects were progressing towards 
construction and the massive 5GW Hornsea Zone was leased. Despite an 
increasingly uncertain UK policy and regulatory environment, this internationally 
significant project pipeline generated sufficient expectation of reward amongst project 
developers to incentivise further investment in Grimsby’s port assets.  
In 2014, Dong invested £11.5million to reconfigure shore side and marine facilities at 
Grimsby’s Royal Dock to support the construction of Westermost Rough wind farm 
and accommodate the operation of three O&M vessels from the facility. In 2015, the 
Danish energy company also announced that it would construct the Race Bank 
windfarm from the Grimsby Fish Dock and that the port would be used as the O&M 
base for the 5GW Hornsea development as part of a projected £6 billion investment 
in the region’s industry. In addition, E.ON’s O&M base for its Humber Gateway 
project, deploying MHI Vestas turbines, was established at the Fish Dock in 2014, 
accommodating four O&M vessels. By the end of 2015, such activities supported 
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approximately four hundred local jobs and circa 30 vessels which made 4,000 O&M 
trips per year67. 
These investments and the related transplanted technologies also facilitated the 
successful diversification of regional firms. For example, in 2014, Humber based Rix 
Sea Shuttle had its fleet of new support vessels fully utilised for O&M and 
construction activities. In the same year, a Grimsby firm, Anglia Engineering 
Solutions, won a multi-million-pound contract to supply fabricated and machined 
components for offshore wind cabling. To support such diversification, the Grimsby 
Renewables Partnership, a local business forum with one hundred members, was 
officially launched in 2015 to encourage local sourcing. 
By the end of the episode, a director of the local Council observed of the 
transformation of Grimsby port and the role of local state agency in its ongoing 
reconfiguration:  
“We had an absolutely transformed port estate, no longer run down and 
dependent on storage, vehicles and timber….(with) a very different offer for 
developers and [inward] investors…. with food companies that no longer 
needing quayside being helped to move to other sites to allow O&M. [The 
Council is] getting Growth Deal monies for managed workspace for local firms. 
ABP have now taken over contracting and contracts from Grimsby Fish Dock 
Enterprises and they’ve done a draft port masterplan…. that they haven’t 
shared with us but they are coming to talk to us”.  
The above quote alludes to both the causal path creating interplay of actors, assets 
and mechanisms but also highlights the ongoing power of a monopoly asset owner, 
ABP, in determining this process. 
6.5 Character of the Path and Effect on Regional Development  
By the end of the third episode over 1,000 direct local jobs68 were associated with the 
path, concentrated in the nodes of Hull and Grimsby on opposite sides of the Humber 
estuary. The south bank was synonymous with the transplanted routine functions of 
O&M and deployment and the north bank with the transplanted routine functions of 
                                               
67 Based on author interviews 
68 Based on figures provided by interviewees 
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turbine blade manufacturing; such industrial partition seemingly echoing the 
Humber’s bisected economic and institutional history. The regional offshore wind 
path that had emerged was recognised as significant at the UK and European levels. 
Alexandra Dock was an important but lower value production and installation node in 
Siemen’s European supply chain and Grimsby port had a globally significant 
concentration of standardised functions for supporting the exploitation of the adjacent 
natural resource.  However, the varied proximities - cognitive, organisational, social 
and institutional (Boschma, 2005; Bathelt et al, 2014) – associated with higher value 
manufacturing and support functions, which were pronounced in the manufacturing 
hubs of the industry in Denmark and Germany, were not manifest on Humberside.                
Therefore, by end 2015, the path that had been created, primarily through the 
mechanism of transplantation, had characteristics associated with both a branch 
plant economy and an extractive economy The Humber had developed an industrial 
path seemingly unrelated to its knowledge base and institutions by being the 
recipient of a disruptive dominant technology from a global system (Boschma et al, 
2017). However, local firm and government actors had limited influence on the extra-
regional institutions and technologies that had created the wider sectoral path, 
thereby having only partial power to ultimately control the valorisation of regional 
assets and the unfolding of the path, a feature synonymous with a branch plant 
economy. Moreover, the path’s anchoring in the region was predicated on inward 
capital flows and legitimisation of extra-regional technology by primarily non-
indigenous actors to exploit and valorise adjacent natural resources, analogous to an 
extractive economy, rather than on local knowledge mobilisation or creation (Binz et 
al 2016).  By developing a path largely unrelated to its technological past, there was 
limited scope for pre-existing innovation capability to enhance the quality of the path 
through diversification, indigenous creation, transplantation of higher value supply 
chain activities or influence the rapidly consolidating technological regime’s 
development. Therefore, higher level skills, functions and authority were predisposed 
to occur outside the region rather than in it, as evidenced by the concentrations of 
local lower value O&M jobs on the south bank and the routinized process 
manufacturing jobs on the north bank.  
Although Humberside was more than just a receptacle where economic activity was 
played out (Scott, 1998; Pike et al, 2007; Hudson, 2007) or a passive arena 
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reshaped by national and international capital flows (MacKinnon, 2014), the region 
like so many lagging regions (Pike et al, 2007; Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011) 
did not possess sufficient power or outward facing networks for it to become a global 
centre of high value offshore wind expertise and functions, akin to Bremerhaven or 
Aberdeen with oil and gas (the cited ambition of a number of Humberside 
interviewees). The agency of local path actors was largely activated, mediated and 
bounded by extra-regional forces on which they had limited influence. Where the 
agency of government actors could have made a difference through the 
complementary development of sites on opposite banks of the Humber to facilitate 
clustering and co-location, there was insufficient institutional coherence, an enduring 
characteristic of the region’s path dependence, to mediate the agency of a dominant 
monopoly asset owner and new regional firm entrants, as evidenced by the absence 
of co-location at AMEP and Paull.  
Therefore, the region did not break from an economic past characterised by lower 
skills, wages and authority related to the exploitation of natural resources, as with 
fishing and agriculture, and lower value intermediary functions associated with the 
region’s traditional dependence on carbon related and food processing industries. It 
is an eventual outcome that indicates a discernible level of related variety (Neffke et 
al, 2011) and path dependence between the new path and the established lower 
value industrial base from which it emerged. Therefore, the high quality jobs called 
for by the IBM and IEDC report commissioned in 2006 went unrealised.       
6.6 Summary     
The creation of Humberside’s offshore wind path was the product of the novel 
knowledge of energy transition fusing with unique regional assets. The degree of 
fusion was contingent on the interplay of mutable aggregations of actors, 
mechanisms and regional assets, which was pointedly mediated by the multi-scalar 
institutional environment. These shifting aggregations and their interplay, occurring in 
unique temporal and spatial contexts, led to three discernible episodes of path 
creation over a decade – path emergence, development and realisation (fig 6.6). At 
the outset, the growing number of nearby Crown Estate leased offshore wind sites 
which were likely to receive UK state subsidy privileged Humberside as a prime 
location for O&M and supply chain inward investment. However, the time lag caused 
by the industry’s project life cycle led to slow and muted valorisation of regional 
164 
 
assets. Also, a lack of regional institutional thickness meant that supply chain 
opportunities were pursued in a competitive rather than a strategic manner across 
Humberside’s localities. This outcome was largely a consequence of ABP’s near 
monopolistic position apropos the estuary’s development and limited regional state 
power. Intra-regional competition and AMEP’s associated valorisation costs, the only 
regional site that could accommodate significant co-location, led to Siemens 
selecting Alexandra dock for its manufacturing facility. Subsequently, uncertainty 
about the direction of UK Government policy and regulation led to a hiatus in 
Siemens’ investment plans and related supply chain investments. Although region 
wide path planning and promotion became more evident, this did not constrain ABP 
from obstructing AMEP’s development through a planning challenge. Even so, the 
path experienced resurgence as projects that had received subsidy were installed in 
the North Sea. This was on sufficient scale for Siemens’ to progress its investment, 
albeit scaled back. Nonetheless, given the restructuring and consolidation of the 
industry at the national and European levels there were less opportunities for supply 
chain or higher value functions locating on Humberside.         
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 6.6: Humberside’s timeline of episodes of path creation 
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Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter contrasts the empirical evidence generated by the case studies and in 
doing so responds to calls for greater comparative analysis in evolutionary economic 
geography research (Boschma and Frenken, 2009; Coe, 2010; Gertler, 2010). By 
comparing key causal episodes in both cases, qualified and cross-referenced 
analytical observations can be drawn from the empirical evidence regarding path 
creation as it unfolds over space and time in differing regional contexts (Pike et al, 
2016b). Specifically, the chapter will compare the path creating interplay of actors, 
assets and mechanisms caused by the stimulus of offshore wind in Glasgow and on 
Humberside. In particular, the research contrasts the role of multi-scalar institutions, 
especially those relating to the state, in enabling and constraining this interplay and 
the resulting timing, scale and nature of path creation. In doing so, the missing link 
(Dawley et al, 2015) regarding how institutional environments enable or constrain 
path creation and related agency will be addressed.   
Reflecting the “path as process” conceptualisation (Martin, 2010), the chapter is 
structured around the three observed episodes of path creation in Glasgow and on 
Humberside. For each of these, the relationship between the stimulus of energy 
transition and path creation will be considered and compared. Consequently, there 
will be exploration of how extra-regional institutions enabled or constrained the path 
creation process in each episode, before consideration of the influence of regional 
institutions. Finally, a summary will consider the interplay of the extra-regional and 
regional institutional environments in shaping path creation in the respective case 
episodes; thereby providing insight to the inter-related effect of exogenous and 
endogenous institutional forces on the phenomenon. The chapter concludes with a 
comparison of the character of the resulting paths and their effect on the respective 
regional economies, before a synopsis of the comparative observations pertaining to 
the three episodes of path creation. 
Notably, the comparative approach endorses the theoretical notion of path evolution 
as an ongoing process of change and continuity that occurs as differing actors 
attempt to deviate from the past by experimenting and strategizing in the present to 
achieve future outcomes (Martin, 2010; Steen, 2016; Evenhuis, 2017). However, the 
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empirical results promote refinement of Martin’s model of local industrial change 
(2010) indicating that the struggle between continuity and change can create differing 
causal episodes within the period of path creation itself, thereby illuminating a more 
conditional, open and punctuated process. Therefore, the empirical evidence 
identifies a need for finer grained path analysis. Table 7.1 below identifies the three 
observed episodes of path creation in Glasgow and on Humberside around which 
this comparative chapter is structured.  
Glasgow Humberside 
Path Emergence, 2006-09 Path Emergence, 2006-11 
Path Development, 2009- 13 Path Development 2011-14 
Path Realisation, 2013-15 Path Realisation, 2014-15 
 
Table 7.1: Episodes of path creation in Glasgow and Humberside 
7.2 Path Emergence Episode 
7.2.1 The interplay of transition with assets, actors and mechanisms  
This section will compare the relationships between socio-technical transition and 
key components of path creation. By adopting a comparative approach, four 
significant observations are revealed. Firstly, the interplay between path actors, 
assets and mechanisms was triggered by the transition to offshore wind and their 
subsequent interplay regulated the scale of path emergence. Secondly, the 
interaction of new knowledge with pre-existing regional assets and conditions, 
predisposed the principal mechanism of path creation in both regions. Thirdly, 
although a small number of firms and related mechanisms were observed as the 
primary causes of path emergence, other actors and mechanisms were evident, 
revealing levels of causal importance. Finally, there is evidence that the agency of 
regional state actors was not an essential pre-requisite for path emergence. Where 
the activity of such actors was conspicuous, it related to the important but auxiliary 
role of priming regional assets for firm valorisation.               
Firstly, in both regions the triggering of the path creation process was caused by the 
broad, instituted and disruptive process of energy transition relating to the 
introduction of offshore wind to the UK’s energy system. This largely exogenous 
stimulus acted as a catalyst for path creation in both regions based on the interaction 
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of actors, assets and mechanisms. This exogenous stimulus encouraged the 
utilisation of novel knowledge at the regional level which allowed path-related actors 
to break from their past via innovation. Such novel knowledge represented the 
integration of new and existing knowledge (i.e. terrestrial technologies, business 
models and processes adapted for an offshore context). In Glasgow such knowledge 
primarily related to offshore wind project appraisal, planning and deployment, 
whereas on Humberside it related to the routine processes of O&M and manufacture. 
In particular, in the case of Glasgow, the mixing of exogenous and endogenous 
sources of knowledge to create novel knowledge infers a complex causal interplay 
that is not always evident in the literature (Martin, 2010; Karnoe and Garud, 2012; 
Cooke 2013).     
Moreover, the scale of interplay between actors, assets and mechanisms determined 
the level of utilisation of novel knowledge in each regional economy, thereby 
determining the degree of industrial change and continuity. This reflects the 
theoretical contention that an economy’s past is linked to its future through innovation 
(Archer, 1996) and that the degree of innovation informs the degree of change 
(Cooke, 2002; Howells, 2005; Morgan, 2007). Therefore, the causal significance 
given to novel knowledge and innovation in path creation literature is borne out 
(Martin, 2010; Boschma et al 2017). However, the findings also indicate that the 
relative marginalisation of extra-regional stimuli for engendering novel knowledge, 
innovation and industrial renewal in the literature remains a theoretical shortcoming 
(Essletzbichler, 2012; Coenen et al, 2015; Trippl et al, 2017).     
Secondly, the interaction of novel knowledge with pre-existing regional assets and 
conditions, predisposed the primary mechanism of path creation. In Glasgow it was 
observed that preformation assets of “value and rareness” (Maskell and Malmberg, 
1999) - skills in electrical power generation and distribution, associated research and 
training, and locally embedded networked organisations -  fused with novel 
knowledge to select diversification as the primary mechanism of path emergence. 
Thus the path’s emergence from a pre-existing regional electrical utilities industry 
aligns with the notion of path branching associated with related variety (Martin and 
Sunley, 2006; Boschma and Frenken, 2009). Alternately, on Humberside, given an 
absence of technological antecedence, novel, primarily exogenous, knowledge fused 
with regional assets - natural resources, physical infrastructure, and maritime, 
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logistics and processing skills – to select transplantation as the principal mechanism 
of emergence (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Dawley 2013). Tellingly, in contrast with 
Glasgow, it was this interaction which created assets of “value” on Humberside 
(Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). Therefore, it can be inferred that the worth of regional 
assets is mutable, not static. Therefore, binary accounts of regional potential, such as 
positive and negative path dependence (Boschma, 2008; Stam and Garnsey, 2009; 
Martin, 2010) are arguably overly deterministic.  
Thirdly, in terms of actors, case comparison reveals that the principal mechanisms of 
diversification and transplantation denoted the relative importance of path actors. 
Correspondingly, in Glasgow, project developers based within large electrical utility 
firms led path emergence, acting as key conduits of novel knowledge for other 
regional actors including higher education and consultancies. In the case of Scottish 
Power, its role was augmented by its acquisition by Iberdrola, not only increasing the 
regional actor’s access to new knowledge but also investment and markets. On 
Humberside, given the absence of industrial antecedence, the primary actor of path 
emergence was unrelated to the region. As in Glasgow, an electricity utility firm 
acting as a project developer represented the primary bearer of novel knowledge and 
the principal agent in valorising regional assets. In contrast though, the developer, 
Centrica, was focused on transplanting the post deployment function of Operations 
and Maintenance for a small offshore wind farm, thereby constraining the scale of 
fusion between novel knowledge and regional assets. In turn, the significance of 
transplantation as the principal mechanism of Humberside’s path emergence was 
underscored by Siemens’ proposal to invest in Hull. Although undergoing very 
different path creation processes, both cases reflect the theoretical contention that 
regional industrial change is dependent on access to and alignment of novel 
knowledge, investment, extra-regional networks and market opportunity (Bathelt et 
al, 2004; Binz et al, 2015). 
However, it is telling that path emergence was also dependent on the operation of 
auxiliary but important actors and related mechanisms. In Glasgow, the role for 
higher education was significant in providing the labour and the testing and validation 
for exogenous OEM technologies on which local developer diversification was based. 
Also, a somewhat hidden role of the UK state was evidenced in the EPSRC’s part 
funding of Strathclyde University’s diversification from terrestrial to offshore wind 
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research which, in turn, assisted firm-led diversification. Such findings validate the 
attention that higher education actors are given in pertinent research on regional 
change (Goddard, 2012; Goddard, 2013 a,b). In the case of Humberside, 
transplantation was encouraged by firms diversifying from traditional core activities to 
provide sites for inward investment e.g. Grimbsy Fish Dock Enterprises and ABP 
(from carbon related transhipment). This empirical evidence exposes the often 
overlooked relational and non-firm nature of path creating actors and mechanisms 
and the need for greater analytical stratification of causal orders of importance. 
Moreover, both cases illuminate that the diversification of assets is as important as 
the diversification of actors (e.g. physical infrastructure on Humberside and research 
in Glasgow). Therefore, the tendency in the literature to present mechanisms as 
disaggregated or isolated and firm centric – for instance Martin and Sunley’s (2006) 
path de-locking mechanisms, Boschma and Frenken’s’ (2009) knowledge spill-over 
mechanisms and Martin’s (2010) intra-firm mechanisms -  minimises the importance 
of their overlap and interplay.    
Fourthly and finally, the role of state economic development actors varied across the 
cases. In Glasgow the role of devolved and regional state actors in regional path 
creation is limited. Notably, the Scottish Government actors based in the city were 
primarily focused on the creation of a national (Scottish) path. Alternately on 
Humberside, a more prominent role for state actors is evident. For example, Hull City 
Council and North East Lincolnshire Council aided firm transplantation and the 
diversification of firms and physical assets via planning (e.g. an LDO for Alexandra 
Dock) and infrastructure provision (e.g. upgrading of Grimsby lock quays), whilst the 
RDA, Yorkshire Forward, marketed the Humber to inward investors. Even so, the 
agency of individual local entrepreneurs linked to Grimsby’s fishing industry was 
observed to be more important than state actors for capturing the opportunity of 
Centrica’s initial O&M investment. Not only do these observations further indicate a 
requirement for more comprehensive, relational accounts of actor agency in path 
literature, they also flag the need to further “unpack” (MacLeod, 2001) the role of 
state actors in heterogeneous regional settings.   
7.2.2 Extra-regional institutional environment in mediating path emergence 
By utilising comparative analysis, the importance of the extra-regional institutional 
environment, especially in relation to the nation state, in enabling and constraining 
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path emergence in both regions is revealed. There are three significant observations. 
Firstly, nation state policies and regulation mediated path actor selection and 
mobilisation and the underlying temporal dynamics of the industry in which they were 
set. Secondly, the UK’s institutional model of capitalism, especially in relation to 
electricity markets, predisposed the scope and nature of regional path emergence, 
especially in relation to the limited degree of firm and technological diversity. Thirdly, 
partial institutional co-ordination meant that synergies between energy, industrial and 
regional policies that could have enhanced regional industrial path emergence went 
unrealised.    
Firstly, at the outset, it is worth noting that the empirical evidence reveals that nation 
state institutions had a critical bearing on the activation and latitude of path creating 
actors, supporting the theoretical contention that such institutions mediate actor 
participation via incentivisation (Steen, 2016). In particular, such state institutions 
regulated actor expectations, co-ordination and uncertainty, thereby shaping the 
scale and timing of the interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets in both cases. For 
instance, the decision to strategize and experiment by project developers, akin to 
mindful deviation (Garud and Karnoe, 2003), was activated in both cases by their 
expectation of reward premised on a benign state institutions, including subsidy, that 
led to diversification of a terrestrial industry to a marine environment.  
Moreover, nation state institutions played a formative role in the creation of 
underlying industrial temporal dynamics (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006). It was observed that state institutions and related institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Boschma et al, 2017), as evidenced by The 
Crown Estate’s packaging and promotion of seabed sites via three UK leasing 
rounds, linked to clarity on subsidy and planning, set the timelines for actor agency in 
both regions. Moreover, it was telling that in both cases, the widespread 
dissemination of The Crown Estate leasing maps were catalysts for actor sentience 
and subsequent deviation from past practice, thereby exposing the value of framing 
and representing regional opportunity in a nationally co-ordinated spatial framework. 
Therefore, although Martin’s model of local industrial evolution (2010) and Boschma 
and Frenken’s (2009) notions of path branching and variety are welcome advances in 
conceptualising path evolution (2009), the relative marginalisation of the influence of 
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wider industrial life cycles and their extra-regional institutional context is something of 
a shortcoming.   
In Glasgow, with a focus on earlier stages of deployment - project appraisal, 
planning, design and procurement - these institutionally derived timeframes meant 
that developer-led path emergence was pronounced in this first episode, as was the 
valorisation of assets and utilisation of mechanisms. Whereas on Humberside 
emphasis was on the latter stages of deployment, particularly O&M which was 
dependent on project completion. Thus, given its position in the new industry’s life-
cycle, Humberside’s initial phase of actor, asset and mechanism activation was later 
in appearing. Consequently, in Glasgow by 2009 150 high skilled jobs had been 
created and mainly recruited from the regional labour market. In contrast, three years 
later only 100 jobs had been created on Humberside. Likewise, such temporal 
dynamics inclined the mindful deviation of supply chain actors to come late in this 
initial phase, as reflected in Siemens’ plans for Hull only being announced in 2011. 
Table 7.2 below plots developments in the UK state’s policy and regulatory 
environment with the observed deviation of project developers from past practice. 
SCALE 2001-2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
 
NATION 
STATE 
 
 
Institutional 
Developments 
Institutional 
Development 
 
Crown Estate 
Leasing Rnd  1 
(2001) and Rnd 2 
(2003) 
 
Energy White 
Paper 
2003 
 
Energy Review 
2006 
Institutional 
Development 
 
Energy White 
Paper 
 
Institutional 
Development 
 
Climate Change 
Act 
 
Crown Estate 
Rnd 3 
 
Institutional 
Development 
 
Low Carbon 
Transition Plan 
 
National 
Renewable 
Energy Action 
Plan 
 
Renewables 
Obligation 
Banding Review 
 
 
REGIONAL 
 
 
Activation of 
Developer  
Agency 
Developer 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
 
2006, Scottish 
Power est. offshore 
wind team 
 
2006, Iberdrola 
acquire Scottish 
Power 
Developer 
Deviation  
Glasgow 
 
Airtricity locate 
UK HQ in 
Glasgow 
Developer 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
 
SSE acquire 
Airtricity 
Developer 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
 
SSE and Scottish 
Power expand 
offshore wind 
teams 
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Developer  
Deviation Humber 
 
2006, Centrica and 
RES identify  Lynn 
& Inner Dowsing 
O&M base at 
Grimsby 
Developer  
Deviation  
Humber 
 
Limited 
deviation 
 
 
Developer  
Deviation  
Humber 
 
Centrica and RES 
establish Lynn 
and Inner 
Dowsing O&M 
base in Grimsby 
Fish Dock 
Developer  
Deviation 
Humber 
 
Limited 
deviation 
 
 
Table 7.2: Nation state institutional developments and developer agency 
The second key point relates to how the UK’s model of capitalism engendered path 
evolution to evolve along distinct paths, thereby illustrating the ongoing importance of 
variegated models of capitalism to path analysis (Christopherson, 2002; MacKinnon 
et al, 2009; Gertler, 2010). By 2006, the UK’s institutional model of electrical 
generation had privileged the emergence of a privatised oligopoly. Therefore, the 
observed number of terrestrial power firms whose diversification was activated by the 
benign institutional environment was limited at the outset. Hence in both cases there 
is no evidence of distributed agency of multiple actors at the regional level that is 
common in the literature (Neffke et al, 2011; Karnoe and Garud, 2012; Cooke, 2012). 
In Glasgow, the path creating interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms was 
primarily shaped by the deviation of Scottish Power and SSE. Similarly on 
Humberside, Centrica was the primary agent of path emergence. Such limited firm 
mobilisation accounts for the seeming veiled emergence of the paths in both regions, 
as mechanisms of path diversification were largely internalised within a few firms. 
Moreover, this exclusive industrial development process limited the options for a 
wider set of actors and mechanisms to utilise regional assets to enable path creation, 
such as disruptive new entrants with new business models, networks and 
technologies.  
Critically for regional path creation, this oligopolistic-oriented industrial structure 
fostered sectoral and technological path dependence (Boschma et al, 2017), thereby 
limiting the potential for firm and supply chain diversity at the regional level. It was 
observed that technological diversification was stimulated by an oligopoly of 
terrestrial developers, including Scottish Power, SSE and Centrica, inclined to utilise 
existing terrestrial relationships with a small number of OEMs. Moreover, it was a 
disposition promoted by the preferences of other sectoral actors, such as investors 
and insurers. Additionally, the state’s subsidy regime, which gave no additional 
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support to more costly deeper water technologies, by default incentivised the less 
costly adoption and deployment of incumbent terrestrial technology in shallow 
waters. These factors and significant cost barriers to entry discriminated against 
radical new technological entrants. Hence, incumbent OEMs, such as Siemens and 
Vestas, had greatest expectation of reward and incentive to deviate from past 
practice; thereby ensuring that the number of firms that could valorise Humberside’s 
development sites or Glasgow’s research capability was limited.  
Thirdly and finally, the research illuminates the cogency of literature that identifies the 
importance to path creation of co-ordination between horizontal energy policy, 
vertical industry policy and territorial development policy (Dawley et al, 2015; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018). Moreover, the evidence supports the contention within 
institutionally orientated literature that the UK state customarily gives limited 
cognisance to the interaction of policies and the spatial consequences of non-
spatially specific policies (Barca et al, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015). Across both 
cases, the UK state primarily perceived its role as that of a market maker. Therefore, 
the UK Government did not place comparable emphasis on the development of an 
industrial value chain or its regional manifestation, as demonstrated by the relative 
absence of a state-led industrial strategy, industrial forums and spatial co-ordination 
in this phase of emergence. In short, the UK state gave little cognisance to its 
institutional capability for arbitrating the fusion of disruptive novel knowledge and 
regional assets to address regional underperformance and imbalance, despite its 
essential role in leasing, consenting and subsidising offshore wind exploitation. 
Furthermore, in terms of devolved government, a reluctance to pursue regional 
prioritisation was observed in the Glasgow case. Edinburgh, like Whitehall, was 
focused on pursuing broader objectives. Whilst on Humberside, given the abolition of 
the RDA, there was no powerful devolved sub-national body. Thus, in both cases, it 
was left by seeming default to regional institutions to arbitrate the process of regional 
path creation. It is therefore apposite to consider the role of such institutions in 
shaping the interplay of assets, actors and mechanisms.  
7.2.3 Regional institutional environment in mediating path emergence 
This section compares the role of regional institutions in regulating path creating 
agency. By comparing and contrasting the empirical case evidence, two significant 
observations are revealed. Firstly, in both cases the role of regional institutions in 
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enabling regional level path creation is more muted and auxiliary than new regionalist 
literature would imply (Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1995; 
Amin, 1999; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). This is perhaps less surprising on Humberside 
given the limited level of industrial antecedence but in Glasgow with a mature 
electrical generation and distribution industry, this is a striking observation. Secondly, 
regional innovation systems (RIS) had only limited bearing on path creation in either 
region. This is somewhat predictable on Humberside where the RIS demonstrated 
the characteristics of an organisationally thin RIS of a peripheral region but in 
Glasgow where pronounced characteristics of an organisationally thick and 
specialised RIS can be identified (Trippl et al, 2017), the auxiliary role of the RIS is 
also notable.          
The first important observation, which connects both cases, is in regard to the role of 
regional institutions in enabling regional path emergence. In Glasgow, a network of 
institutional arrangements can be easily observed (for instance, Scottish Power, 
SSE, University of Strathclyde, Scottish Government, consultancies). However, this 
institutional environment was orientated towards the wider sector’s development 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006) and regional actors purposively framed their mindful 
deviation in the context of broader sectoral dynamics. As a consequence, there was 
limited evidence of regional economic actors actively championing and supporting 
the regional path; with state actors only becoming aware of the city’s assets when 
undertaking an “audit” for a Chinese state visit. Conspicuously, although a 
concentration of diverse organisations and interactive networks, especially relating to 
the labour market, can be identified, two other vital characteristics of institutional 
thickness were largely absent i.e. structures of association that promote collective 
expectation; and mutual awareness of common purpose (Amin and Thrift, 1994b). 
This absence hindered regionally-oriented strategizing and common path 
representation. Therefore, institutional thickness played a more suppressed role in 
incentivising the path creating interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms at the 
regional level than the number of seemingly networked, highly visible organisations 
might imply. Thus, case evidence supports the theoretical contention that for 
institutional thickness to arbitrate and facilitate regional industrial evolution, all four 
dimensions of the phenomenon need to be operating (Henry and Pinch, 2001).    
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On Humberside, given limited related industrial antecedence, a regional 
concentration of diverse institutional arrangements and industrial networks was not 
present. Moreover, institutional arrangements that could have contributed to 
collective expectation and common purpose, namely Yorkshire Forward and ABP (as 
monopoly harbour authority and operator) were respectively compromised by local 
rivalries and rent seeking behaviour (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). Tellingly though, it was 
observed that local authorities through their planning and development functions 
played noteworthy roles in engendering firm transplantation by priming local physical 
assets. However, such activities focused on promoting specific local spatial 
opportunities rather than those of the wider region. Thus, Siemens was encouraged 
by Hull City Council to select a site that would subsequently minimise supply chain 
co-location opportunities and restrict the development of the regional path. Therefore, 
in summary, it can be argued that regional institutional thickness was predisposed to 
privilege extra-regional development in the case of Glasgow and sub-regional 
development in the case of Humberside. Thus, literature requires to give further 
attention to the ambiguous overlap between regional institutional thickness and its 
scalar focus; the two need not be contiguous.     
Secondly, in terms of innovation and path creation, the case results indicate that 
exogenously sourced technologies and knowledge were of critical importance to the 
phenomena. This was unsurprising on Humberside given limited industrial 
antecedence and the existence of a regional innovation system (RIS) with 
pronounced characteristics of an organisationally thin RIS in a peripheral region 
(Trippl et al, 2017). However, in Glasgow, despite identification of significant research 
networks between firms, government and an internationally preeminent university 
(Goddard et al, 2012, 2013), synonymous with an organisationally thick and 
specialised RIS (Trippl et al al, 2017), there was unexpectedly limited evidence of 
endogenous research and development capacity having a primary influence on 
regional path emergence. Rather the empirical evidence indicates that Glasgow’s 
innovation system was conditioned by broader sectoral and technological path 
dependences, thereby leading to a RIS that tested, modified and applied exogenous 
incumbent technologies rather than generated radical technological alternatives. 
Therefore, nascent but rapidly emerging sectoral and technological path 
dependences operating across levels (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Truffer and Coenen, 
2012; Boschma et al, 2017) promoted an auxiliary role for the RIS and the university, 
176 
 
thereby producing more restricted actor deviation, mechanism activation and 
valorisation of regional assets than current literature might imply (Cooke, 2012; 
Goddard et al, 2013; Trippl et al, 2017).  Furthermore, observed proximities - 
cognitive, organisational, institutional (Boschma, 2005) – and links (Bathelt et al, 
2004; Coe et al, 2008) privileged the exogenous; akin to an industrial node rather 
than a regional cluster, such as the developers’ procurement links with OEMs and 
Scottish Power’s relationship with its parent company, Iberdrola. Returning to 
Humberside, given the nature of its RIS, it is predictable that there is no evidence 
that regional innovation capacity, proximities (except for proximity to the natural 
resource) and networks influenced Centrica and Siemens decisions to select the 
region for the transplantation of exogenous technologies and processes. In short, the 
causal power of regionally centred institutional frameworks to promote innovation to 
activate path creating agency was evident in Glasgow but was not primary, whilst on 
Humberside it was negligible. Therefore, literature that champions endogenous 
innovation models may only offer partial insight on the possibilities and limits for 
regional industrial renewal (Porter, 1990; Morgan et al, 1999; Maskell, 2001; 
Hausman and Roderik 2003; Morgan, 2003, 2013b; Foray et al, 2011).  
7.2.4 Summary of comparative observations for path emergence  
Case comparison of the empirical evidence indicates that path emergence was a 
contingent phenomenon, whereby novel knowledge, linked to the socio-technical 
transition process of offshore wind, interacted with distinctive regional assets (for 
example skills in Glasgow and physical assets on Humberside) to select a process of 
path creation. In Glasgow this related to path branching and on Humberside 
transplantation. Additionally, the analysis reveals that such exogenous and 
endogenous interaction had a bearing on the determination on the relative value of 
regional assets, thereby exposing the conditional worth of such assets and regional 
competitiveness. 
The principal agents of change in each case were associated with the respective 
mechanisms of path emergence. In Glasgow diversification was led by project 
developers embedded within large corporate entities. On Humberside, 
transplantation was led by a developer pursuing the direct exploitation of the 
resource at distance from its corporate base (Boschma et al, 2017; MacKinnon et al, 
2018). Furthermore, the deviation of these primary actors was supported by a diverse 
177 
 
range of firm and non-firm actors and mechanisms, revealing a gap regarding the 
contingent and relative nature of these relationships in path literature.        
Significantly, analysis confirmed that institutions regulated the scale of fusion 
between the exogenous stimulus and the region. Nation state institutions were 
observed to play an enabling role in triggering and structuring the process of 
transition relating to offshore wind and regulating the sector’s temporal dynamics at 
the national and regional levels. However, a lack of institutional co-ordination 
between and within scales was conspicuous. Palpably, both paths emerged due to a 
degree of benign but relatively unplanned multi-scalar and intra-scalar institutional 
complementarity (Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016). There is limited evidence of an 
actively managed state-region nexus or state-devolved-region nexus to optimise 
actor deviation at the regional level (Martin, 2000). Although the agency of 
institutional entrepreneurs was identified (Boschma et al, 2017), particularly in regard 
to The Crown Estate and DECC, their roles related to sectoral path creation rather 
than regional emergence. Similarly, the agency of system builders (Hughes, 1987; 
Geels, 2004) to disentangle and mediate symbiotic dependencies between sectoral, 
technological and regional industrial path evolution was undetected. Rather, by 
default it was left to regional institutions to arbitrate this process. However, a 
surprising lack of regional institutional thickness to incentivise and co-ordinate 
change at the regional level in Glasgow and conflicted institutional capacity on 
Humberside led to an equivocal role for regional institutions.  
Finally, extra-regional institutions and their seeming promotion of sectoral and 
technological path dependency had a greater causal bearing on the dissemination 
and utilisation of novel knowledge than regional institutions. Although Glasgow had a 
mature RIS relating to power generation and distribution, its presence supported 
diversification of the principal firm actors within the path and was not a principal 
cause. On Humberside, a limited RIS meant the role of regional institutional 
frameworks in enabling the utilisation of novel knowledge to promote path 
emergence was insignificant. The results indicate that the agentic powers of a RIS 
are circumscribed by extra-regional sectoral and technological path dependencies.         
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7.3 Path Development Episode 
7.3.1 The interplay of transition with assets, actors and mechanisms 
In this intermediary phase, the process of path creation was observed to be more 
pronounced in Glasgow than on Humberside. In exploring this divergence, the 
adopted comparative approach identified a more mutable and punctuated path 
creation process than Martin’s (2010) linear model implies. In Glasgow the observed 
process of path branching (Boschma and Frenken 2009; Neffke et al, 2011) was 
enhanced by an increased fusion of new exogenous knowledge with regional assets 
caused by the mobilisation of multiple actors and related mechanisms. In contrast, on 
Humberside this interaction was restrained, exemplified by stalled transplantation at 
Alexandra Dock and AMEP. It is to understanding in greater detail this interplay of 
actors, assets and mechanisms in both cases that we now turn.     
As in the previous episode, the principal mechanisms of path creation denoted the 
importance of path actors. In Glasgow, it was evidenced that project developers 
remained the primary agents of diversification and consequently asset valorisation. 
Nevertheless, given an increasing focus on deployment due to the industry’s maturing 
project life cycle, they were encouraged to develop links with OEMs and oil and gas 
firms. In turn these new regional actors further valorised the region’s research base, 
skills and networks. However, the empirical evidence also strikingly reveals the role of 
non-firm actors in attempting to shape path evolution and validates literature that seeks 
a more inclusive perspective on actor agency (Dawley, 2013; Dawley et al, 2015; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018). In this path development phase, the University of Strathclyde 
and Scottish Enterprise played a significant role in attempting to further fuse the 
exogenous stimulus of energy transition with regional research and skills assets, 
exemplified by a joint £100million investment in ITREZ. Conspicuously, the newly 
appointed Principal of the University of Strathclyde (who was also on the Board of 
Scottish Enterprise) represented a key individual agent of change, championing a path 
narrative both nationally and internationally. On Humberside, transplantation was still 
led by only one project developer, Centrica. This limited level of developer agency was 
conditioned by the industry’s project life cycle and the region’s related dependence on 
hosting O&M functions. Moreover, given that Siemens only confirmed its final 
transplantation plans in 2014, the role of OEMs remained muted in this episode. Thus 
there continued to be limited fusion between exogenous novel knowledge and 
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endogenous assets on Humberside. Moreover, this hiatus revealed the limited power 
of regional actors, even powerful ones, such as ABP, to influence this fusion. It was a 
position reinforced by their observed exclusion from the industry’s “global pipelines” of 
knowledge and power (Bathelt et al, 2004; Binz et al, 2015), as reflected in Siemens’ 
limited communication with Hull City Council and ABP during this episode, reflecting 
the region’s branch plant / extractive economy status.  
In comparison with Humberside, the evidence of multiple, near simultaneous triggering 
of branching sub-mechanisms by path actors in Glasgow is striking. Moreover, the 
evidence accords with Boschma and Frenken’s (2009) recognition of firm dynamics, 
such as acquisitions, mergers and alliances, representing important means for regional 
industrial evolution. Moreover, the size of the firms employing these sub-mechanisms 
and their international nature builds a bridge between the these empirics and theory 
which readily accommodates global corporate strategy (MacKinnon et al, 2002; Bathelt 
et al, 2004; Coe et al, 2008; Elola et al, 2013; Dicken 2015; Binz et al, 2015). Notable 
in this regard, was SSE developing alliances and joint ventures with a range of 
international actors including Mitsubishi and the research alliance between Scottish 
Power, the University of Strathclyde and Gamesa. In this episode distributed actor 
agency akin to bricolage became evident (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006). Critically, the identified varied mechanisms were interactive and 
relational, dependent on the distributed agency of private and public actors for their 
activation; once again revealing a need for greater theoretical vigilance and 
stratification than literature might imply. Finally, the rapidly changing importance of 
differing actors and mechanisms exposed the ready mutability of the path creation 
process. It is to understanding the influence of institutional environments on this 
observed elasticity that the section now turns.   
7.3.2 Extra-regional institutional environment in mediating path development 
By utilising comparative analysis, the importance of the extra-regional institutional 
environment in enabling and constraining the causal interplay of actors, assets and 
mechanisms is further revealed. There are four significant observations apropos this 
episode of path development. Firstly, UK policy and regulation continued to regulate 
the tempo, scale and character of actor agency and its interplay with assets and 
mechanisms. Secondly, these institutions further promoted sectoral and 
technological path dependence, constraining the scope for a broader set of firms and 
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technologies to shape regional path creation across the cases. Thirdly, continuing 
policy misalignment constrained the interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms. 
Fourthly and finally, the contrasting fortunes of the cases was also a result of the 
Glasgow case being embedded in a benign devolved institutional environment.       
Firstly, nation state institutions had notable causal effect on mediating the mindful 
deviation (Garud and Karnoe, 2003) of path actors in both regional paths in this 
episode. The cases correspondingly reaffirmed that the agency of firms was noticeably 
regulated by expectations of reward largely premised on the UK institutional 
environment (Essletzbichler, 2012; Steen, 2015). The tempo of the industry’s 
development continued to be shaped by institutional developments such as The Crown 
Estate leasing rounds and related planning, consenting and subsidy frameworks. Once 
again, flagging the relative marginalisation of the interplay of institutions, industry life 
cycles and regional path creation in current literature.   
In Glasgow, additional leasing rounds in 2008 and 2009 linked to increased subsidy 
introduced by an industrially expansionist Labour Government encouraged growth of 
offshore wind developer teams. As more offshore wind projects approached delivery 
or entered operation, developers placed greater focus on technological procurement 
and maintenance, thereby activating the agency of a wider set of path actors, including 
OEMs, oil and gas firms, consultancies and research bodies. Such agency, which 
accords with Martin and Sunley’s (2006) notion of distributed path creating agency, 
further valorised regional assets relating to skills, research and networks. In turn, direct 
path employment doubled in this phase to c. 300 jobs, most of them highly skilled.  
On Humberside, path attenuation was a feature of this episode, despite some modest 
investments, such as Centrica’s second O&M base. As evidenced, this was partly a 
result of the industry’s temporal logic which placed O&M later in the project life cycle, 
as compared with Glasgow’s emphasis on planning and development. However, given 
this inherent time lag, the growing cost reduction agenda of the new Coalition 
Government was also increasingly detrimental to Humberside’s path (signalled by the 
establishment of the Cost Reduction Task Force in 2011). This new cost cutting state 
disposition made electricity utility firms cautious about progressing investments on the 
scale previously anticipated. Uncertain expectations of reward circumscribed their 
incentive to deviate and, in turn, that of potential supply chain actors, such as OEMs.  
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Secondly, it was observed that the incentive to experiment by OEMs was dulled by 
Siemens’ rapid domination of UK offshore wind turbine orders, a position based on its 
corporate technologies favouring expedient and economic exploitation of shallow 
waters. Such dominance when combined with a decreasing market size (due to the 
focus of the UK Government on cost reduction) dis-incentivised GE and Vestas from 
transplanting novel knowledge to Humberside and also dis-incentivised Doosan 
Babcock and Gamesa from doing likewise in Glasgow. Additionally, as observed, 
Siemens developed its own O&M model which developers purchased with the 
turbines. Consequently, the higher value, technically intense aspects of this model 
were undertaken by Siemens employees based outside Humberside, thereby further 
limiting the fusion of novel knowledge with regional assets on Humberside. 
Therefore, the growing attention in the literature to framing and analysing regional 
paths within wider sectoral dynamics is germane (Elola et al, 2013; MacKinnon et al 
2018). 
Thirdly, it was observed that the regional economic consequences of nation state 
energy policies and regulation on corporate dynamics were not mitigated on 
Humberside by increasing UK Government emphasis on industrial development, 
commencing with the creation of the UK’s largest Enterprise Zone in 2011 (Humber 
Renewable Energy Super Cluster Enterprise Zone) and culminating in a national 
industrial offshore wind strategy in 2013. Rather, an unaligned nation state policy 
environment, induced by uncoordinated objectives and priorities across BIS, DECC, 
DCLG, Cabinet Office and The Treasury, led to limited alignment of horizontal energy 
policy, vertical industry policy and regional policy. As a result, the mindful deviation of 
a sufficient quantum of firms to transform Humberside’s assets - excess labour, 
development sites and port infrastructure - was constrained. Thus by 2014 only 200 
jobs largely relating to low to medium skilled O&M roles had been created. The 
evident significance of such institutional misalignment foregrounds the need for the 
link between agency and institutional co-ordination and change to be further 
developed in path literature. Although recent research (Boschma et al, 2017) has re-
engaged with concepts such as system builders (Hughes, 1987; Geels, 2004) and 
institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009), it primarily places 
such agents within the context of the firm rather than the state. Table 7.3 summarises 
the correlation between UK institutional change and firm agency on the Humberside.   
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SCALE 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
NATION 
STATE 
 
Institutional 
Developments 
UK Institutional 
Development 
UK Renewable 
Energy Route 
Map 
 
Offshore Wind 
Cost Reduction 
Task Force 
 
LEPs established 
 
Centres for 
Offshore 
Renewable 
Engineering est. 
UK Institutional 
Development 
Offshore Wind 
Programme 
Board 
 
Regional 
Development 
Agencies 
abolished 
 
UK Institutional 
Development 
UK Energy Act 
 
Offshore Wind 
Industrial Strategy 
(OWIC) 
 
Offshore Wind 
Industrial Council 
(OWIS) 
UK Institutional 
Development 
Contracts for 
Difference 
introduced 
 
 
REGIONAL 
 
Activation / 
Deactivation 
of Firm 
Deviation 
Actor Deviation 
Humber 
Siemens 
transplantation 
announced in joint 
MoU with ABP at 
joint Alexandra 
Dock and Paull 
sites 
 
Actor Deviation 
Humber 
Siemens 
transplantation 
hiatus 
Actor Deviation 
Humber 
Siemens 
transplantation 
hiatus 
 
ABP object to 
development of 
AMEP site 
 
Centrica establish 
Lincs O&M base 
in Grimsby Fish 
Dock  
Actor Deviation 
Humber 
Siemens confirm 
transplantation 
and joint 
investment with 
ABP exclusively 
at Alexandra 
Dock 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Nation state institutional developments and firm agency on Humberside 
Finally, the empirical results reveal that the contrast in experience between the cases 
was also a product of a notable difference in the extra-regional institutional 
environments in which they were embedded. This case evidence validates Gertler’s 
(2010) contention that industrial evolution is conditional on interacting multi-scalar 
institutional architectures and Schroder and Voelzkow’s (2016) proposition that 
regional industrial trajectories are conditioned by the interplay of multi-scalar 
institutions and that their mutual efficiency is contingent on their level of 
complementarity. Given the industry’s institutionally informed timeline, Glasgow’s 
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second episode of path creation commenced earlier than Humberside’s while 
expectation of reward amongst firms remained high. However, in Glasgow, growth 
expectations were also augmented by a benign devolved institutional environment, 
as evidenced by internationally significant renewable energy targets, enhanced 
subsidies for specific offshore wind technologies, a national industry forum, and state 
investment in industrial and research infrastructure. Therefore, as the UK institutional 
context became increasingly uncertain, devolved institutional powers partially 
compensated. Even so, the observed abandonment of inward investment plans by 
OEMs demonstrate the limits of Scotland’s devolved power as a substitute for UK 
power. Table 7.4 summarises the inter-relations of firm agency in Glasgow with 
developments in the UK and Scottish institutional environments. 
SCALE 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
 
NATION 
STATE 
 
Institutional 
Developments 
UK 
Institutional 
Development 
Low Carbon 
Trans. Plan 
 
Renewable 
Energy Action 
Plan 
 
Renewables 
Obligation 
Review 
UK 
Institutional 
Development 
Treasury 
Infrastructure 
Cost Review 
 
UK 
Institutional 
Development 
UK 
Renewable 
Energy Route 
Map 
 
Offshore Wind 
Cost 
Reduction 
Task Force 
UK 
Institutional 
Development 
Offshore Wind 
Programme 
Board 
 
 
UK 
Institutional 
Development 
UK Energy 
Act 
 
FIDER 
introduced 
 
OW Industrial 
Strategy & 
Council 
 
 
 DEVOLVED 
 
 
Institutional 
Developments 
Scottish 
Instit. 
Development 
Climate 
Change Act 
 Renewables 
Plan  
Scottish 
Territorial 
Waters 
Leasing  
Marine 
Scotland est 
OW Ind. 
Group est 
Scottish 
Instit. 
Development 
Offshore 
Wind Route 
Map 
Scottish 
Instit. 
Development 
100% 
electricity 
from 
renewables 
by 2020 target 
Scottish 
Instit. 
Development 
Task Force on 
Licencing and 
Consenting 
Government 
Economic 
Strategy 
Scottish 
Instit. 
Development 
Enhanced 
Renewable 
Obligations 
Scotland 
Refresh of 
Offshore 
Wind Route 
Map 
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REGIONAL 
 
Activation/ 
Deactivation  
of Firm 
Agency 
Actor 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
SSE establish 
CEERE 
 
SP expand 
OW team 
 
Atkins 
develops OW 
team  
 
Actor 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
SSE strategic 
Alliance with 
Mitsubishi 
 
Mainstream 
transplant 
developer 
function 
 
Wood Group 
purchase  
control in 
Sgurr Energy 
Actor 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
Gamesa 
transplant 
turbine design 
function 
 
SSE open 
Hunterston 
turbine test 
centre 
 
SSE purchase 
turbine tower 
manufacturer 
 
Doosan 
Babcock 
announce 
turbine manu. 
investment 
 
Xodus opens 
office 
Actor 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
Construction 
of ITREZ and 
Strathclyde 
Uni TIC 
 
SSE 
procurement 
alliance est. 
 
SP announce 
new corporate 
HQ office  
 
Gamesa 
scales back 
plan and 
Doosan 
Babcock halts 
plan 
 
 
Actor 
Deviation 
Glasgow 
ORE Catapult 
locating to 
Glasgow 
announced 
 
DNV open 
office 
 
Gamesa 
mothball 
design office 
 
Table 7.4: UK and Scottish institutional developments and firm agency in Glasgow 
7.3.3 Regional institutional environment in mediating path development 
This section compares the roles of regional institutions in enabling or constraining 
path development in both cases. In doing so, it firstly reveals the detrimental effect of 
the lack of regional institutional thickness on Humberside, whilst exposing the 
importance of its evolution in relation to Glasgow’s path. Secondly, it reveals that 
although regional path actors in Glasgow attempted to enhance the power of the RIS, 
this was stymied by an unaligned extra-regional institutional environment.    
On Humberside, the lack of regional institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) 
observed in the initial phase of path emergence remained an obstacle to realising the 
development of the region’s assets. This was despite the launch of a regional brand, 
new institutional arrangements (the Humber LEP and the Single Conversation 
Group) and a number of regional strategies, plans and deals prioritising offshore 
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wind69. Strikingly, the contraction in the projected offshore wind market which 
fostered OEM consolidation led to competition amongst regional path actors, 
particularly in regard to influencing the final investment location of Siemens. This 
competition was exemplified by ABP’s objection to Able UK’s plans for AMEP, which 
effectively neutralised the only regional site that could enable large scale industrial 
clustering which the above regional policies and initiatives sought. Such regional 
competition also negated the agglomeration objectives of related UK initiatives, 
namely the CORE initiative and the Enterprise Zone. 
Despite the observed influence of UK Government institutions on regional path 
creation on Humberside, regional institutions had limited leverage on them. It was 
observed that local development organisations perceived themselves to be locked 
out of critical corporate and UK Government decision making, assuming roles of 
lobbyists and supplicants. During this phase of development, local authorities were 
primarily involved in the downstream “nitty-gritty”70 of inward investment, such as 
planning applications, infrastructure provision and skills and supply chain audits. This 
case evidence demonstrates the limited power of regional actors, if unsupported by 
extra-regional power. It is a finding that does not accord with the empowered actors 
found in “new regionalism” literature (Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; Ohmae, 1995; 
Storper, 1995; Amin, 1999; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013).           
In Glasgow, the influence of regional institutional thickness on path creation was 
more evident in this phase, revealing a rapid mutability of institutional thickness that 
is not often referenced in literature. A common institutional purpose and structure of 
association (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) relating to the path and its associated regional 
innovation system was observed in this episode. In 2012, the University of 
Strathclyde and Scottish Enterprise established ITREZ, a £100 million investment 
supported by research agreements with regional firms. The multi-actor initiative 
represented the evolution and physical representation of the RIS, facilitating mindful 
deviation and experimentation by firms through the co-ordinated and shared 
utilisation of regional research, skills and networks. Moreover, it was observed that 
ITREZ aimed to incentivise the creation of alternate technologies and related 
networks and proximities (Bathelt, 2004; Coe et al, 2008; Boschma, 2005) that could 
                                               
69 Hull and Humber City Deal, LEP Strategic Economic Plan, Humber Growth Deal, Humber Spatial Plan 
70 Cited by H-LA1, July 2016 
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challenge the rapidly emerging technological path dependence of the sector 
(Boschma et al, 2017). However, a long-term OEM partner, a stated pre-requisite for 
ITREZ’s success, was not secured due to UK policy and regulation focusing on cost 
cutting, thereby discouraging new supply chain entrants and favouring incumbents. It 
is an observation which validates calls for greater theoretical vigilance of how 
regional development initiatives are circumscribed by broader policies and priorities 
of the state (Dawley et al, 2015; Trippl et al, 2017). 
In many respects, ITREZ exhibited characteristics of the theoretical notion of a niche 
(Geels, 2004). It was an attempt to create instituted protected space which could 
foster alternate technologies through shielding, nurturing and empowering (Smith and 
Raven, 2012). However, ITREZ lacked the power to promote the multi-scalar 
institutional alignment required for the creation and operation of such space, a critical 
pre-requisite identified by Truffer and Coenen (2012). Although, the support of the 
Scottish Government for the initiative is evident, strategic alignment with the nation 
state policy and regulatory environment appeared lacking with limited strategic 
dialogue and touch points being observed. Therefore, although non-territorial and 
extra-regional accounts of instituted innovation systems are often marginalised in 
regional path literature, the empirical evidence foregrounds the necessity and 
opportunity to place regional path theory within broader notions of technological and 
sectoral change and institutional interdependence (Truffer and Coenen, 2012; 
Boschma et al, 2017).   
7.3.4 Summary of comparative observations for path development 
Case comparison in this phase exposes a non-linear, open and fluid process of path 
creation, in which alternate path trajectories, primarily relating to acceleration and 
attenuation, were engendered through differing institutional frameworks and 
economic and political choices. Such mutability is also observed in the shifting 
importance of differing actors and related mechanisms, with pronounced evidence of 
the agency of state and higher education actors in Glasgow’s path development.  
Such interacting institutional forces were triggers and brakes regulating the tempo, 
scale and character of actor deviation and their interplay with assets and 
mechanisms. A more constructive interaction of state, devolved and regional 
institutional forces is exposed in the Glasgow case, triggering more pronounced 
distributed agency as compared with the previous phase. Whereas on Humberside, 
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the unfavourable effect of nation state policy and regulation and regional institutional 
conflict exposed the braking influence that interacting institutional environments can 
exercise on firm-led path creating agency.  
Despite these observations, there remained limited sign of a structured nation state-
region nexus on Humberside or a nation state-devolved-region nexus in Glasgow. 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, there was evidence, especially on Humberside, of regional 
actors being frustrated by their marginalisation and lack of influence. Additionally, 
although institutional entrepreneurship (Boschma et al, 2017) is witnessed in the 
Glasgow case, for example in changes to Scottish marine planning which 
incentivised Glasgow based project developers, there was limited evidence of multi-
scalar institutional coordination or holistic system building in either case (Geels, 
2004). Thus, in the case of Glasgow, the attempt to create protected regional 
innovation space to challenge broader sectoral and technological path dependences 
was circumscribed. Whilst on Humberside, incumbent technological consolidation 
associated with a narrow set of firms led to less opportunities for regional and state 
actors to effect regional path scale and quality premised on firm diversity.  
7.4 Path Realisation Episode  
7.4.1 The interplay of transition with assets, actors and mechanisms 
This section compares the regional industrial paths that were realised in the final 
episode of observed path creation. On Humberside path creation accelerated, whilst 
in Glasgow firm-led activity decelerated. To understand these path dynamics, there 
will be an assessment of how the exogenous stimulus of energy transition continued 
to interact with actors, assets and mechanisms. In turn, this facilitates consideration 
of the role of institutions, extra-regional and regional, in enabling or constraining this 
interplay. Finally, there will be a comparison of the character of the created regional 
industrial paths and their influence on the development of the respective regions, 
prior to a synopsis of the observations across the three episodes of path creation.  
Case comparison reaffirms path creation as a more open and malleable process than 
path literature might imply (Stam and Garnsey, 2009; Martin, 2010), once again 
exposing the potential latitude of differing path agents to effect the path creating 
interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms. For example, the UK Government was a 
direct causal agent of regional path creation, in its roles as deal maker vis-à-vis 
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Siemens’ investment and sponsor and adjudicator of the Catapult investment. In 
addition, the empirical evidence indicates that the selection of path creation 
processes remained contingent on novel knowledge interacting with regional assets. 
However, in Glasgow, firm attenuation was evident and the scale of path branching 
declined (Boschma and Frenken 2009; Neffke et al, 2011). In turn, the economic 
benefits that had seemed imminent in the preceding episode did not materialise. 
Moreover, many of the jobs associated with the path were now publicly funded. In 
contrast, on Humberside, the fusion of new exogenous knowledge and regional 
assets was pronounced. The creation of nearly 1000 jobs and the valorisation of 
neglected port sites on both sides of the Humber represented, albeit on a more 
reduced scale than anticipated, path resurgence based on asset utilisation by inward 
investors. However, it was observed that such transplantation did not arguably 
represent the region’s de-locking from its historic industrial trajectory (Martin and 
Sunley, 2006) characterised by lower skills, wages and authority. The outcome 
indicates a discernible level of qualitative related variety (Neffke et al, 2011) between 
the new path and the industrial base from which it emerged; one dependent on the 
exploitation of natural resources and lower value intermediary functions. Strikingly, 
this observation can also be applied to Glasgow, given that the path was becoming 
characterised by public sector employment and investment and notable but auxiliary 
knowledge-based functions.  
In Glasgow, the importance of previously key regional actors acting as creators and 
conduits of novel knowledge, especially Scottish Power and SSE, faded as the 
number of offshore wind projects being managed from Glasgow contracted. In 
addition, supply chain firms withdrew from the region. However, rapidly decelerating 
firm diversification was partially but conspicuously substituted by the UK Government 
establishing its offshore wind Technology and Innovation Centre, Offshore 
Renewable Energy Catapult, in Glasgow and recruiting c. 100 skilled staff. Notably, 
such nation state led “transplantation” does not sit neatly with orthodox 
conceptualisations of path creating mechanisms and firm-led inward investment 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma and Frenken, 2009). Moreover, it identifies a 
mutability in the changing importance of differing scalar actors over time, both firm 
and non-firm, and justifies calls for disaggregating path dynamics over time and 
space (Pike et al, 2016b).    
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Conversely on Humberside, the process of path realisation was primarily led by 
extra-regional firms. However, where before project developers had been the primary 
agents of transplantation, the role of Siemens became pronounced. Although 
developers further invested in Grimsby, it was Siemens’ £160 million investment in 
Alexandra Dock that represented the most significant example of asset valorisation in 
this episode. Moreover, the investment was augmented by ABP’s diversification from 
its carbon based regional business model, as demonstrated by an additional £150m 
investment for site reconfiguration. Finally, and significantly, it was observed that the 
UK state played the central role in securing Siemens’ investment, with regional actors 
cast as by-standers.  
In short, comparison across the two cases in this final episode again exposes the 
malleability of actor agency across relatively short periods of time. The direct role of 
the nation state is clearly illuminated in both securing and sponsoring transplantation 
in both regions. Although Peck and Theodore (2007) usefully posit the notion of the 
elasticity of agency, it would appear that this notion can also be applied to the relative 
value of regional assets and the relational and conditional nature of mechanisms 
which valorise them. In short, the entire path creation phenomenon has such elastic 
properties. Therefore, it is appropriate to once again turn to the case evidence to 
understand how institutions pull, twist and mould this process. 
7.4.2 Extra-regional institutional environment in mediating path realisation 
In this episode, the comparative approach exposes the temporality of the effects of 
changes to the nation state institutional environment in differing regional contexts. In 
Glasgow such changes had a near immediate impact on firm-led path creation, whilst 
on Humberside it reveals a time lag in the accrual of economic and industrial benefits. 
Moreover, comparison also exposes the sub-ordinate, conditional causal power of 
devolved and regional institutions as compared with the nation state.         
Firstly, in this third and final phase of path creation, the noted decrease in firm-led path 
creation in Glasgow can be attributed to the UK state’s emphasis on cost reduction. As 
observed, the introduction in 2014 of a more restricted, competitive subsidy framework 
had a near immediate negative effect on planned projects in Scottish waters. Within 
months of the related UK legislation being enacted, Scottish Power dropped its only 
Scottish project that was in planning (one of the largest in Iberdrola’s international 
project portfolio) and SSE abandoned plans for its only Scottish west coast project. 
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Moreover, the state’s cost cutting imperative further incentivised developer activity in 
shallow, close to shore sites prevalent in English waters. Consequently, the case 
revealed that Iberdrola in response to diminution of expected reward in Scottish waters 
and corollary increase relating to English waters developed its offshore wind team in 
London and, in turn, the relative power and scale of the Glasgow office decreased. 
Likewise, SSE reduced its staff expansion plans in line with its needs for delivering 
only one Scottish project. Therefore, Glasgow’s focus on the earlier stages of the 
industry’s life cycle ensured that repercussions were quickly felt in the regional path. 
In turn, given the rapidly decreasing Scottish market and projected UK market 
contraction from 30GW to 10GW, supply chain firms withdrew from Glasgow. 
Significantly, the one notable new actor in this period, Offshore Renewable Energy 
Catapult (OREC), a competitively won state investment had a notable impact on the 
valorisation of regional skills, if not regional research. Therefore, this phase exposes 
that the nation state can have a rapid and direct bearing on asset valorisation, further 
refining firm-led and gradualist conceptualisations of path evolution (Martin, 2010).   
Alternately on Humberside, the internal temporal logic of the industry led to an 
observable acceleration in path creation. Despite adverse state institutional changes 
that were constraining future prospects, Humberside was demonstrably benefitting 
from the earlier policy and regulatory environment and the related offshore wind 
projects that were now entering their period of construction and operation, once 
again illuminating a paucity of research linked to industry life cycles, institutions and 
path creation in literature. This increasing level of deployment encouraged further 
reconfiguration of Grimsby’s docks and utilisation of its labour force through the 
transplantation of greater novel knowledge. Significantly, this cyclic upturn in 
deployment provided Siemens’ with sufficient incentive to progress its investment in 
Hull. Moreover, the decision was aided by the Energy Act of 2013 linking the award 
of subsidy to levels of UK sourcing in (incentivising developers to purchase the 
blades that were to be made in Hull). Even so, it was observed that the anticipated 
size of the UK offshore wind market was insufficient to encourage Siemens’ 
transplantation of higher value technologies and manufacturing processes from 
Germany or Denmark. Such market dynamics and the associated costs of 
reconfiguring the Paull and AMEP sites also discouraged co-location of supply chain 
inward investors, such as tower manufacturers. These deterrents to agglomeration 
were pointedly exposed by a South Korean investor purchasing an existing tower 
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manufacturer on the opposite coast from the main UK market rather than incur 
significant infrastructure costs on Humberside.  
Secondly, the seeming inability of devolved and regional institutions to influence nation 
state power was notable. Despite continuing evidence of institutional entrepreneurship 
by the Scottish Government, exemplified by the use of enhanced subsidy to create a 
national innovation system for offshore floating wind projects (analogous to a national 
niche), UK institutional power had primacy over firm deviation. Moreover, the 
withdrawal by the UK Government of the devolved power to adjust subsidy illuminated 
a lack of institutional collaboration between scales of government, if not distrust. It was 
an act that pointedly illustrates the reserved sovereignty of the UK state and the 
conditional nature of sub-state economic development agency. This institutional 
disjuncture was also evidenced by misalignment between the University of 
Strathclyde’s technology and innovation centre (funded by the Scottish Government 
as part of ITREZ) and OREC (funded by the UK Government). Finally, the direct 
intervention of the Prime Minister in the Siemens’ negotiations not only revealed the 
pre-eminent power of the UK state compared with regional actors but also an absence 
of co-ordinated, stable and transparent state policies on which firms could depend 
(Barca et al, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015). The absence of regional input to these 
discussions and the undisclosed nature of the deal struck by the UK Government 
starkly illustrates a disinclination to systems building in the UK state (Geels, 2004; 
Boschma et al, 2017). This disposition is perhaps in part caused by the inadequate 
theoretical attention given to such issues in literature; albeit with notable exceptions 
(Dawley et al, 2015).      
7.4.3 Regional institutional environment in mediating path realisation 
Once again, comparative analysis of respective case evidence reveals that regional 
institutions played a more constrained role in this process than literature might imply 
(Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1995; Amin, 1999; Rodriguez-
Pose, 2013). In the case of Humberside, regional institutions had an auxiliary role in 
determining the magnitude of fusion between exogenous novel knowledge and the 
region, albeit remaining critical in priming regional assets for valorisation by firms. In 
Glasgow, the role of regional institutions in enabling path creation was less 
discernible in this episode of path realisation.       
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Firstly, it was observed that institutions on Humberside played a noteworthy if 
supporting role, for example local government actors and the LEP assisted 
transplantation and asset valorisation through the use of planning powers, 
investment in port infrastructure and skills and employability programmes. A good 
example of such activity is the use of local planning powers and regional growth 
funds to relocate food processing firms from Grimsby port to permit additional inward 
investment. However, it was a telling reflection of the respective power of regional 
institutions that local actors were effectively excluded from the final Siemens’ 
negotiations with the UK Government. Therefore, Hull City Council and the Humber 
LEP could be viewed as public sector project delivery agents rather than strategic 
partners.  
Finally, in this episode of the Humber’s path realisation, plans for an Open Access 
Innovation Centre were progressed by the LEP and Hull University. However, the 
developed research networks of Siemens and the limited absorption capacity of the 
local business base, meant its agenda was to be shaped by incumbent extra-regional 
actors, reflecting the asymmetric relationships synonymous with an organisationally 
thin RIS in a peripheral region (Trippl, et al, 2017). The new regional path’s evolution 
in relation to manufacturing, installation and O&M, was wholly conditioned by the 
wider sectoral and technological path dependence in which it was set (Boschma et 
al, 2017). This case evidence posits questions about the cogency and emphasis 
placed on Smart Specialisation and other endogenous models of development for 
lagging regions in the literature (Porter, 1990; Morgan et al, 1999; Maskell, 2001; 
Hausman and Roderik 2003; Morgan, 2003, 2013b; Foray et al, 2011).  
In Glasgow, the regional institutional landscape was changed with the arrival of ORE 
Catapult, a nation state investment that further valorised regional skills. However, 
although the organisation added to the region’s diversity of institutional 
arrangements, it did not add to the region’s institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 
1994). By having a mission largely focused on the UK state’s cost cutting agenda 
with limited regional reference, the organisation did not contribute to regional 
common purpose. Rather ORE Catapult’s sectoral relationships concur with 
Boschma’s (2005) notion that knowledge proximities need not be geographic and 
Bathelt et al’s (2004) notion of pipelines linking regional actors with external 
networks, thereby testing the primacy of territorial innovation models (Moulaert and 
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Sekia, 2003) . Therefore, the new actor did not contribute to the existing RIS on the 
scale anticipated nor did it encourage the development of a RIS with niche like 
characteristics; one which could challenge extra-regional technological path 
dependence (Geels, 2004; Truffer and Coenen, 2012).  
Moreover, given the contraction of confidence and deviation in Glasgow firms, their 
funding of ITREZ stopped. In turn, ITREZ and the University of Strathclyde refocused 
commercial relationships on other low-carbon sectors. Thus, in this final phase of 
path realisation, Glasgow’s institutional environment, including its established RIS, 
played a suppressed role in engendering the path creating interplay of actors, assets 
and mechanisms. Thus, validating Trippl et al’s (2017) contention that a proactive 
and resourced regional innovation policy will only succeed in fostering industrial 
renewal if it is supported by wider exogenous institutional forces.  
7.4.4 Summary of path realisation and effect on regional development 
Case comparison in this final episode further reveals calibration between UK 
Government institutions and the scale and nature of path creation. Additionally, it was 
reaffirmed that the effect of such nation state “rules” (MacLeod, 1997; Peck, 1999; 
Gertler, 2010) can have differing gestation periods. In Glasgow, its rapid bearing on 
the dis-incentivisation of firm-led agency was observed, whereas on Humberside 
path creating firm agency was seen to increase when the UK institutional 
environment was disadvantageous due to the time lag in the industry’s project life 
cycle. Strikingly, in this last phase, the primacy of nation state power compared with 
devolved and regional power in regard to path creation was exposed, vividly 
illustrated by the UK Government withdrawing subsidy powers from the Scottish 
Government and in its conduct of final negotiations with Siemens.    
Furthermore, the causal power of the respective regional innovation systems were 
shaped and circumscribed by wider sector and technological path dependences. In 
terms of Glasgow, the case evidence indicates that although ORE Catapult 
represented a significant nation state investment, it had limited effect on enabling 
regional research, augmenting regional institutions apropos industrial path creation or 
the formation of sheltered innovation space. On Humberside, the proposed Open 
Access Innovation Centre, given an absence of regional research and absorption 
capacity, was framed by the technological requirements of incumbent actors, 
primarily Siemens.  
194 
 
Given the observed influence of interacting multi-scalar institutions on path creation, 
the evident deficit of institutional systems building (Geels, 2004; Boschma et al, 
2017), institutional complementarity (Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016) or a nexus 
between scales of government (Martin, 2000) remains striking. If anything, the 
backdrop of Scottish independence made complementarity, let alone strategic 
alignment, between UK and devolved institutions all the more problematic in this 
episode.  
In comparing the regional industrial paths that were realised, a number of 
dissimilarities and similarities are conspicuous. Both paths were different in terms of 
their place in the wider sector’s division of labour, their respective size and the 
significance of private and public actors in their operation. Even so, a resemblance 
was witnessed regarding the relative inability of regional actors to mediate the 
regional industrial paths’ evolution and engender alternate outcomes. It is in further 
exploring this variance and similarity that this summary of path realisation concludes.      
In the Glasgow case, approximately 350 high skill, direct jobs were attributable to the 
regional industrial path, the largest concentration of such offshore wind jobs in the 
UK outside London. The path that emerged represented a distinctive concentration of 
specialised capability relating to project development and research in the sector’s 
national and international division of labour. Moreover, this was embedded in a 
regional network of actors with mature, diverse outward facing relations and 
proximities. Strikingly, nearly half of path employment was public sector funded. In 
turn, there was a noted sense of fragility about the path’s future, especially in relation 
to private sector investment and employment and its status in the wider sector’s 
division of labour. 
By contrast over 1000 private sector direct jobs were associated with Humberside’s 
path. The regional path which emerged was recognised as significant in terms of 
manufacturing and deployment in the sector’s national and international division of 
labour. The south bank was synonymous with the transplanted routine functions of 
O&M linked to the exploitation of adjacent resources and the north bank with the 
transplanted routine functions of blade manufacturing. Therefore, the path had 
characteristics associated with both an extractive economy and a branch plant 
economy. Consequently, higher level skills, functions and authority were predisposed 
to occur outside the region.  
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Despite such apparent divergence, by 2016 the development choices of regional 
path actors in both cases were decidedly circumscribed by the wider sector’s market 
and technological evolution, the scale and nature of which were largely shaped by 
nation state institutional forces. Although this had been a constant characteristic of 
Humberside’s path creation, this had been formerly less overt in the Glasgow case. 
However, the formative power of path actors, such as Scottish Power and SSE, 
waned over time. This was exemplified by the growing importance of Iberdrola’s 
London office for offshore wind at the expense of its Glasgow office. 
Therefore, although both regions were more than just passive receptacles where 
economic activity was played out (Scott, 1998; Pike et al, 2007; Hudson, 2007), 
regional institutions possessed only partial power to influence the open and fluid 
processes of path creation to realise sought after path outcomes. In particular, an 
inability to shape often uncoordinated nation state rules for regional benefit was 
evident. This relative institutional weakness denied both regions the means to 
optimise opportunities to create the volume of private sector, knowledge intensive 
jobs and firms that both the Glasgow Economic Forum and the Hull IBM/IECD reports 
called for in 2006. Nor was either region able to achieve their ambitions; that of being 
a “super cluster” in the case of Humberside and a “global hub” in the case of 
Glasgow.   
To illustrate these missed opportunities, the graphs below (fig 7.1 and 7.2) compare 
realised employment outcomes for each region with potential employment outcomes 
that may have been achieved had multi-scalar state institutional complementarity 
been more pronounced. Such complementarity would have promoted a greater level 
and diversity of firms and investments, thereby enhancing the fusion of novel 
knowledge with the respective case regions. Drawing on research interviews, board 
and policy papers, marketing materials and press releases, job creation data relating 
to potential projects in each region has been aggregated. For example, it was 
predicted that SSE’s proposed centre for offshore wind engineering in Glasgow 
would create circa 300 jobs and GE’s anticipated Humberside investment would 
create circa 1000 jobs; when in fact neither project was realised. While such 
counterfactuals are the stuff of debate, they illuminate possible alternate trajectories 
that could have been realised had the open and malleable nature of path creation 
been differently influenced by state actors co-ordinating between and across levels.       
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Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 7.1: Alternate path creation scenarios – Glasgow 
 
Figure 7.2: Alternate path creation scenarios – Humberside 
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Finally, limited consideration by state actors of the interplay between extra-regional 
sectoral and technological dynamics and regional change and continuity is telling. By 
neglecting this symbiotic interaction, the deep-rooted nature of regional path 
dependence in both regions went unaddressed. Hence, in Glasgow, as in the past, a 
new industrial trajectory predicated on the region’s exceptional skills, research base 
and networked organisations was only partially realised in terms of scale and 
function; one that if fully realised could have challenged the region’s industrial 
decline, related public sector over-dependence and the established international 
centres of the industry. Likewise on Humberside, the sought after increase in higher 
value industrial activity and skilled employment based on the estuary’s pan-regional 
assets was only partly attained. In short, as in the past, incoherent institutional 
frameworks constrained industrial path creation in both regions and maintained their 
path dependent economic structures and performance. Strikingly, the paths that 
emerged exhibited a pronounced degree of related variety in terms of their quality 
and function vis-à-vis the industrial base they had emerged from (Neffke et al, 2011). 
7.5 Comparative Analysis Synopsis 
In taking an overview of the three episodes of path creation, it can be observed that 
the scale of interaction between the stimulus of energy transition and the respective 
regions determined the scale of path creation i.e. the level of regional industrial 
change and continuity. Moreover, the scale of this fusion was determined by the 
magnitude of causal interplay between actors, assets and mechanisms. 
Critically, it was observed that in both cases the timing, intensity and nature of this 
agentic interplay (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) was mediated by the degree of multi-
scalar and intra-scalar state institutional complementarity. Moreover, the preeminent 
causal power of nation state institutions as compared with devolved and regional 
institutions was revealed. The former fostered broader sectoral and technological 
evolution, which had direct bearing on regional path creation, whereas the latter 
assumed a more auxiliary role, such as priming regional assets in order to optimise 
the economic benefits associated with offshore wind.        
These interacting extra-regional and regional institutional environments regulated the 
shifting quantum and variety of firms (and technologies) at the regional level. In turn, 
the resulting level of distributed agency determined the scale and nature of asset 
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valorisation via the operationalisation of multiple relational mechanisms, which were 
informed by regional industrial antecedence. The malleable nature of path creating 
agency meant it was highly receptive, often over short periods of time, to changes in 
the institutional environment. Therefore, the relative path creating power and 
actuation of differing path actors could alter quite rapidly according to institutional 
incentivisation and disincentivisation, creating a more open, uncertain, and 
punctuated process of path creation. This complex yet institutionally structured 
interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms indicates that a range of rapidly unfolding 
path episodes are possible, beyond those observed in this empirical study, including 
path stasis, reversal and collapse.  
Despite the obvious power of these interacting institutional environments to enable or 
constrain path creating agency, there was no evident state co-ordination across 
scales, leading to inferior outcomes in terms of path size and quality. Thus mitigating 
the positive effect of the new paths on their respective regions’ economic 
development and historic trajectories (see figures 7.1 and 7.2).       
In terms of resulting path evolution, this led to three observed episodes of path 
creation in both cases over a decade, representing, unique dynamic aggregations of 
actors, assets and mechanisms in time and space, as summarised in figure 7.3.  
 
     Figure 7.3: Episodes of path creation over time  
In Glasgow’s episode of path emergence, complementarity between UK and 
devolved institutions enabled actor diversification to fuse regional assets with new 
Source: Own elaboration 
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exogenous knowledge leading to the emergence of a path employing c. 150 highly 
skilled persons. On Humberside similar UK institutional dynamics were shaping the 
path’s emergence, albeit with an observed time lag, to create via transplantation a 
path with c. 100 low to medium skilled O&M jobs. However, the institutionally derived 
oligopolistic nature of the UK’s power generation industry meant that path creation in 
both regions was driven by a narrow set of firms, thereby limiting actor and 
technological diversity to further valorise regional assets and counter emergent 
sectoral and technological path dependence.   
In Glasgow’s episode of path development, pronounced complementarity across 
institutional scales incentivised experimentation and strategization by a diverse range 
of firm and non-firm actors, thereby challenging sectoral and technological path 
dependence, and resulting in the path doubling in size. On Humberside, where the 
phase of path development commenced two years after Glasgow, regional 
institutional competition and a more uncertain nation state institutional environment, 
leading to consolidation of supply chain actors, engendered a path that created c. 
200 low to medium skill jobs largely dependent on the ongoing transplantation of 
standardised O&M technologies. 
Finally, in Glasgow’s episode of path realisation, misalignment between UK and 
Scottish institutional levels and pronounced sectoral and technological path 
dependence markedly reduced firm-led distributed agency and its interplay with 
regional assets, reflected in attenuation of firm diversification and transplantation. 
However, this disincentivisation of firm experimentation and the adverse economic 
implications were somewhat masked by the location of a major UK state anchor 
investment, ORE Catapult, revealing the significance of direct state agency and 
mechanisms. On Humberside, despite limited co-ordination between UK and regional 
institutions and pronounced sectoral and technological path dependence, there 
remained sufficient incentivisation for Siemens to progress investment in Hull and 
project developers to further invest in Grimsby, thereby creating c. 1000 largely 
low/medium skilled jobs. However, a constraining institutional environment ensured 
that there were limited opportunities for the co-location of diverse supply chain firms 
and technologies to augment the path.      
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis contributes to evolutionary economic geography theory by providing 
further insight in to the process of regional industrial path creation. In particular, it 
brings greater specificity to what represents an enabling or constraining institutional 
environment for this process. My findings were informed by multi-scalar, multi-actor 
analysis in order that the “deep-seated [and] wider relations, positions and contexts 
of actors in inter-related structures unfolding over space and time” (Pike et al, 2016b, 
p 132) were more comprehensively explored and explained. In turn, this approach 
provides further understanding of the interplay of exogenous and endogenous forces 
on regional path creation.  
By fusing this research with my practical experience of economic development, I 
sought to build a bridge between the worlds of theory and policy and practice, 
specifically in understanding how new regional industrial paths are created, 
especially in relation to socio-technical transition. The timing seemed apposite given 
an increasing focus in this regard in both theory and policy. Moreover, I wanted to 
ensure that this research focused directly on geographically uneven development 
and the scope for the state to effect quantitative and qualitative regional industrial 
renewal (Martin and Sunley, 2013). To this end, the research was informed by three 
questions. 
 What are the key forms of agency that shape regional path creation? 
 How do multi-scalar institutional environments enable or constrain this 
process? 
 What is the scale and character of the resulting path and its effect on regional 
development? 
Building on theory, the analytical framework facilitated exploration of the effect of 
socio-technical transition, in this instance relating to offshore wind, on the path 
creating interaction of actors, mechanisms and assets in two lagging regions. 
Critically, given the observed missing link regarding the role of institutions in 
mediating this interaction (Dawley et al, 2015), the framework promoted investigation 
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of the role of regional and extra-regional institutional environments in enabling or 
constraining path creating agency and path outcomes.   
In this concluding chapter, the empirical findings will be firstly framed in the context of 
the research questions and, in turn, the main theoretical contributions presented. To 
link this world of thought to the world of action, key implications of the research for 
economic development policy and practice will be subsequently presented. Finally, 
an agenda for future research will be offered. 
8.2 Empirical Findings Relating to Research Questions 
This section will address each of the three research questions in light of the empirical 
findings of the Glasgow and Humberside cases and synthesise these findings into a 
conceptual framework. 
What are the key forms of agency that shape regional path creation? 
A number of differing forms of actor agency across time and geography were evident 
in relation to the process of regional path creation in Glasgow and on Humberside. 
Prior to identifying these varied forms, two overarching empirical findings regarding 
agency merit illumination. Firstly, path creating agency is a malleable phenomenon. 
During the respective cases of path creation, the diversity, quantity and relative 
importance of actors altered. This malleability, echoing Peck and Theodore’s (2007) 
notion of agentic elasticity, contributed to the observed episodic evolutionary process 
of path emergence, development and realisation over a decade; with each of the 
three episodes representing unique dynamic aggregations of actors, assets and 
mechanisms in time and space. Secondly, actor agency is primarily framed, if not 
bounded, by the dynamics of broader sectoral and technological path dependences, 
validating recent research on the interplay of agency and regional and extra-regional 
path dependences (Boschma et al, 2017), In short, regional path creating agency can 
be a contingent, relatively reflexive response to wider sectoral and technological 
dynamics (Martin and Sunley, 2006). 
As regards differing forms of agency, the centrality of firm agency is readily 
evidenced. The research confirmed that firms represented primary conduits of novel 
knowledge relating to energy transition on which the reconfiguration and valorisation 
of regional assets were largely contingent. Moreover, the central mechanisms of path 
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creation, diversification and transplantation, were primarily firm led. In both cases, the 
relative importance of these mechanisms denoted the relative importance of firm 
types. In Glasgow, where the path creation process was largely driven by 
diversification, firms with historical associations to the region were the initial primary 
agents of change. On Humberside, given the absence of industrial antecedence, 
private sector inward investors were critical to the path’s inception and subsequent 
evolution. However, in Glasgow, extra-regional firms, such as Iberdrola, became 
increasingly important for providing the regional path with access to extra-regional 
finance, markets, knowledge and technology, reflecting the contention that regional 
path creation represents an alignment process of regional and extra-regional 
heterogeneous factors (Binz et al, 2015). Whilst on Humberside, the diversification of 
regional firms was important for promoting and reconfiguring regional sites and 
infrastructure for utilisation by inward investors. Therefore, firm agency is central to 
path creation and its nature is multi-scalar, relational and malleable over time.         
Path creation was also dependent on the operation of non-firm actors, especially the 
state, validating a growing cognisance of state actors in path literature (Dawley et al, 
2015; MacKinnon et al, 2018). Although the agency of state actors could be identified 
across all three episodes, there was a variance and malleability in their relative 
causal power. At the level of the nation state, the Crown Estate and DECC were vital 
for creating the market on which both paths were predicated by developing an 
incentivised national spatial framework for resource exploitation. Also, as both paths 
evolved, the direct intervention of the nation state at the regional level became 
pronounced via the facilitation of anchor flag-ship investments: Siemens on 
Humberside and ORE Catapult in Glasgow. Moreover, the latter investment 
demonstrates the potential for central government to act as a primary agent of 
regional asset valorisation. In Scotland, agents of devolved government, namely 
Scottish Enterprise and Scottish Development International, facilitated firm 
transplantation and invested in research infrastructure relating to the Glasgow path. 
However, the efficacy of such agency became less obvious when unaligned with UK 
state policy and agency. On Humberside, the agency of local authorities became 
more prominent after the abolition of the RDA. However, although their agency 
promoted and facilitated firm-led valorisation of assets, such agency was driven by a 
desire to optimise economic benefit at the local level rather than the regional, despite 
the LEP’s attempts to arbitrate such vested interests. Therefore, it can be inferred 
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that the agency of local state actors may lead to sub-optimal path outcomes at the 
regional level in the absence of powerful means of co-ordination.    
Strikingly, although the agency of higher education and research organisations is 
commonly cited as a key source of industrial renewal (Hausman and Roderik 2003; 
Foray et al, 2011; Goddard et al, 2012, 2013b; Morgan, 2013a), the role of such 
agency on Humberside was negligible and in Glasgow it was equivocal. The 
research indicates that the path creating agency of a major research university or a 
national technology centre, even if seemingly aligned with the path’s technological 
realm, can be relatively muted; their agency being framed and circumscribed by 
broader sectoral and technological dynamics and non-spatial proximities (Boschma, 
2005; Truffer and Coenen, 2012; Boschma et al, 2017).          
A final form of agency that is worthy of note relates to actors who adapt and 
transform institutions to enable path creation or work across domains to facilitate 
techno-industrial change which catalyse regional path creation. The role of such 
actors has enjoyed a degree of renewed attention in recent literature refreshing 
previous accounts of institutional entrepreneurs and system builders (DiMaggio, 
1988; Geels, 2004; Boschma et al, 2017). The findings indicate that institutional 
entrepreneurs played a vital role in creating the UK offshore wind market and 
adapting the market at the Scottish level. In regard to system builders, despite the 
seeming need to connect and co-ordinate domains of economics, technology, 
research and politics to promote complementary sectoral and regional path 
development, there was limited evidence of their agency. Lastly, the literature’s 
tendency to perceive such forms of agency as primarily firm-led appears partial. 
The final point in regard to agency relates to its fluid associational nature. For 
instance, during the path creation process individual agents were significant at key 
moments e.g. in terms of promoting Grimsby’s port assets or Glasgow’s research 
strengths. Moreover, the initiation of path creation in both regions was dependent on 
a small number of actors, thereby indicating that bricolage is not essential for path 
creation (Garud and Karnoe, 2003). However, as the path creation process evolved 
distributed agency of firm and non-firm actors became more evident at the regional 
level. Nevertheless, a trend toward oligopoly at the UK and European levels reduced 
the number of potential firms in the value chain, thereby reducing the variety of firm 
agency at the regional level.  
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Notably, collective agency at the regional level manifested itself in three discernible 
ways: priming; portraying; and promoting. The distributed agency of regional actors 
played a critical role in priming regional assets, for instance in regard to preparing 
sites on Humberside for inward investors and developing regional research capacity 
to test and validate exogenous technologies in Glasgow. Such collective agency also 
portrayed path actualisation, creating a path profile, narrative and awareness within 
and beyond the respective regions. In Glasgow, such path representation was 
deferred due to regional actors being initially predisposed to frame regional offshore 
wind activity in the context of the broader sector. On Humberside, regional actors, 
such as Team Humber Marine Alliance and the LEP, successfully branded the 
emergent offshore wind path as an estuary wide opportunity despite local rivalries. 
Finally, regional actors promoted the path’s quantitative and qualitative evolution in 
relation to the wider sector’s division of labour. For example, in Glasgow this was 
done via the establishment and funding of ITREZ by both public and private actors 
and on Humberside this was progressed via the creation of a forum of key regulatory 
actors.    
To summarise, key forms of path creating agency can be fluid and relational across 
time and spatial scales. Although firms are critical primary agents of change, non-firm 
actors play a crucial role, especially the state in creating the market and harnessing 
related regional economic opportunity. It is to understanding how institutional 
environments enable or constrain the path creating process that we turn. 
How do multi-scalar institutional environments enable or constrain this process? 
Although the empirical findings demonstrate that both exogenous and endogenous 
institutional environments are important for enabling and constraining path creating 
agency, a causal hierarchy was identified. Extra-regional institutions shaped the scale 
and nature of transition, influencing the speed, scale and nature of broader sectoral 
and technological path creation, whereas regional institutions played a vital but narrow 
and bounded role in realising the resulting development opportunities at the regional 
level.   
Nation state institutions were observed to play a formative role in triggering market 
and technological disruption through incentivising the agency of a narrow set of firms, 
akin to an oligopoly. Moreover, such institutions determined the underlying sector’s 
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temporal logic and related market and industrial value chain dynamics (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). In turn, these broader market and industrial value chain dynamics 
primarily informed the phasing, scale and character of both regional industrial paths. 
Like Prometheus bringing fire from the heavens, firms were the primary conduits of 
novel knowledge fostered by disruptive energy transition. However, the ignition and 
intensity of the flame was regulated by nation state institutions. Moreover, given that 
such institutions promoted the activation of a limited number of developers and 
OEMs, thereby increasing sectoral and technological path dependence (Boschma, 
2017), the requisite level of firm and technological diversity to promote clustering in 
both regions was not generated.  
Strikingly, although nation state institutions underpinned spatial management and 
exploitation of the natural resource, through an integrated leasing, consenting and 
subsidy framework, there was limited evidence of co-ordinated nation state horizontal 
(energy), vertical (industrial) and spatial policies required to optimise industrial 
development in either region. It is a finding that accords with recent literature which 
notes an absence of effective UK policy co-ordination for regional development 
(Barca et al, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015; Martin et al 2015). Limited multi-scalar 
co-ordination also diminished the causal power of devolved government. It was 
observed that Scottish Government policies and regulation could augment the speed, 
scale and nature of market development and Glasgow’s path emergence; validating 
the theoretical contention that complementary multi-scalar government architectures 
aid industrial development (Gertler, 2010; Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016). However, 
the relative effectiveness of these devolved institutions was delimited by their degree 
of alignment with the broader UK institutional environment in which they were nested.  
In terms of the regional institutional environment, the regulatory and planning powers 
of local government was vital on Humberside; the case region in which the 
reconfiguration of legacy infrastructure and development sites was imperative to the 
path. In Glasgow, such powers were less crucial, given the path’s knowledge 
intensive nature. In both regions, institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994b) was 
of equivocal importance to path creation. In Glasgow, despite an evident density of 
local private and public institutions, limited powers of association and common 
purpose inclined regional institutions to be more focused on broader commercial and 
industrial goals than regional path emergence. However, the mutability of regional 
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institutional thickness in terms of its form and focus was demonstrated by its growing 
importance during Glasgow’s episode of path development. On Humberside, regional 
institutional thickness was undermined by local rivalries and vested interests which 
arguably promoted sub-optimal regional-level path outcomes. Even so, structures of 
association were sufficiently strong to promote common regional branding and 
proposition, and co-ordinated regulatory planning for the estuary’s development.             
As regards Glasgow’s organisationally thick and specialised regional innovation 
system, its significance was shaped and circumscribed by the broader sector’s 
development, which was informed by UK policies and regulation (Dawley et al, 2015; 
Trippl et al, 2017). Therefore, the scope for regional policy makers to create shielded, 
nurturing and empowered regional innovation space was conditioned and delimited 
by extra-regional institutions (Smith and Raven, 2012; Tuffer and Coenen, 2012). 
The finding is striking given Glasgow’s noteworthy networked innovation capacity 
(Morgan, 2003) and the presence of an internationally renowned university related to 
the path’s technology (Goddard et al, 2012, 2013b). 
Therefore, to précis, extra-regional institutions mediated the timing, scale and nature 
of socio-technical transition, whilst regional institutions (and particularly local ones on 
Humberside) facilitated the fusion of the related industrial opportunity with the 
respective regions. Crucially, the power of the latter was notably framed and 
bounded by the former. Therefore, regional capability to determine path evolution 
was markedly constrained by multi-scalar institutional dynamics in both regions. 
Moreover, in terms of causal orders of importance vis-à-vis regional capability and 
related path creation, the extra-regional was more significant than the regional.  
Building on Peck and Theodore’s (2007) notion of the elasticity of agency, it can also 
be stated that multi-scalar institutional environments represent interacting triggers 
and brakes which regulate the elasticity of actor agency in terms of timing, scale and 
nature, thereby mediating their interplay with assets and mechanisms and eventual 
path outcomes. The observed agentic power (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) of these 
differing institutional environments composed of interacting triggers and brakes is 
detailed in table 8.1.  
Tellingly, despite the significant causal power of these interacting environments, 
there was a near absence of evidence relating to the operation of a systemic nation 
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state / regional nexus or a systemic nation state / devolved / regional nexus to 
coordinate across scales (Martin, 2000). In addition, there was limited indication of 
the agency of state system builders working across and between policy domains 
(Geels, 2004; Boschma et al, 2017). Finally, as previously noted, there was evidence 
of state institutional entrepreneurs (Di Maggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009) but it was 
limited and spasmodic. Institutional complementarity, when it occurred, was relatively 
uncoordinated (Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016). These circumstances led to a sub-
optimal state-led economic development process between and across scales.  
Scale 
  
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
ENERGY INDUSTRY SPATIAL 
Triggers of 
Actor 
Agency 
Brakes on 
Actor 
Agency 
 
Triggers of 
Actor Agency 
 
 
 
Brakes on 
Actor Agency 
 
 
Triggers of 
Actor 
Agency 
 
Brakes on 
Actor Agency 
UK 
(Nation 
State) 
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation:  
 
OW Market  
 
 
ROCs subsidy 
2002 
 
Energy White 
Paper 2003 
 
Energy Review 
2006 
 
Climate 
Change Act 
2008 
 
ROCs subsidy 
enhancement 
2009  
 
Low Carbon 
Plan 2009 
 
UK Renewable 
Roadmap 2011 
Institutions 
negatively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market 
 
 
Cost Reduction 
Task Force  
2011 
 
Offshore Wind 
Programme 
Board 2012 
 
Energy Act 
2013 
  
CfD subsidy 
2014 
 
DECC “reset 
position” 2015 
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation:  
 
Value Chain   
 
 
Building Britain’s 
future – New 
Industry, New 
Jobs’ 2009 
 
OREC 
announced 2012 
 
Offshore Wind 
Ind. Strategy  
and Council 
2013 
 
UK Content Plan 
2014 
Institutions 
negatively  
regulating 
expectation:  
 
Value Chain 
 
 
Developers 
Forum 2010 
 
Cost Reduction 
Task Force  
2012 
 
CfD subsidy 
2014 
 
DECC “reset 
position” 2015 
 
 
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market 
 
 
Crown Estate 
UK Leasing 
Rounds 2001, 
2003 and 2009 
  
 
Value Chain 
 
RDAs <2010  
 
Enterprise 
Zones 2011 
 
Centres for 
Offshore 
Renewable 
Engineering 
2012  
Institutions 
negatively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market 
 
 
Wind farm 
planning delays 
2010 onwards 
 
 
Value Chain 
 
Abolition of 
RDAs 2012 
 
Planning 
challenges 
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Scotland 
(Devolved) 
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market 
 
ROCs 
(Scotland) 
2002  
 
Climate 
Change Act 
2009 
 
Route Map 
2009 
 
 
 
 
Institutions 
negatively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market  
 
ROCs Scotland 
closure 2015 
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
Value Chain  
 
Economic 
Strategy 2007 
 
Offshore Wind 
Industry Group 
2009 
 
Offshore Wind 
Route Map 
 
National 
Renewables 
Infrastructure 
Plan 2010 
  Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market 
 
Crown Estate 
Scottish 
Leasing Round 
2009 
 
Marine 
Scotland 2011 
Institutions 
negatively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
OW Market 
 
Wind farm 
planning delays 
2010 onwards 
Glasgow 
& Humber 
(Regional) 
  
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
Value Chain 
 
Scottish Govt. 
OW Team 
established in 
Glasgow 2009 
 
OREC 
established in 
Glasgow 2013 
 
Institutions 
positively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
Value Chain 
 
Planning 
approvals for 
Alexandra 
Dock and 
Grimsby Docks 
2006> 
Green Port 
Regional 
Growth Fund 
(Hull) 2012 
 
SE part fund 
ITREZ / TIC in 
Glasgow 2012 
 
UK grant for 
site prep. at 
AMEP 2014 
 
Open Access 
Innovation 
Centre on 
Humberside 
launched 2015 
Institutions 
negatively  
regulating 
expectation: 
 
Value Chain 
 
Intra-regional 
competition re 
development 
sites on 
Humberside 
2008> 
RSPB lodge 
concerns 
ABP object to 
development of 
AMEP site 2013> 
 
Table 8.1: Horizontal, vertical & spatial institutional triggers and brakes regulating actor agency 
Therefore, in conclusion, it can be evidenced that an enabling institutional 
environment is one in which multi-scalar institutional triggers are sufficiently aligned 
or complementary, and institutional brakes are minimised, to optimise the agentic 
power of social actors to deploy mechanisms in order utilise regional assets to create 
a new path. Whereas, a constraining environment is one in which institutional triggers 
are poorly associated and institutional brakes predominate across and between 
spatial scales. Moreover, this interplay of multi-scalar and intra-scalar institutional 
environments regulate the diversity and magnitude of path related actors and 
mechanisms at the regional level, thereby shaping the scale and character of path 
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creation. Moreover, these dynamics regulate regional capability (such as innovation 
capacity and institutional thickness) and the efficiency and effectiveness of the state-
led economic development process. Finally, this institutionally structured interplay of 
actors, assets and mechanisms indicates that a range of rapidly unfolding path 
episodes are possible, beyond those observed in this empirical study, including path 
stasis, reversal and collapse. It is to the question of quantitative and qualitative path 
outcomes that we now turn. 
What is the scale and character of the resulting path and its effect on regional 
development? 
In Glasgow and on Humberside deficient multi-scalar and intra-scalar institutional 
complementarity led to paths that did not meet expectations in regard to scale and 
character. Institutional mediation restricted the variety of firms and technologies 
within the UK’s offshore wind sector, thereby limiting the subsequent quantitative and 
qualitative nature of both regional paths and the scope for agglomeration. 
Furthermore, the path outcomes did not profoundly tackle either region’s historic path 
dependences or structural weaknesses.     
On Humberside, the new path created over a thousand jobs. However, this fell short 
of previous hopes, rather than being a “super cluster”71  the path exhibited 
characteristics of a lower-value supply chain node based on prevailing technologies 
owned and utilised by an oligopoly of firm actors. In Glasgow, the regional industrial 
path was of modest employment scale compared with earlier predictions and 
increasingly dependent on public sector employment. It too displayed features of a 
supply chain node, albeit one premised on knowledge assets, and fell short of 
previous aspirations to be a “global hub”72. Characteristics associated with more 
qualitative industrial forms, such as clusters and niches, were difficult to discern in 
either case. In terms of the international division of labour of the sector, neither path 
challenged leading centres of the industry in Denmark or Germany.  
Despite the outcomes representing net economic benefit to the respective regions, 
the opportunity to address longstanding industrial decline and un-competitiveness 
was only partially realised. In Glasgow, the resulting scale and function of the new 
                                               
71 Renewable Energy Super Cluster Enterprise Zone publication (2011) 
72 Scottish Enterprise Board Paper (2011) 
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industrial trajectory did not challenge the region’s industrial decline and related public 
sector over-dependence. On Humberside, the sought after increase in higher value 
industrial activity and jobs was only partially realised. In short, the institutionally 
constrained interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets was insufficient to 
meaningfully address the regions’ path dependent economic structures and 
performance.  
Furthermore, these respective path outcomes indicate a discernible level of 
qualitative related variety (Neffke et al, 2011) between the new paths and the 
industrial bases from which they emerged; on Humberside this related to the 
exploitation of natural resources and lower value intermediary functions; and in 
Glasgow this related to public sector functions and a concentration of knowledge 
functions that were highly reactive, if not vulnerable, to extra-regional market and 
government signals. Thus it can be ventured that path creation need not lead to a 
region de-locking from its historic industrial trajectory (Martin and Sunley, 2006). 
The seeming multi-scalar institutional incoherence that shaped both region’s 
economic histories continued. Although both regions were more than just passive 
receptacles where economic activity was played out (Scott, 1998; Pike et al, 2007; 
Hudson, 2007), regional institutions possessed only partial capability to influence the 
open and fluid path creation process. In addition, an inability to shape nation state 
rules for regional benefit was evident.   
Synthesising the empirical findings: a conceptual framework  
In light of the empirical findings in regard to the three research questions, the original 
analytical framework can now be presented as a developed conceptual framework 
(fig 8.1). Path creation is exposed and explained as a highly elastic process, moulded 
and shaped by the multi-scalar institutional environment in which it is set. This 
environment represents a dynamic and complex set of interacting institutional 
triggers and brakes, regulating the catalytic path creating power of socio-technical 
transition. 
Notably, meso-level institutional constructs relating to the market, the industrial value 
chain, the economic development process and regional capability possess significant 
but shifting influence on the incentivisation and dis-incentivisation of path creating 
actor agency and its co-ordination. Therefore, these constructs have a critical bearing 
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on the selection of actors, their respective causal power and the associational nature 
of their agency (individual, narrow, distributed etc.). Moreover, the mutability of these 
meso-level configurations are markedly mediated by the wider policy and regulatory 
environment in which they are set.  
In turn, this shifting institutionally mediated process engenders the assembly and 
interplay of differing aggregations of actors, mechanisms and regional assets over 
time and space, thereby creating the episodic nature of regional path creation. 
Accordingly, this process determines the scale and character of the resulting path, 
thus shaping the degree of regional economic change and continuity. 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 8.1: The elasticity of the regional industrial path creation process 
8.3 Theoretical Contributions  
My contributions to the advancement of evolutionary approaches in economic 
geography have been shaped by a desire to understand how socio-technical 
transition can be harnessed to create new industries in lagging regions, whilst 
recognising their relevance to other regional types. Moreover, the research has been 
guided by the aspiration to make evolutionary economic geography more applicable 
to economic development policy in “a real world in flux” (Massey, 1984). To this end, 
the thesis contributes to the literature in three areas: the open and conditional nature 
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of path creation; enabling and constraining institutional environments for path 
creating agency; and path creation and policy prescription. In each of these three 
areas, specific theoretical contributions to current literature are identified.  
Before exploring these contributions, it is important to recognise that they are based 
on findings relating to one particular transition related industry, offshore wind. Like all 
industries, it is distinct, especially in relation to its dependence on state policy and 
regulation. Therefore, although these theoretical contributions advance 
understanding of path creation, they need to be set against industrial heterogeneity in 
future research.    
8.3.1 The open and conditional nature of path creation 
The malleable nature of the path creation over time 
The research endorses the notion of path evolution as an ongoing process of change 
and continuity that occurs as differing actors attempt to deviate from the past by 
experimenting and strategizing in the present to achieve future outcomes (Martin, 
2010; Steen, 2016; Evenhuis, 2017). However, the research also reveals that the 
ongoing struggle between continuity and change can create differing causal episodes 
within the period of path creation itself, thereby illuminating a more conditional, open 
and punctuated process.  
The identification of three differing episodes of path creation – emergence, 
development and realisation – over a relatively short interval refines less delineated, 
gradual and deterministic accounts (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma and 
Frenken, 2009; Neffke et al, 2011). Therefore, the research enhances the common 
linear model of path creation (Martin, 2010) and identifies path creation as an 
intrinsically malleable phenomenon. Such malleability implies that a range of rapidly 
unfolding path episodes within the path creation process itself are possible, in 
addition to path emergence, development and realisation, including path stasis, 
reversal and collapse.  
Although Peck and Theodore (2007) usefully posit the notion of the elasticity of actor 
agency, this notion can also be applied to the value of regional assets and the nature 
of mechanisms which valorise them. It is the malleability of these unique and 
dynamic aggregations of actors, assets and mechanisms over time and space that 
shape the scale and character of path creation. This innate conditional openness 
213 
 
exposes the ongoing opportunity for strategic state agency to influence the path 
creating interplay of actors, assets and mechanisms to shape path outcomes (both 
quantitative and qualitative) and the path’s respective position in the wider sector’s 
division of labour (Dawley, 2013; Dawley et al, 2015; MacKinnon et al, 2018).  
Finally, it was demonstrated that the instituted process of socio-technical transition 
can act as a catalyst for the initiation of path emergence and subsequent evolution. 
Such an exogenous stimulus encourages the utilisation of novel knowledge at the 
regional level which allows actors to break from their past via innovation. The 
interaction of exogenous and endogenous knowledge and new and existing 
knowledge to create novel knowledge infers a complex causal interplay that is not 
always evident in the literature (Martin, 2010; Karnoe and Garud, 2012; Cooke 2013).     
The conditional nature of regional assets and regional path dependence  
The value of regional assets apropos regional industrial change is revealed as 
relative and changeable, rather than absolute and static (Maskell and Malmberg, 
2009). For example, seemingly dilapidated physical assets and infrastructure or path 
dependent human capital can be repurposed by fusion with novel knowledge relating 
to an exogenous stimulus such as energy transition (Essletzbichler, 2012; Kasabov 
and Sundaram, 2016). Furthermore, the magnitude of valorisation is dependent on 
the scale of fusion with novel knowledge. Consequently, positive and negative 
regional path dependence are illuminated as contingent phenomena, as is the latent 
regenerative potential of regions (Stam and Garnsey, 2009). Hence, the exogenous 
stimulus of grand societal challenges, such as decarbonisation, represent significant 
opportunities for regional industrial renewal. Therefore, the contention that lagging 
regions are locked-in to industrial decline given limited competitive assets or 
structural weaknesses is revealed as overly deterministic (Boschma, 2009; Stam and 
Garnsey, 2009; Martin, 2010). In short, the transformative power of regional assets is 
conditional and mutable on their latitude for fusion with novelty. 
The shifting and relational nature of actors and mechanisms 
The final contribution in regard to the open and conditional nature of path creation, 
relates to the varied nature of path actors and mechanisms and their shifting, relative 
nature (Jessop, 1997; Dawley, 2013). Although firms do indeed act as the primary 
conduits of novel knowledge (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Martin, 2010) by which 
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regional assets are reconfigured and valorised they are supported in this role by a 
diversity of non-firm actors, including state actors, universities and individual agents. 
Significantly, the state can act as a primary agent in the valorisation of regional 
assets, for example in regard to the establishment of industrial innovation and test 
centres (Goddard et al, 2012). In addition, actor agency can be distributed, 
oligopolistic or individual in nature, with shifting emphasis during the fluid path 
creation process.  
Similarly, although primary mechanisms (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma and 
Frenken, 2009), such as diversification and transplantation, lead the process of path 
creation they are contingent on the operation of a range of auxiliary mechanisms. 
Also, mechanisms can be internal to the firm (Martin, 2010) and intra-firm 
diversification can mask a path’s emergence to external actors. The research also 
revealed that key path creating mechanisms can be public sector driven, such as 
state transplantation or state sponsored diversification of university departments, 
thereby effecting the character of the path in terms of balance between private and 
public ownership. At a more abstract level, it can be proposed that all regional 
industrial path creation is essentially the diversification of assets, for instance skills 
and infrastructure, triggered by the transplantation of novel knowledge to a new 
productive domain by incentivised social actors.  
8.3.2 Institutional environments and path creation 
The relative importance of differing institutional scales  
The research validates the theoretical contention that actors are incentivised by 
institutional frameworks to mindfully deviate from past practice and to strategize and 
experiment in the present to attain future outcomes (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; 
Bakker, 2014; Steen, 2016). Also, the influential role that institutions play in 
managing and co-ordinating actor agency is reaffirmed (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2014; 
Steen 2016). In effect, path creation represents complex yet institutionally structured 
interplay of actors, mechanisms and assets. Building on this, the research exposes 
how multi-scalar state institutional environments represent an interacting system of 
triggers and brakes for regional path creating agency. Additionally, an acute temporal 
calibration of agency with institutional change is identified which augments more 
gradualist interpretations (Martin, 2010). Notably, an institutional causal hierarchy 
has also been identified. 
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The research reveals path creation as a contingent, relatively reflexive by-product of 
wider sectoral and technological dynamics. Therefore, the extra-regional institutions 
that mediate these wider dynamics are exposed as critical to regional path creation. 
In particular, nation state institutions play a central role in determining the magnitude 
of the exogenous stimulus of energy transition (Truffer and Coenen, 2012), shaping 
national market and industrial value chain dynamics which regulate the potential for 
path creation at the regional level. Additionally, these dynamics shape the level of 
industrial competition and consolidation, thereby regulating levels of firm and 
technological variety. Tellingly, changes in nation state policy and regulation not only 
incentivise firm agency but can also rapidly dis-incentivise it, making firms retreat 
from major investments in relatively short periods of time. Furthermore, the devolved 
institutional environment can indeed play a notable role in triggering sectoral and 
related regional path emergence (Gertler, 2010; Rezvani, 2016). However, it is 
auxiliary and contingent on wider state institutional dynamics.  
Likewise, although the findings validate the important role accorded to the regional 
institutional environment in triggering actor agency, its role is more auxiliary than new 
regionalist theory implies (Saxenian; 1994; Kanter 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 
1995; Amin, 1999; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). Critically, regional institutions are not 
sufficiently powerful to substitute for nation state power in the case of energy 
transition. However, the regional institutional environment can play a key role in 
facilitating the priming of regional assets, portraying the path’s actualisation within 
and beyond the region, and promoting the path’s quantitative and qualitative 
evolution in relation to the wider sector’s division of labour.  
Institutional synchronicity is a pre-requisite for an enabling environment 
In regard to enabling and constraining institutional environments, the research 
reveals that the degree of multi-scalar and intra-scalar institutional synchronicity has 
significant bearing on regional path dynamics and outcomes. Although systematic 
institutional co-ordination is not revealed as a pre-requisite for path creation, the 
research develops theory which contends that complementarity between institutional 
scales is an enabler of industrial change (Schroder and Voelzkow, 2016). Institutional 
synchronicity, even if strategically un-coordinated, enhances path creating agency; 
whilst misalignment has the opposite result. For example, it was demonstrated that 
the level of alignment determines the potential for agglomeration; as regional policies 
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which promote clustering are dependent on nation state policies which foster firm and 
technological variety, not consolidation and oligopoly. 
Furthermore, the research also indicates that actor diversity, even related firm variety 
(Boschma and Frenken 2009; Neffke et al, 2011), is insufficient in itself for the 
process of path creation in lagging regions to lead to de-locking from historic 
industrial trajectories. In order for regional path dependence to be countered and 
path creation to lead to a region occupying an influential position in a sector’s division 
of labour, multi-scalar institutional synchronicity is also required. Such synchronicity 
will ensure that extra-regional sectoral and technological path dependences 
(Boschma et al, 2017) and regional path dependences (Martin and Sunley, 2006) are 
mediated to optimise the scale and quality of path creation at the regional level. 
Therefore, a key contribution is that firm diversity coupled with multi-scalar 
institutional synchronicity is required to create regional industrial paths of sufficient 
magnitude and sectoral importance to tackle the challenge of industrial renewal 
(figure 8.3).          
 
  Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 8.2: Interaction of institutions and diversity on regional path outcomes   
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The research also enhances literature on the need for coordination across nation 
state policies (Barca et al, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015) by observing that 
synchronicity on each institutional scale influences the elasticity of path creating 
agency (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Thus, unaligned horizontal, vertical and spatial 
policies at the nation state level and un-coordinated regional institutional thickness 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994a) constrain regional path creating agency. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the quantity of regional institutions does not represent a reliable measure 
of regional institutional thickness or capability; common purpose focused at the 
regional level and common expectation also require to be evident.   
Framing RIS concepts in broader institutional and technological contexts   
The research demonstrates that the power of regional innovation systems (Cooke et 
al, 2004; Asheim et al, 2011b) to enable path creating agency can be circumscribed 
by extra-regional market and industrial value chain dynamics which are considerably 
shaped by nation state policy and regulation. Therefore, the research responds to 
recent calls in the literature to assess how extra-regional institutional environments 
mediate the causal power of regional level economic development initiatives and 
capability (Dawley, 2013; Pike et al, 2017b; Trippl et al, 2017). The influence of a RIS 
on path actor agency, even an organisationally thick and specialised RIS (Trippl et al, 
2017) or one with a world class research university at its centre (Goddard et al, 2012, 
2013b), is contingent on broader technological path dependences, which are 
regulated in the case of energy transition by the nation state. Moreover, the ability of 
regional actors to create institutionally protected innovation space to challenge 
technological path dependence, akin to a niche (Geels and Schot, 2007; Boschma et 
al, 2017), is dependent on the degree of alignment between the regional and extra-
regional institutional environments and the interplay of varied proximities and 
pipelines connecting the region with the wider sector’s development (Bathelt et al, 
2004; Boschma, 2005; Coe et al, 2008).   
In short, RIS theory requires greater accommodation of nation state institutions and 
wider technological dynamics if it is to generate further insight on the power of 
instituted innovation frameworks, regional capability and universities to enable actor 
agency, especially in lagging regions (Goddard et al 2012, 2013b; Morgan, 2013a).    
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8.3.3 Regional path creation theory and policy prescription 
Responding to the limits of endogenous-oriented theory and related policy  
The research qualifies the efficacy of endogenously orientated theory and concepts 
which currently have a significant bearing on regional development policies, for 
example Smart Specialisation (Hausman and Roderik 2003; Foray et al, 2011), 
Clusters (Porter, 1990; Maskell, 2001) and those relating to regional higher education 
and research (Morgan et al, 1999; Morgan, 2003, 2013b; Goddard et al, 2012, 
2013a, b). In effect, the utility of such theoretically informed policies for facilitating 
industrial renewal is conditional on their recognition of, responsiveness to and 
rapprochement with extra-regional institutional, sectoral and technological dynamics. 
Similarly, Constructing Regional Advantage (Todtling and Trippl, 2005; McCann and 
Ortega-Argiles, 2013), an analytical policy tool closely associated with evolutionary 
economic geography, should more fully reflect and accommodate the multi-scalar 
reality in which regions are set.  
Furthermore, the research reveals that integrated multi-scalar policies are required to 
enable the sustained interaction of regional assets with exogenous stimuli to enable 
regional industrial path creation, especially in lagging regions. Tellingly, un-
coordinated policies may only create new paths with similar qualitative deficiencies to 
the established regional industrial base from which they emerged. Therefore, the 
notion of related variety need not only have positive connotations, as inferred in 
associated literature (Boschma and Frenken, 2009; Neffke et al, 2011; Cooke, 2012). 
Reconceptualising the role of state agents in the economic development process   
The research responds to calls for the role of state actors in regional economic and 
industrial development to be reconsidered (Cooke, 2006; Martin et al, 2015; Pike et 
al, 2016a). Given the process of regional path creation is dependent on multi-scalar 
institutional synchronisation which enables or constrains actor agency, regional 
development and industrial renewal cannot be determined exclusively at any one 
level. Therefore, the need for state actors to act as system builders (Geels, 2004) 
and institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009) is strikingly 
exposed. Such state actors have a critical role in reconciling and influencing the 
multi-scalar interplay between three forms of path dependence which mediate 
regional path creation and outcomes: sectoral, technological and regional (Martin and 
219 
 
Sunley, 2006; Boschma et al, 2017). In order to achieve this mediation, state actors 
need to connect and co-ordinate the domains of economics, industry, research and 
politics through the synchronisation and adaptation of institutions. In doing so, state 
actors can engender the mobilisation of firms and related mechanisms to repurpose 
and utilise regional assets in a manner that optimises industrial and economic 
benefits at both the national and regional scales.  
8.4 Implications for Public Policy 
As noted earlier, a principal aim of my research is to strengthen the bridge between 
the worlds of economic geography theory and economic development policy and 
practice, specifically in relation to how new regional industries are created and the 
role of the state in this process. Therefore, this section considers the broad 
implications of my research for policy and practice. To this end, the section identifies 
general messages for state agency and then postulates on what state actors could 
have done differently to enhance the outcomes which were witnessed in the 
observed cases of Glasgow and Humberside. However, before doing so, the 
significant potential of socio-technical transition for regional industrial transformation 
and the accompanying need for redesign of the economic development process is 
considered.   
The research has demonstrated that socio-technical transition can act as a catalyst 
for regional industrial renewal, albeit one that is highly susceptible to changes in the 
institutional context in which it is set. As public concern and political action increases 
vis-à-vis climate change and sustainability, greater policy attention will be given to 
how the industrial opportunities and challenges of related socio-technical transitions 
can be respectively optimised and mitigated. For instance, these relate to 
opportunities for industrial renewal based on energy transition and decarbonisation 
and, conversely, the challenges for regions that are dependent on carbon intensive 
industries, such as coal mining, oil and gas, and the transhipment of carbon fuels. In 
addition, the sustainable utilisation of natural resources, such as those in the marine 
environment, and the development and repurposing of societal infrastructure in light 
of climate change offer opportunities for industrial renewal. In all these areas state 
agency will or can be determinative in addressing the related opportunities and 
challenges.  
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The research has exposed and explained that regional industrial path creation based 
on socio-technical transition is premised on the interplay of region specific and extra-
regional factors. Moreover, this process of industrial change is dependent on the 
incentivisation, mobilisation and co-ordination of diverse actors and the operation of 
related mechanisms (diversification and branching, transplantation etc.) in order to 
revalorise and reconfigure regional assets in line with industrial need. Critically, both 
regional institutions and extra-regional institutions regulate the interaction of changing 
aggregations of actors, mechanisms and regional assets through space and time and, 
in turn, shape the resulting scale, nature and timing of new regional transition related 
industries. Therefore, state policies and practice need to be cognisant of and 
responsive to: i) the endogenous drivers (such as unique regional assets and 
institutions) and exogenous drivers (such as wider sectoral and technological 
dynamics) of regional change; and ii) the centrality of institutions (policies, regulation, 
behaviours, organisations, networks etc.) in framing and shaping the effectiveness of 
state agency. 
In order to integrate these requirements into policy and practice, the common 
approach to regional industrial development in the UK needs adapted. The prevailing 
supply-side policy focus of state actors (Pike et al, 2016a) has remained largely 
unchanged for over a generation. Despite its endurance, the relative industrial 
decline of many UK regions has not been halted. Moreover, current approaches do 
not adequately utilise the observed power of the nation state and institutional 
synchronisation, as evidenced in the Glasgow and Humberside case studies, to 
engender and optimise industrial change and demand at the regional level. 
The orthodox regional industrial development model facilitates regional industrial 
change via incentivisation of firm behaviour through the utilisation of tools relating to 
innovation, investment, skills etc. The approach has a tendency to operate in 
isolation from and with little influence on the extra-regional dynamics which shape 
broader sectoral and technological developments. Therefore, the model has a 
tendency to overlook the fact that new regional industrial paths are the reflexive by-
product of wider industrial dynamics. Hence, in this research, a number of state 
actors were observed to be taken unawares by the adverse effect of extra-regional 
energy policy and regulatory changes on firm agency at the regional level. Moreover, 
this approach to industrial development is often synonymous with regional state 
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actors with limited power to influence the vested interests and rent seeking behaviour 
of powerful regional firms or the exogenous institutional landscape. Moreover, the UK 
Government’s challenge funds and sector deals linked with the UK’s new industrial 
strategy have a predisposition to incentivise limited numbers of often incumbent 
firms. Such bespoke deals risk promoting narrow sectoral and investor benefits at the 
expense of wider economic and societal benefits. The UK’s closed and narrow public 
and private partnerships for the development of the offshore wind industry and Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s undisclosed final negotiations with Siemens are 
reminiscent of this approach.    
Therefore, it is proposed that there are four key policy and four key practice 
messages generated by this research for state actors if the opportunities and 
challenges for socio-technical transition are to be addressed. Underpinning these 
messages is the recognition of the multi-scalar, multi-actor, institutionally conditional 
nature of regional industrial path creation. Notably, these lessons are not only 
pertinent to lagging regions pursuing industrial renewal via socio-economic transition 
but also have a relevance to differing regional types and industries. 
Key messages for policy    
i. The process of regional industrial path creation is open and fluid and thus a 
variety of future industrial development trajectories are possible. Lagging 
regions are not inevitably locked in to a negative equilibrium, rather they have 
ongoing opportunities for industrial renewal. Moreover, the path creation 
process is highly susceptible to changes in the multi-scalar institutional 
environment in which it is set. Therefore, policy makers have an ongoing 
ability to influence the emergence and evolution of regional industrial paths 
within relatively short timeframes; so long as they are cognisant of and shape 
the appropriate institutional triggers and brakes that respectively incentivise 
and dis-incentivise path creating agency.  
      
ii. The catalyst for path emergence and subsequent path evolution is the fusion 
of novelty with regional assets; a process that is shaped by the interaction of 
differing aggregations of actors, mechanisms and regional assets through time 
and space. Moreover, the magnitude of fusion determines the extent of 
industrial change. As was observed in the research, regional assets, even 
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ones that were seemingly latent or could be termed a liability (such as old 
derelict docks), could be repurposed and valorised relatively rapidly. Critically, 
the state can play a leading and formative role via institutional synchronisation 
in promoting firm agency and co-ordination and the related activation of 
mechanisms to valorise and reconfigure regional assets. In addition, the state 
can also directly influence this process through the transplantation of and 
investment in research, education and policy functions to utilise regional 
assets. Therefore, the deterministic contention that lagging regions are locked-
in to historic industrial decline, stasis and underperformance due to limited or 
obsolete assets is misleading, rather the transformative power of regional 
assets is conditional on their latitude for fusion with novelty. 
 
iii. A dynamic regional research and science system and higher education sector 
or pronounced regional institutional thickness are no guarantors of industrial 
renewal. Therefore, related policies such as Smart Specialisation need to be 
supplemented with policies that transplant institutional power and influence, 
novel knowledge and investment to regions. 
  
iv. Given that the process of regional path creation is dependent on multi-scalar 
institutional synchronisation which incentivises, coordinates and de-risks actor 
agency to valorise regional assets, regional industrial renewal cannot be 
determined exclusively at any one level. Extra-regional state institutions can 
and do have significant bearing on the underlying temporal logic of the wider 
industry and the related evolution of associated market dynamics, competition 
and the industrial value chain73, this is particularly the case in regard to socio-
economic transition. As noted, new regional industrial paths are the reflexive 
by-product of wider industrial dynamics conditioned by wider institutions. 
However, regional state institutions can and do play a critical role in facilitating 
the priming of regional assets and portraying and promoting the path at the 
regional level. Therefore, in order to optimise the scale and quality of the 
regional path, synchronisation of state institutions between and across scales 
is required. This will ensure that the spatial consequences of aspatial policies 
                                               
73 All three have a key influence on firm diversity at the national level. In Glasgow and on Humberside 
national industrial consolidation and oligopoly mitigated options for clustering   
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(such as energy and competition) are understood and impediments and trade-
offs vis-à-vis the pursuit of regional industrial renewal can be assessed and 
addressed. Moreover, a deficit of explicit co-ordination can still lead to a path 
of scale but such a path may exhibit similar qualitative deficiencies and 
characteristics to the established regional industrial base from which it 
emerged. In order to create regional industrial paths of magnitude which 
possess higher value functions within the industry’s national and international 
division of labour, akin to leading internationally competitive clusters, there 
needs to be high levels of both institutional synchronisation and firm diversity.        
Key messages for practice 
i. In order to facilitate regional path creation, the state’s capacity to comprehend 
institutional causal relationships and subsequently synchronise institutions 
across and between scales of government needs developed. Such a change 
in capacity involves the innovative reconfiguration of state skills, tools, 
methods, behaviours and collaborative models. Although comprehensive co-
ordination of the multi-scalar institutional environment is challenging if not 
impossible, the greatest level of alignment should be sought to optimise 
quantitative and qualitative industrial outcomes and their temporal 
manifestation. By adopting this approach, the interrelated dynamics of 
sectoral, technological and regional change and continuity (i.e. interacting path 
dependences) can be mediated to enable industrial development and renewal 
at the nation state, devolved and regional levels. In turn, such co-ordination 
will minimise inefficient displacement, deadweight and inter-regional 
competition. Although elimination of narrow vested economic and political 
interests, such as rent seeking behaviour, is unrealistic, institutional co-
ordination and collaboration would mitigate their practice and consequence.  
ii. A new type of state agent, akin to the System Builder (Geels, 2004) or an 
Institutional Entrepreneur (Di Maggio, 1988; Battilana et al, 2009), is required 
within the economic and industrial development process. Such actors would 
work between and across differing scales of government (i.e. nation state, 
devolved and regional) to optimise institutional synchronisation to promote 
industrial renewal and related quantitative and qualitative outcomes. Central to 
their role would be the utilisation, manipulation and restructuring of institutional 
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frameworks to incentivise path actor agency, co-ordination and firm diversity. 
Moreover, a key role of these state actors would be to recognise and reconcile 
the respective policies and functions of different scales of government. For 
example, in the case of offshore wind, the UK Government had the primary 
role in creating the market and the industry’s temporal logic and value chain, 
whilst the Scottish Government had a subsequent key role in shaping its 
specific industrial manifestation (for example in relation to floating wind), whilst 
regional / local government primed regional assets for valorisation by firms. 
These state agents would also promote collective governance, transparency 
and legitimacy across geographic scales. The operational domain of these 
agents of change would be the nexus relating to the interface of industry, 
research and the varying scales of government (see figure 8.3).    
 
       Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 8.3: Domain of state system builders  
iii. Greater integration is required between a predominantly transactional 
approach to state-led regional industrial development, based on the 
distribution of resources for prescribed outcomes, and a relational approach, 
based on the synchronisation of formal institutions, such as policy and 
regulation, and informal institutions, such as common purpose and 
collaboration. Therefore, there is a requirement to enhance the state’s 
proficiency in integrating relational and transactional practices. Furthermore, 
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for a more relational approach to be successful, further power needs to be 
transferred to regions in order that they too can influence such institutional 
synchronisation, thereby ensuring that regions are not just passive arenas 
reshaped by capital flows and extra-regional policies but active and 
empowered places. 
 
iv. Although path dependence and path creation theories and concepts represent 
a common framework in academia for exposing and explaining regional and 
industrial continuity and change, and how geography shapes regional 
economic and industrial evolution, they have not exercised the prominence in 
the world of economic development practice one might anticipate. Given their 
utility in analysing a region’s unique circumstances and legacies in terms of its 
institutions, knowledge, skills, competences, experiences, infrastructure, 
physical and natural resources, such a framework merits integration into the 
mainstream analytical approaches of state actors. By embracing and utilising 
these theories and concepts, regional heterogeneity and the opportunities and 
choices for industrial renewal that such regional distinctiveness offers would 
be more readily exposed, as well as the related options for state agency.     
Finally, in light of these proposed adaptations to policy and practice, it is appropriate 
to briefly reflect on what state actors could have done differently to enhance the 
observed path outcomes in the two cases studies (see figs 7.1 and 7.2).  
In regard to Glasgow, greater strategic co-ordination between Westminster and 
Edinburgh could have allowed Scottish projects which had been leased prior to the 
introduction of the Contracts for Difference to still receive the anticipated ROCs 
subsidy in light of Scotland’s more challenging waters. The retention of these projects 
would have encouraged the progression of significant regional investments by 
Gamesa and Doosan Babcock and further experimentation amongst the city’s 
electricity utility firms, thereby leading to the valorisation of ITREZ’s research 
capability. In addition, the UK Government’s ORE Catapult technology and 
innovation centre could have been further integrated with local knowledge assets; 
whilst a component of Glasgow’s £1.1billion City Deal could have been invested to 
boost the local path’s position in the broader sector’s international division of labour 
and knowledge, for example regarding deeper water technologies. Finally, the 
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presence of an offshore wind regional industrial forum could have co-ordinated 
regional path actors, facilitating common purpose and path promotion.  
In terms of Humberside, the grouping of several offshore wind projects into a 
common development and procurement framework by the UK Government could 
have encouraged development of shared onshore infrastructure (e.g. for installation 
and construction) and offshore infrastructure (e.g. cabling). Such industrial scaling-up 
would have encouraged greater investment by supply chain actors on Humberside. 
In reality, the rollout of projects was intermittent and fragmented, mitigating 
economies of scale and investor confidence. In addition, had the UK Government 
linked award of subsidy to the utilisation of the UK supply chain prior to 2014, 
Siemens’ and other supply chain investments could have occurred earlier. Finally, 
significant pan Humber strategic planning powers or greater institutional thickness 
could have countered the monopolistic vested interest of ABP. This, in addition to the 
other measures noted above, would have boosted the valorisation of AMEP on the 
Humber’s south bank, the only site in the region that could accommodate substantial 
supply chain co-location.             
8.5 Future Research 
My enquiry indicates promising future research in a number of areas of path theory. 
These namely relate to path creation in relation to differing regional types and 
enabling and constraining institutional environments. Moreover, future research 
should further utilise comparative analysis across sectors and regional and national 
settings.      
The research has affirmed the necessity to undertake further empirical enquiry in 
lagging regions to generate more comprehensive, refined and purposeful theory and 
mitigate the preponderance of theory derived from observation of successful regions 
(Pike et al, 2007; MacKinnon et al, 2009). If “the issue of geographically uneven 
development” is truly the fundamental concern of our discipline (Martin and Sunley, 
2013, p 32), empirical enquiry needs to place further emphasis on less dynamic 
regions and embrace the rich diversity of options for path investigation across 
regional types.  
In regard to enabling and constraining institutional environments for path creation, 
the research exposes a rich vein of future research pertaining to: the alignment of 
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nation state and devolved state actors to generate mutual industrial benefit; the 
influence and interaction of differing policy paradigms and conventions across scales 
of government on regional path creation; and the direct role of the state actors and 
mechanisms (e.g. transplantation) on regional path creation. Also, given the 
continuing paucity of RIS and endogenous-led models vis-à-vis lagging regions, a 
promising departure point for future enquiry relates to the construction of fuller 
relational conceptualisations of regional innovation frameworks and Smart 
Specialisation.  
Furthermore, the research has demonstrated the methodological feasibility and value 
of integrating path research objects, subjects and levels into a holistic framework 
(Martin and Sunley 2006, 2013; Pike et al, 2016b). Therefore, this methodology could 
be readily transferred to analyse the interplay of institutions and regional path 
creation in other economic and industrial contexts. Moreover, the demonstrated value 
of comparative analysis based on immersive longitudinal case studies indicates that 
the methodological approach should be further embraced in future research across 
industries, regions and nations.  
Finally, on a more general point, future enquiry should place continued emphasis on 
the needs of policy makers and practitioners operating in the sphere of economic and 
regional development, in order that economic geographers “seek to not only make 
social life intelligible but also to make it better” (Gregory, 1994, p 10).  
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Appendix A 
Glasgow primary research interviewees 
 
Firm Actor Code Type of Firm Ownership Actor 
Position 
Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
G-Dev1 Project developer/ 
Electricity Utility Firm 
UK owned Director Glasgow 15/1/16 
G- Dev2 Project developer 
/Electricity Utility Firm 
Foreign owned Manager Glasgow 8/1/16 
G-Dev3 Project developer Foreign owned Manager Glasgow 2/8/16 
G-Con1 Consultancy (project 
development)  
UK owned Director Glasgow 9/12/15 
G-Con2 Consultancy 
(engineering and 
technology) 
UK owned Manager Glasgow 21/7/16 
G-Rep1 Business Chamber Membership 
organisation 
CEO Glasgow 13/1/16 
G-Rep2 Renewables Industry 
Representative  
Membership 
organisation 
Manager Glasgow 28/1/16 
Government Actor 
Code 
Type of Government 
Organisation 
Jurisdiction Actor 
Position 
Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
G-RDA1  RDA  Devolved govt. Manager Glasgow 3/12/15 
G-RDA2 RDA Devolved govt. Manager Glasgow 10/12/15 
G-RDA3 RDA Devolved govt. Director Edinburgh 22/12/15 
G-FDI Inward Invest’ Agency Devolved govt. Manager 
(retired) 
Glasgow 16/12/15 
G-MS Marine Scotland Devolved govt. Manager  Edinburgh 21/12/15 
G-SGov1 Scottish Government Devolved govt. Manager Glasgow 15/12/15 
G-SGov2 Scottish Government Devolved govt. Minister 
(former) 
Glasgow 11/1/16 
G-CE Crown Estate Nation state 
govt.  
Manager Edinburgh 22/12/15 
 Research & Higher 
Edu Actor Code 
Type of Organisation Jurisdiction Actor 
Position 
Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
G-RHE1 University Devolved govt.  Principal Glasgow 17/2/16 
G-RHE2 Technology and 
Innovation Centre #1 
Devolved govt. Director Glasgow 22/12/15 
G-RHE3 Technology and 
Innovation Centre #2 
Nation state 
govt. 
 
Manager Glasgow 11/12/15 
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Appendix B 
Humberside primary research interviewees 
 
Firm Actor Code Type of Firm Ownership Actor Position Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
H-OEM OEM (MNC) Foreign owned Director Hull 21/3/16 
H-PO1 Port Operator UK owned Manager Hull 21/3/16 
H-PO2 Port Operator UK owned Director Immingham 24/6/16 
H-O&M1 Logistics & Transport UK owned CEO Hull 22/3/16 
H-O&M2 Training Organisation UK owned Manager Grimsby 25/5/16 
H-Rep1 Business Chamber Membership 
organisation 
CEO Hull 26/5/16 
H-Rep2 Marine Industry 
Representative 
Membership 
organisation 
CEO Hull 22/3/16 
Government Actor 
Code 
Type of 
Government 
Organisation 
Jurisdiction Actor 
Position 
Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
H-UKGov1  Dept Business 
Innovation and Skills 
Nation state 
govt. 
Director 
(retired) 
Leeds 22/3/16 
H-UKGov2 Dept Business 
Innovation and Skills 
Nation state 
govt. 
Senior 
Manager  
London 9/2/16 
H-RDA Local Enterprise 
Partnership  
Nation state / 
Local govt. 
Manager Hull 3/2/16 & 
21/3/16 
H-LA1 Local development Local govt. Director Hull 13/7/16 
H-LA2 Local development Local govt. Economic 
Dev Officer  
Hull 26/5/16 
H-LA3 Local development Local govt. Director Grimsby 25/5/16 
H-LA4 Local development Local govt. Manager Grimsby 25/5/16 
H-UKCC City of Culture Office Nation state 
govt.  
Manager Hull 21/3/16 
 Research & 
Higher Edu. Actor 
Code 
Type of 
Organisation 
Jurisdiction Actor 
Position 
Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
H-RHE1 University Nation state  
govt.  
Pro Vice 
Chancellor  
Hull 26/3/16 
H-RHE2 Regional Innovation 
Prog. 
Nation state 
govt. 
Director Hull 15/8/16 
H-RHE3 Technology and 
Innovation Centre #2 
Nation state 
govt. 
Regional co-
ordinator 
Glasgow 23/12/15 
 
  
272 
 
Appendix C 
Wider sectoral research interviewees 
 
Firm Actor Code Type of Firm Ownership Actor Position Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
S-Dev1 Project developer/ 
Electricity Utility Firm 
UK owned Director Glasgow 3/2/16 
S-Dev 2 Project Developer/ 
Electricity Utility Firm 
Foreign 
owned 
Managing 
Director 
London 8/2/16 
S-OEM OEM Foreign 
owned 
Manager NE England 2/8/16 
S-Con Energy Technology 
Company 
UK owned Director London 10/2/16 
Government 
Actor Code 
Type of Government 
Organisation 
Jurisdiction Actor Position Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
S-UKGov1 Dept Energy & Climate 
Change 
Nation state 
govt. 
Manager London 9/2/16 
S-UKGov2 Dept Business, 
Innovation and Skills 
Nation state 
govt. 
Manager London 9/2/16 
S-UKGov3 The Treasury Nation state 
govt. 
Senior Advisor London 9/2/16 
S-UKGov4 Dept Energy and 
Climate Change 
Nation state 
govt. 
Manager London 10/2/16 
S-CE Crown Estate Nation state 
govt. 
Manager London 10/2/16 
 Research Actor 
Code 
Type of Organisation Jurisdiction Actor Position Interview 
Location 
Interview 
Date 
S-R1 Welsh Government Devolved 
govt. 
Regional Co-
ordinator 
Cardiff 17/12/15 
S-R2 Technology and 
Innovation Centre #2 
Nation state 
govt. 
CEO Glasgow 29/12/15 
S-R3 UK Innovation Agency Nation state 
govt. 
Manager Glasgow 27/1/16 
S-R4 UK Innovation agency Nation state 
govt. 
Lead 
Technologist 
London 10/2/16 
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Appendix D 
Discussion Themes for Glasgow Case Interviews 
 
PART A : Views on path emergence and evolution  (c 15m) 
 
1) Role of interviewee and organisation 
 
2) From your perspective, why do you think the Offshore Wind industry 
emerged in the Glasgow area (GA)? What were key causal moments? (refer 
to Fallon & OREC, 2013, corporate decisions influenced by climate change 
legislation and related subsidy)     
 
3) How important were local assets in its emergence? e.g. unique knowledge, 
skills, business practices / competences 
 
4) How would you describe the evolution of OW industry in GA in terms of its  
 
- Growth e.g. planned, unplanned; stable, disjointed 
- Structure e.g. functional mix; integration; type & nature of relationships 
- Quality e.g. economic value of services,  functions and products;  levels 
of autonomy 
 
 
PART B: Views on agents and mechanisms that facilitated emergence and 
evolution (c 15m) 
 
5) What were the prominent firms & other organisations - at a local, national, 
UK, international levels - involved in OW emergence and evolution in the GA 
– and why?  SE role? 
 
6) What were the firm development processes re the development of the OW 
industry in the GA e.g. FDI, diversification and R&D?     
 
 
PART C: Views on institutional arrangements that facilitated emergence and 
evolution (c 25m) 
  
7) Are there examples of how local organisational arrangements (leadership, 
networks, organisations and shared learning processes):  
 
 Enhanced creation and sharing of knowledge and innovation re OW in the 
GA 
 
 Assisted radical industrial & tech. experimentation beyond industry norms in 
the GA? 
 
8) Comparatively how important were UK Government policies towards OW in 
enabling, constraining or shaping emergence & evolution of the industry in 
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the Glasgow area? (e.g.  energy market regulation RO>FID>CFD; energy 
mix policy; OWIS; CfD supply chain dev.) 
 
9) What was degree of alignment (formal & informal) between local, Scottish & 
UK levels (e.g. Eco Leadership Board, OWIG/SG Energy Advisory Board, 
OWIC // OW Route Map & OWIS // SDI & OWIO/UKTI)?  
 
10) How much did sub-state organisations and arrangements (e.g. SE, Scot 
Govt, OWIG) shape UK policies? 
 
PART D: Future Prospects (5m) 
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Appendix E 
Discussion Themes for Humberside Case Interviews 
 
 
SEP Ambition:  “Humber to become a renowned national & international centre for 
renewable energy” 
 
PART A : Views on path emergence and evolution  (c 15m) 
 
1) Role interviewee and organisation 
 
2) From your perspective, why do you think the OW industry emerged in the 
Humber area? What is emerging – O&M and manufacturing /assembly / 
deployment/ installation? What were key causal moments? (Leasing rounds; 
Siemens MoU 2011/announce 2014; CFD supply chain)     
 
3) How important were local assets in its emergence (e.g. geog; infra; 
competences e.g. logistics, engineering; energy & chemicals)? Legacies 
that hindered development? 
 
4) How would you describe the evolution of OW industry and why, in terms of:  
 
- Co-ordinated, smooth; stop, start; sub-optimal (Siemens MoU 2011, 
decision 2014, 2 sites to 1 site and blades, Able MEP,  wider supply 
chain) – Andrea Leadsom “payback” 
- Structure - integrated functions; supply chain; ind. community (Enrgy 
Estuary rivalry?) 
- Quality e.g. functions; scope for innovation; autonomy; “internationally 
renowned” 
 
 
PART B: Views on agents and mechanisms that facilitated emergence and 
evolution (c 15m) 
 
5) What were prominent firms - at a local (ABP), UK (utilities), international 
levels (Dong, Siemens) - involved in OW emergence and evolution – and 
why?  What were other prominent organisations (RDAs/Las/GPH) involved 
in OW emergence (geog)– and why?   
 
6) What were the firm development processes re OW development e.g. FDI, 
diversification? 
     
 
PART C: Views on institutional arrangements that facilitated emergence and 
evolution (c 25m) 
  
7) Are there examples of how local organisational arrangements (leadership, 
networks, organisations and shared learning processes ref. GPH, City 
Leadership Board, GRP, SC pilot):  
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 Assisted emergence? 
 Assisted industrial & tech. innovation created inside and outside region? 
 Specifically, views on proposed open access innovation centre led by Uni of 
Hull? 
 
8) Comparatively how important were UK policies towards enabling, 
constraining evolution? (e.g.  energy mix policy; ROCs>CFD; supply chain; 
OWIS; CORES, EZs, Growth & City Deals) 
 
9) Degree of alignment with UK insts. (BIS, OWIO, DCLG, DECC) & role of UK 
insts in location?  
 
10) How much did Humber organisations and arrangements shape UK policies; 
and the geog manifestation of industry and manage rivalries (Hull & 
Siemens v Immingham, S bank)? 
 
PART D: Future Prospects (5m) 
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Appendix F 
Discussion Themes for London/UK Case Interviews 
 
  
PART A : Views on path emergence and evolution  (c 10m) 
 
1) Role of interviewee and organisation 
 
2) What do you think were key causesfor the emergence and evolution of the 
OW industry over the last two decades? (refer to Fallon re OREC and 
Siemens in Hull)  
 
 
PART B: Views on role of institutions (c 30m) 
 
3) What was the role and relative importance of govt industry strategy in 
shaping OW’s evolution in terms of nature, scale and localities & regions 
(OWIS only launched in 2013)? 
 
4) What was the role and relative importance of government subsidy in shaping 
evolution in terms of nature, scale and geography (NFFO, ROCs, CFD)? 
Influence of horizontal policies with national actors (i.e. energy market etc)? 
 
5) Since 2000 how has the govt’s disposition re intervention in industry and 
role of the state - and changes to this outlook - evolution of OW in terms of 
nature, scale and geography? 
 
6) How has partnership working (OWIC, OWPB, OWA etc) shaped emergence 
and evolution in terms of nature and scale? Given the small number of large 
international actors, how was the risk of group-think been mitigated? Also 
Auction model? 
 
7) Any thoughts in regard to alignment to promote cost reduction and economic 
benefit in i) government (primarily UK but also EC and Scotland) and ii) 
between government, industry and research (refer to BVG report)?  
 
How do national institutions and strategies relate, understand and shape things 
happening in localities & regions. What do they make of sub-national geography 
of the industry and also the institutions and strategies connecting to, and 
emerging from, local and regional scales? 
 
 
 
PART C: Views on role of innovation (c 20m) 
 
8) Why do you think the UK performs well re publishing research papers on 
OW but registers few patents? (Is this due to the nature of the OW global 
industry? Incumbent corporates and related technologies? Issues of NIS / 
Triple Helix?)  
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9) How would you characterise UK innovation policy re OW e.g. in terms of 
objectives, timescales, actors, international interaction (what is your view on 
the contribution of ORE Catapult in the context of a NIS or a triple helix 
model)?  
 
10) What are implications of increasing emphasis on cost reduction for 
innovation policy? 
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Appendix G 
Codes for Collation of Primary Data  
 
Based on Analytical Framework 
1) Actors   
1.1 Regional actors and relationships  
1.2 Extra-regional actors and relationships  
1.3 Primary and auxiliary actors 
1.4 Strategic Priorities 
1.5 Nature of related agency (individual, collective, distributed)  
1.6 Strategic purpose; mindful deviation; happenstance 
2) The state (local/regional, devolved, state, supra)    
2.1 Strategic Priorities 
2.2 Arrangements and Partnerships  
2.3 Alignment / misalignment of scales, rationales & interventions 
3) Processes and Mechanisms 
3.1 Process of creation (phasing and related characteristics) 
3.2 Mechanisms (path creating, branching, others)  
3.3 Primary and auxiliary 
4) Regional Assets 
4.1 Technological, knowledge, scientific offering and relationship with demand 
4.2 Evidence of RIS / niche characteristics  
4.3 Skills and competences / Feedstock / human capital creation / skills supply 
4,4 Churn and retention 
4.5 Embedded networks, stickiness and alumni 
5) Institutions and their Configurations in enabling or constraining   
Incentivising; Co-ordinating; De-risking, Moulding, Legitimising agency   
5.1 Institutions (scales) in shaping nature and scale of market demand 
5.2 Institutions (scales) in shaping nature and scale of market supply  
5.3 Institutions shaping Technological Demand & innovation environment 
5.4 Technological Institutional Environment (RIS, niche, clusters, regime) 
280 
 
5.5 Institutional alignment /misalignment, co-ordination and flexibility   
6) Path interaction wider sector 
4.1 Influence of path on sector 
4.2 Influence of sector on path 
7) Nature of regional industrial path 
7.1 Characteristics 
8) Key causal moments 
 
Open coding classifications (examples) 
1) Taxonomies, definitional boundaries and narratives of path evolution 
 
2) Implications of physical geography of resource for path evolution (west coast / 
east coast, Crown Estate Rounds and maps etc) 
 
3) Spatial prescience / affiliation of path actors 
 
4) Counterfactuals of regional industrial path creation outcomes 
 
5) Previous expectations regarding path development 
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Appendix H 
Example of plotting Glasgow case temporal dynamics: key instances of actor 
agency; institutional developments; and technological change 
2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 2015 
SP est 
OW 
team 
Airtrcity 
locate 
SSE 
acquire 
Airt’city 
SSE and 
Strath Uni 
announce 
CEERE 
SSE 
Strategic 
Alliance 
with 
Mitsubishi 
SSE ‘HQ’ 
CEERE / 
create 
proc’ment 
alliance / 
procure 
tower manu 
Constructio
n of TIC 
(ITREZ) 
starts 
ORE 
Catapult 
est 
OREC 
locates 
ITREZ + 
merges 
with 
NAREC 
OREC 
takes 
ownership 
of 7MW 
turbine  
Iberdr’la 
acquire 
SP 
   Wood 
Group 
acquire 
stake in 
Sgurr  
Gamesa 
opens 
design 
office 
SP 
announce 
new 
corporate 
HQ in city 
centre 
Sgurr 
acquires 
Strath 
Control  
Atkins 
JV on 
floating 
wind  – 
acquire 
Princple 
Danish K2 
announces 
relocation 
from 
London 
    Mainstrm 
Renewabl
s locate in 
Glasgow 
Doosan B 
announce 
plan for 
manu 
facility 
Doosan  B / 
halts plan/ 
Gamesa 
scales back  
Nor. DNV 
open 
Scottish 
energy HQ 
  
    Atkins 
develop 
OW Team  
Xodus 
opens 
office 
 SSE, SP & 
Technip 
collaborat
e via TIC 
  
     “Economist” 
article + SR 
 Gamesa 
mothball’d 
  
2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 2015 
UK 
Energy 
Review 
EU 
targets  
gh gas 
UK 
Climate 
Change 
Act 
UNFCCC 
Copen / 
EU Renew 
Ener 
Directive 
binding tgt 
UK 
Coalition 
UK 
Renewable 
Energy 
Roadmap 
EC Blue 
Growth 
UK Energy 
Act 13 / 
LCF 
EC 
Energy 
W’ 
Paper 
non-
bind 
targets 
Cons Gov 
 UK 
Energy 
White 
P 
DECC 
created 
UK Low 
Carbon 
Transtn 
Pln 
Rd 3 for 
SP and 
SSE 
SNP 
majority 
Gov  
OW CRTF 
recommend
s + £100 
target  / 
OWPB est 
OWIS & 
OWIC 
(replaces 
OWDF) 
CfD 
intruced 
Rudd 
Reset 
Speech 
 SNP 
Gov 
Rd 2 
SP  
Duddon 
Sands 
Prefer’tial 
Roc band 
Treasury 
Infra Cost 
Review 
Scottish 
Routemap 
with 100% 
target 
(update of 
AP 2009) 
CORES est FIDer 
intruced 
Scottish 
Sites for 
Floating 
Wind 
Ass’t 
Chinese 
UK State 
Visit 
 Scot 
Gov 
Eco 
Stra’gy 
Rd 2 
Airtricit
builds  
G’ Gbrd 
Building 
Britain’s 
Future 
UK OW 
Developer
Forum est 
 GES 2 Scot Gov 
enhanced 
RO S 
Glasgo
w CR 
Deal 
GES 3 
 Rd 1 
SSE 
Beatric
e Dm 
live 
 Clim 
Chnge 
Scot Act + 
SR Actn 
Pln 
Scot Gov 
OW 
Routemap 
 SG 
Taskforce 
on 
Licencing 
Consenting 
Refreshed 
SG OW 
Route 
Map 
 Paris 
December 
   STW for 
SSE, SP 
and MR 
Chinese 
Visit / IPA 
Report 
     
   Marine 
Scot. est 
Glasgow 
Economic 
Comm’n 
     
   Scot OW 
Ind Grp est 
      
    OFGEM 
Project 
Transmit 
Launched 
  Project 
Transmit 
Position 
Statement 
Project 
Submit 
further 
Consult 
2016 
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2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 2015 
  SET 
Plan 
Statoil 
Hywind 
floating 
demo 
Siemens 
80% EU 
market 
Siemens 
100%UK 
purchases 
Vestas 
Sheerness 
dropped 
Dominanc
e of 4 
developer
s / Dong  
Siemns 
Mou 
March/ 
Revised 
Plan 
Sept 
Adwen 
(Gam & 
Areva) > 
Siemens 
     Siemens 
MOU 
March  
Samsung 
announce 
Fife 7MW 
MHI 
Vestas 
created 
MHI 
Vestas 
Blade 
Manu 
Isle of 
W 
Cuxhaven 
Siemens 
     2B Energy 
Ann’ for 
Fife 
MoU Areva  Samsun
g drops 
Areva, 
Gamesa 
and Mit 
formally 
drop Scot 
plans 
     Doosan B 
announce 
investment 
in turbines 
Doosan B 
stops 
 MHI 
8MW 
Prototyp 
(2016 
purchas
efor 
Blyth) 
 
Permision 
given for 
Hywind 
floating 
3MW 
Vestas 
(Barro’) 
- 2MW 
Vestas 
(Blyth 
2000) 
Siemns 
3.6 
MW 
deplyd 
Burbo 
Bk-  
buy 
Bonus  
   Gamesa 
progress 
turbine 
plans 
 Samsung 
7MW 
installed 
Fife 
SP East 
Anglia 1 
Consntd 
Siemns 
7MW 
Kincardine 
preparing 
appli for 
licence 
       Siemens 
6MW Gun 
Fleet 
Sands 
Demo 
 SSE 
Beatrice – 
Siemens 
7MW 
         EU market 
Siemns 
60% 
Adwen 
18% 
MHIV  
13% 
 
Blue shading - horizontal (energy) policy and regulatory environment 
Red shading - vertical (industrial) policy and regulatory environment 
Green shading - spatial policy and regulatory environment 
 
 
